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Semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs) have been established all 
over the world as a distinctive institutional model outside the traditional public 
service aimed at enhancing tax administration, and thereby raising tax 
revenues. In order to boost the robustness of their operations, substantial 
expenditures have gone towards modernising ARAs. Expenditures have 
been guided by medium-term corporate-wide plans, and the results 
monitored, assessed and reported using performance measures.  
Performance measurement has proved challenging for ARAs to implement 
and sustain in practice. Some of the challenges evolve around weak 
capacity, implementation costs, issues to do with quantification, competing 
demands from a wide range of constituents, the inappropriate selection of 
measures and a bias towards performance measures that focus on finances. 
As a means for enhancing performance measurement, there are practices, 
lessons and theoretical perspectives that can be discerned from the broad-
spectrum of literature on performance measurement in the public sector and 
ARAs from around the world. 
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This thesis explores how performance measurement in African ARAs can be 
more strategic, efficient and effective by ascertaining which key factors 
shape its adoption. The research focuses on the in depth study of three 
ARAs in Sub Saharan Africa, involving a combination of structured interviews 
with internal and external stakeholders, the administration of a survey 
instrument and review of ARA documents. The final chapters of the thesis 
deploy fuzzy set logic techniques to identify and test the significance of 
various causal conditions in the adoption of performance measurement in 
ARAs, as a plausible answer to the research question. 
Keywords 
Key performance indicators, revenue authorities, efficiency, effectiveness, 
strategic, case study. 
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1 Background and context  
1.1 The rationale for establishing specific agencies to 
administer tax revenues 
Enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of operations as well as 
broadening the tax base as a means for financing high priority public 
spending, remains one of the key goals in many countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) (Devas et al., 2001). Increased tax revenues also enable such 
countries to: “mitigate the adverse impact of volatility and uncertainty in aid 
flows” (Gupta and Tareq, 2008:2); and meet their debt obligations (Fjeldstad 
and Moore, 2008). To these ends, on the one hand, tax policies need to be 
promulgated which raise revenues and at the same time stimulate economic 
growth, encourage formalisation in the economy, and are simple, efficient 
equitable, and politically acceptable ((Bird, 2008); (Fjeldstad and Moore, 
2008)). On the other hand, a sound system for administering tax policies is 
needed which does not vary from policy objectives as variations “may distort 
the intended economic and trade policies and revenue yields” (Jenkins, 
1994: 75). Yet, according to Jenkins et al. (2000), tax administrations in 
most-low income developing countries have been plagued by corruption, 
inefficiency and a lack of transparency. It is claimed that “fiscal corruption 
solely from the revenue/tax side of the public budget generates a tax gap 
and reduced tax system neutrality and progressivity” (Mann, 2004: 43). 
In response to the problems above, since the 1990s, responsibility for the 
administration of tax laws and the collection of taxes in many Anglophone 
African countries has been assigned to semi-autonomous revenue 
authorities (ARAs) established by statute. An ARA is typically headed by a 
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Chief Executive Officer, who reports to a management Board consisting of 
up to 15 members from the public and private sectors (Kidd and Crandall, 
2006). The introduction of ARAs has been influenced by donor agencies and 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which plays a 
prominent role in “ensuring the fiscal health of governments in poor 
countries” (Fjeldstad, 2009: 11). According to the IMF, the experience of 
many countries is that such change, “is easier when the organization is 
relatively autonomous” (Silvani and Baer, 1997: 29). Moreover, the IMF’s 
take on ARAs is that they: 
“Can lead to better performance by removing impediments to effective 
and efficient management while maintaining appropriate accountability 
and transparency” (Crandall, 2010b: 1). 
Following their formation, substantial expenditure outlays have been made to 
transform ARAs. Investments are informed by a series of medium-term 
plans/programmes for each organisation covering periods of three to five 
years. It is noteworthy that reforms in ARAs cover a range of areas including: 
segmenting service provision to various groups of taxpayers (small, medium 
and large); simplifying tax procedures; introducing self-assessment; and 
reengineering and automating business processes ((Silvani and Baer, 1997); 
(Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008); (IMF, 2011)). For example, ARAs have taken 
advantage of technology to reengineer and automate their internal and 
external processes and systems with a view to enhancing efficiency of 
operations and voluntary compliance. Areas amenable to automation 
include: “(1) taxpayer records and tax collection; (2) internal management 
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and control over resources; (3) legal structure and procedures; and (4) 
systems to lower taxpayer compliance costs” (Bird and Zolt, 2008 : 15). The 
adoption of quality standards such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 9001:2008, are also commonplace – in this regard the 
work of Demuzere et al (2008) finds that high levels of organisational 
autonomy promote the use of quality management tools. So are techniques 
such as risk profiling, which aim to target high risk taxpayers (e.g. evaders or 
delinquent individuals and firms) for audits and investigations.  
The widespread establishment of ARAs is often associated with the new 
public management (NPM) doctrine. A common feature of NPM is 
‘corporatisation’ through for example the establishment of executive 
agencies ((Polidano, 2001); (Devas et al., 2001)). Executive agencies were 
originally set up in developed countries to undertake public service executive 
functions in terms of more efficiently managing costs and delivering services, 
within a policy and resources framework determined by their respective 
parent ministries (Talbot, 2004). ARAs in SSA countries constitute the 
product of corporatisation of customs and excise and income tax 
departments, which previously fell under each country’s Ministry of Finance. 
According to Chand and Moene (1999), ARAs have greater freedom to “raise 
salaries [and minimise corrupt practices], shed poor performers, hire better-
qualified staff, offer bonuses linked to revenue targets, and operate on a self-
financing basis” (Polidano, 2001: 48). They are also less encumbered by 
political interference ((Devas et al., 2001); (Fjeldstad, 2003)). For instance, 
the establishment of an ARA extricates “enforcement policy from the political 
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arena and [allows it to] operate according to its own professional standards” 
(Taliercio, 2004a: 217). 
ARAs in a number of SSA countries have to varying degrees adopted 
another feature of the NPM, performance management, to gauge progress in 
achieving the goals articulated in their strategic plans. The NPM approach 
“asserts that performance is more likely to be ensured when public agencies 
make a shift to meet objectives rather than follow rules” (McCourt, 2001: 
109). Under such a regime performance measurement is a key feature. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been 
a strong advocate for measuring performance in the public sector as a 
means for: (1) enhancing operations by monitoring results; (2); improving 
accountability to stakeholders; and (3) promoting fiscal restraint through the 
realisation of efficiencies (OECD, 1997). A recent study of ‘Tax 
Administration in OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries’ identified the 
increased use of performance measures to quantify levels of compliance, 
satisfaction with levels of services and taxpayers’ compliance burden. In 
addition, revenue administration bodies are progressively “setting targets that 
focus on the outcomes to be achieved and which are made public, and 
against which progress is reported in annual performance reports” (OECD, 
2009: 68). The IMF has drawn on the practices in revenue administration 
bodies in OECD countries to elaborate on how ARAs in developing countries 
can implement performance management systems at a strategic, operational 
and individual level (Crandall, 2010c). 
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1.2 Some trials and tribulations around performance 
measurement in ARAs 
Greiner (1996) suggests that public sector organisations (PSOs) face four 
obstacles in performance measurement. First, many PSOs lack ‘institutional 
readiness’ as: there has been no history of using performance measures in 
the public sector; some governments are not open and/or confident enough 
to report poor performance; and the right institutional incentives are not in 
place. Second, PSOs tend to be pragmatic in that they imitate each others’ 
practices. However, when they perceive that an initiative such as 
performance measurement is not used effectively, a PSO will avoid adopting 
it. Third, there are technical obstacles. For instance, in a public sector setting 
there is a multitude of data needed to cater for a wide-range of constituents. 
It is also difficult to make information available on a timely basis. Fourth, 
implementing performance measurement systems can be expensive. 
The same author suggests that some of the challenges described so far, are 
expected to be ameliorated as a result of research aimed at improving the 
performance measurement process and from technological developments. 
Furthermore, resource constraints and demands for value for money by 
citizens and civil society are likely to promote the use of performance 
measures by PSOs. 
In the context of ARAs, additional challenges persist. The literature on the 
performance of ARAs, particularly those in developing countries, indicates 
that they struggle with the issue of quantification. “Most administrations do 
not collect or analyse data that could permit specific conclusions to be 
drawn” (Kidd and Crandall, 2006: 42). This gap partly arises because 
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operational research capacity in ARAs is weak. Such capacity is needed to 
collect, organise, store, monitor, analyse and report on indicators of 
efficiency and effectiveness of various strategic initiatives (IMF, 2011). 
Even when an ARA does maintain performance data, they can be rather 
simplistic and/or are not always comprehensive and/or are overwhelming in 
terms of the available types of indicators that can be collected. With respect 
to simplicity, Serra (2005: 123) suggests that “lack of quantitative data (or 
knowledge) may tempt policy makers to employ” simple measures of 
performance – which in turn can encourage ARA staff to maximise scores at 
the expense of attaining institutional goals (James et al., 2006). What is 
more, assessing the effect of reforms in an ARA “on revenue itself…can be 
especially difficult, since they take time, are complex, and rarely lend 
themselves to experiment-type evaluation” (IMF, 2011: 19). It is also 
noteworthy that several ARAs in SSA are at various stages of 
implementation of balanced score card (BSC) measures which can be 
problematic. The BSC in a public sector setting may be an impediment as: 
there are multiple stakeholders with “differing agendas and requirements” 
(Mc Adam et al., 2005: 270); there is no single ‘bottom line’ (Cole and 
Parston, 2006: 44); and goals are often ambiguous (Johnsen, 2001).  
On the issue of comprehensiveness of performance measures, James et al. 
(2006: 9) consider that “tax performance, particularly, in developing 
countries, is ordinarily evaluated by the taxable capacity and tax effort”. In 
this regard, for instance, ARAs are held accountable to politicians and 
Ministries of Finance primarily on the basis of achieving revenue collection 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  7 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
targets (i.e. tax as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)). Yet an 
indicator such as tax as a percentage of GDP depends on factors which are 
outside an ARA’s control (e.g. the health and structure of the economy). 
Besides “a sole focus on this indicator is insufficient for adequately reflecting 
administrative performance” (Von Soest, 2007: 356) – this is especially so 
where a medium-strategy is in place with clear objectives and goals. This 
narrow scope might be explained by difficulties in identifying appropriate 
indicators which measure the extent of achievement of goals/objectives. 
According to the OECD (2009: 67): 
“Even countries that have been using this approach for over fifteen years 
continue to struggle with issues of measurement; this is especially the 
case for ‘outcomes’. A key challenge for all countries is obtaining good 
quality information which is valid, reliable, and timely”.  
Guidance on which performance indicators can be used by ARAs specifies 
an overwhelmingly large list of potential measures. Mann (2004) provides 
almost 200 possible input, process and output indicators. Furthermore, 
several of the indicators listed appear to be subjective (e.g. changes in tax 
laws that shift administrative costs from tax agency to taxpayers and/or vice-
versa) and/or difficult to measure (e.g. coordination of information flows with 
other external entities, especially the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, 
and the planning ministry). Besides, the same author does not appear to 
define the hierarchy or identify the linkages between the menu of indicators 
and outcomes. 
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It is also significant that ARAs in both developing and developed countries do 
not use a common set of definitions and measures. For instance: one 
measure of an ARA’s effectiveness is the degree of voluntary compliance; 
another is the extent to which an ARA meets its objectives; and yet another 
is its ability to fully apply fiscal policies (Klun, 2004). Whilst such disparities 
may reflect differences in initial conditions, they make benchmarking across 
ARAs problematic. Still according to a recent publication by the IMF (2011: 
19), some common measures that can be used to assess performance of an 
ARA include: “tax gaps, audit recovery rates and the level and pattern of 
arrears”. It is however noteworthy that all four measures have a financial 
orientation. Besides, there is a view that robust empirical studies do not form 
the basis for computing tax gaps (Therkildsen, 2004). 
Strategies and associated key performance indicators of an ARA are not 
necessarily congruent. For instance, as a means of achieving what is 
commonly gauged as the ultimate performance measure, increased revenue 
as a percentage of GDP, an ARA may choose to focus on extracting more 
taxes from registered taxpayers using coercive methods which can 
contribute to “public perceptions of unfair treatment in tax 
administration…[and reduced] taxpayer compliance” (Therkildsen, 2004: 73). 
Also, such an intervention may adversely affect economic growth, and is 
often implemented at the expense of broadening the tax base by “identifying, 
locating and registering new taxpayers [which] can be difficult”(Fjeldstad and 
Moore, 2008: 257).  
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1.3 Purpose of the research and its intended contribution 
Given the situation described above, this researcher considered that there 
was merit in further exploring the issue of performance measurement in 
ARAs. This thesis therefore explores how best to address the following 
question: ‘How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, 
efficient and effective?’ The strategic dimension investigates how ARAs 
identify, measure and manage “what matters in order to improve the 
effectiveness, efficiency and overall performance” of their organisations 
(Marr, 2009: 3). The efficiency dimension seeks to explore how ARA data for 
select indicators can be collected, maintained, analysed and reported at an 
affordable cost and in a timely manner. The effectiveness dimension aims to 
ascertain what issues ARAs take into account to ensure that measures as 
best as possible reflect the results being sought.  
The underlying theme of the research is to ascertain which key factors (or 
causal conditions) shape the adoption of performance measurement. It 
should be noted that adoption (particularly in this researcher’s analysis) is 
understood to mean the take up or pursuit of particular performance 
measures, tools and methods (Oxford Corpus, 2009). This definition includes 
how they are put into effect, implemented or used. On the basis of these 
definitions, the researcher investigated themes such as: (1) performance 
measurement practices; (2) reliability of performance measures; (3) 
processes/routines in place; (4) commonly used performance measures in 
ARAs; (5) priority performance measures from the point of view of internal 
and external stakeholders; (6) the effect that political, strategic, policy and 
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legislative, cultural, cost and other factors have on the adoption of 
performance measurement systems; and (7) steps that can be taken to 
enhance the performance measurement framework. 
The literature on ARAs suggests that they are similar to central banks in that 
“they generously borrow ideas and institutional technologies from one 
another” (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008: 235). According to the same authors, 
many developed and developing countries have implemented comparable 
reforms in the area of taxation. Therefore, this research has been enriched 
by drawing on international practices in performance measurement in ARAs. 
The research also identifies performance measures developed for universal 
application by both bilateral and unilateral institutions, and assess their utility 
among ARA staff.  
This author anticipates that this research will contribute to knowledge and 
management in several ways. First, the research will provide further insights 
as to the reasons why performance measurement has not received as much 
attention. Second, the thesis intends to promote greater levels of objectivity 
and reliability of performance measures by developing a comprehensive 
menu of metrics which can be used to assess an ARA’s accomplishments – 
as a result any existing performance measurement frameworks will be 
enhanced. Third, this researcher intends to propose processes for 
continuous data collection and analysis for management decision-making 
and evaluation purposes. Fourth, it is expected that the outputs from the 
research will contribute to operational research knowledge and practice in 
ARAs. Fifth, the adoption of the recommended performance measurement 
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framework by several ARAs in SSA will facilitate comparison of performance 
across various authorities. Sixth, this author’s research is expected to enable 
improved focus by ARAs by assisting them to set and monitor the right 
measures and achieve planned results cost effectively.  
1.4 Outline of the remainder of this thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is presented in ten chapters. Figure 1.1 
sketches the flow between chapters, including what analysis feeds into which 
research step.   
Chapter 2 outlines the research methodology, including the case for adopting 
a realist paradigm, and data collection and analysis methods used. Chapter 
3 presents the results of the review of the literature on performance 
measurement in a public sector environment and: informed the design of 
topic guides; assisted this researcher to identify possible causal conditions 
for the adoption of performance measures; and pinpoints gaps in the 
literature.  
Chapter 4 analyses the characteristics of performance measurement in tax 
administration in 9 Commonwealth countries and the United States of 
America (USA) which is English speaking and has strong ties with the United 
Kingdom (UK). The research drew on this chapter to: fill in some of the gaps 
detected during the broader literature review; further develop topic guides; 
identify additional causal conditions for the adoption of performance 
measures; and pinpoint commonly used and universal key performance 
indicators (KPIs) used in a survey questionnaire.  
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Chapter 5 presents internal and external stakeholders’ perspectives on 
performance measures and reports. It sets out the results of a quantitative 
survey and interviews, and in particular two sets of 12 priority KPIs selected 
by ARA internal and external stakeholders.  
Figure 1.1: The flow between chapters 
 
Source: This researcher 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 set out the results of the research in three revenue 
authorities covering the following areas: a history of performance 
measurement; current strategic goals and KPIs; service request KPIs in 
charter; performance measurement processes and routines; lessons learnt, 
challenges and areas for further consideration. Chapter 9 uses the evidence 
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from the research as well as theory to assess the factors that shape the 
adoption of performance measurement in the three ARAs.  
Chapter 10 seeks to identify dominant causal conditions that influence the 
adoption of performance measurement. Chapter 11 summarises the findings 
from the research, provides perspectives on this research’s possible 
contribution to knowledge and practice and offers some recommendations on 
areas for further research as well as measures that ARAs could take to 
enhance their performance measurement arrangements.  
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2 Research methodology 
2.1 The case for a ‘realist’ research paradigm 
Considering this author’s research question, and the themes she intends to 
explore, a critical realism paradigm (RP) appears amenable to her proposed 
work for several reasons. Her research topic involves the study of a complex 
social system involving ‘reflective people’ (Healy and Perry, 2000: 121). In 
this respect, critical realism recognises that social systems are open and 
evolving. Such systems are unlikely to achieve equilibrium in the same way 
that phenomena do in natural sciences (Sayer, 2000). Therefore, a critical 
realism paradigm not only explores what can be observed, “but also the 
world that lies behind appearances” (Chalmers, 1999: 226). This RP also 
supports the views that: (1) a wide range of research methods can be used; 
and (2) social science research can make theoretical generalisations based 
on a small sample using inferential techniques such as abduction and 
retroduction (Jakobsen, 2002). In addition, according to Robson (2002: 30) 
critical realism is “particularly appropriate for research in practice [including 
management and organisational analysis]”.  
In contrast, a positivist RP appears inappropriate for this author’s research, 
as it is restricted to phenomena that the researcher is able to observe, and 
measure and make deductions using mathematical and statistical models. 
Positivism also does not recognise values as a source of knowledge, 
focussing only on “regularities or constant conjunctions between events” with 
a view to formulating laws (Blaikie, 2007: 111). It is noteworthy that an 
interpretive RP totally rejects positivism’s quantitative orientation, advocating 
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that researchers should concentrate on the subjective meaning of behaviours 
observed. Interpretivism “calls for [research] methods [which are] radically 
different from, and foreign to those of natural science” (Lee, 1991: 347). 
Whilst critical realism recognises this feature of an interpretive approach, its 
proponents suggest that this RP offers room for “causal explanation” (Sayer, 
2000). 
In summary, in adopting a critical realism RP, given that the phenomenon to 
be studied is ‘real’ and can only be partially understood, this researcher 
expects her findings may probably be true as opposed to absolutely true in a 
positivist RP. In this regard, Pawson and Tilley (1997: 115) intimate that 
realistic driven evaluations at best deliver “a family of answers related by 
principles that emerge only over the course of much research”. 
2.2 Research methods selected 
The literature suggests that a case study methodology is ‘instrumental’ for 
garnering a broad understanding and insights around this author’s research 
topic (Stake, 1995). A case study methodology is also suitable where: (1) the 
research topic poses a how or why question (Yin, 2003); (2) underlying in-
depth questions seek to explore why certain issues or features are the way 
they are (Healy and Perry, 2000); (3) the question being addressed is in a 
‘natural’ context (Hancock, 2006); (4) the issue at hand has a social context 
with many ‘realities’; (5) the phenomenon (performance measurement) is 
process and relationship driven (Denscombe, 2007); and (6) the anticipated 
outputs are theoretical as opposed to statistical generalisations (De Vaus, 
2001). 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  16 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
In addition to the above, it is this author’s intention to use multiple case 
studies by developing intensive knowledge of three ARAs. According to 
Herriott and Firestone (1983) multiple-case designs enable evidence to be 
garnered which is generally assessed to be “more compelling, and the 
overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 2009: 53). 
This is especially the case when the researcher intends to draw theoretical 
generalisations (Denscombe, 2007). 
The three ARA cases were shortlisted based on the following criteria – it is: a 
member of the Commonwealth; the best in class in the adoption of a 
performance measurement framework (South Africa); the best revenue 
performer in East Africa1, but not a rigorous user of performance measures 
(Kenya); a pioneer in the use of a performance measurement system in East 
Africa (Tanzania); a member of the Africa Tax Administrators Forum (ATAF), 
which aims to “promote efficient, effective and economic tax administration” 
through various reforms including modernisation.2  Summary features of the 
modernisation initiatives in the three ARAs are presented in Table 2.1. In 
terms of the average level of revenues over the decade to 2008, South Africa 
not only led in terms of tax collections as a percentage of GDP, but also, 
recorded a growth in revenue collections of 3.4 percentage points. It is also 
noteworthy, that the South African Revenue Service (SARS) has over a 
period of years developed a far more comprehensive list of performance 
measures to monitor progress in implementing various reforms. However, 
the performance measures SARS uses to report performance have not 
                                                     
1 It collects the highest revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
2 See www.ataftax.net/  
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remained consistent. In comparison, it would appear that Kenya Revenue 
Authority (KRA) is a newcomer in the performance measurement arena. KRA 
specifies a number of performance measures in its most recent strategic plan 
that tend to comprise a mixture of input and output indicators. 
Table 2.1: Modernisation measures – recent and ongoing  
Reform measure  Kenya  South Africa  Tanzania  
Tax policy reform  9 9   9
Corporate planning and performance measurement 9 9   9
Business process reengineering/redesign  9 9   9
Automation through ICT  9 9   9
Strengthening enforcement  9 9   9
Enhancing risk management  9 9   9
Staff capacity building  9 9   9
Anti-corruption initiatives  9 9   9
Improving client services  9 9   9
Implementing quality management standards  9 9   9
Source: PwC, 2010  
The literature on case study design suggests that there are a variety of 
methodological options that can be employed. Yin (2003) prescribes a 
design comprising five parts: (1) framing the study question; (2) developing 
the question’s propositions; (3) specifying units of analysis; (4) logic linking of 
data to the propositions; and (5) developing and applying criteria to interpret 
findings. Dul and Hak (2008) specify: (1) theory-building research; and (2) 
practice-oriented research. The first methodology is similar to Yin’s (2003) 
approach. However, at the outset, although this researcher considered that 
independent variables such as culture, values, administrative structure and 
management tools could be significant, she could not discern the specifics of 
how they drive performance measurement. Yet, in theory-building research, 
some knowledge of the dependent and independent variables and their 
relationships are needed before a specific research objective can be coined. 
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Therefore, this author’s research is exploratory in that it seeks to investigate 
what factors influence the adoption of performance measures. Whilst the 
research anticipated that the literature review would offer a menu of causal 
factors, her objective was to draw on specific evidence from the three cases 
to discover the relevance of the factors offered in theory using “cross-case 
confirmatory analysis”, as a basis for drawing some generalisations and 
offering “signposts for future research” particularly in a wider group of ARAs 
(Gerring, 2007).  
For the reasons above, in this researcher’s view, practice-oriented research, 
with a descriptive orientation, seems the most viable option. The fact that the 
critical realism RP that this researcher identifies with is associated more with 
being descriptive as opposed to prescriptive, further strengthens the case for 
this type of practice-oriented research (Perry, 1998). Under this option (see 
Figure 2.1), the researcher has the opportunity to compare and contrast 
within the multiple cases performance measurement designs, 
implementation strategies and other findings from the research. The 
research methodology is therefore ‘comparative’ in its orientation and seeks 
to contribute to knowledge and management (Dul and Hak, 2008).  
It is, however, worth bearing in mind some of the criticisms of practice-
oriented research. In particular, there is a view that it does not sit comfortably 
in scientific research as it does not contribute to theory. There is also the 
argument that practice-oriented research is easier to carry out than a 
theoretically driven study. Still, authors such as Verschuren (2009: 61) 
postulate that practice-orientation offers the researcher the opportunity to 
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contribute to ‘context-bound’ knowledge as well as “better opportunities to 
theorize on new phenomena, as well as on all kinds of processes”. 
Figure 2.1: Descriptive practice-oriented research 
 
Source: Dul and Hak, 2008  
2.3 Theoretical framework to guide the study of performance 
measurement 
Whilst one of the salient features of a critical realism RP, are the inductive 
methods it offers, deduction is also considered to be a complementary 
technique in case study research (Jakobsen, 2002). To this end there is a 
school of thought that recommends that less experienced researchers should 
have some form of conceptual framework to guide them prior to embarking 
on their research. In this regard, for example, Miles and Hubberman (1994) 
advocate for tighter research designs which facilitate greater focus whereas 
when looser designs are applied all results may seem important. The same 
authors also acknowledge that researchers embark on their areas of study 
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In the context of the above, this author reviewed several performance 
measurement frameworks, with a view to singling out a preferred model to 
guide the initial stages of her research. These frameworks are expounded on 
in ascending order of preference as follows. First, techniques such as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), the free disposal hull (FDH) method and multi-
attribute utility (MAU)3 theory are increasingly used in the interpretation of 
multiple performance measures ((Greiner, 1996); (IMF, 1997); (Johnson et 
al., 2007)). Such techniques are influenced by the economics and/or 
engineering, and/or psychology doctrines. 
On further exploration, this author found that the application of DEA in Chile’s 
tax administration by Serra (2005) was limited to correlating a few 
productivity measures to the maximum feasible levels of tax revenue 
collection. A study by Moesen and Persoon (2002) of 289 tax offices in 
Belgium, uses DEA and FDH methods to establish the relationship between 
inputs (personnel) and outputs (audited returns). These studies do not seek 
to explain the underlying reasons for the selection of particular indicators and 
not others. They also appear to be biased towards efficiency as opposed to 
effectiveness aspects of performance measurement. 
Second, from a management doctrine perspective, Neely (2007) reviews six 
performance measurement frameworks that have evolved from the 1980s 
and 1990s: (1) performance measurement matrix; (2) strategic measurement 
                                                     
3 DEA is a non-parametric tool used to gauge productivity in an organisation when there are 
several criteria to be considered. FDH which is parametric, measures productivity by 
comparing efficiency under different scenarios (e.g. best against current practice). MAU has 
been used to develop performance measures – once a menu of possible performance 
measures is drawn up, each measure is evaluated against weighted criteria and a priority list 
of KPIs generated. 
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and reporting technique; (3) results-determinants; (4) cause and effect; (5) 
the balanced scorecard; and (6) the European Foundation for Quality 
Management’s ‘Excellence Model’. The author criticises all six techniques on 
the basis that they are not: hierarchical and integrated across functions; 
balanced in their perspective of the business; able to provide an overview of 
organisational performance; are generally not multi-dimensional; are not 
comprehensive; and are not able to link results to their determinants. Neely 
(2007) suggests a framework which he coins as the ‘performance prism’ that 
establishes that strategies, processes and capabilities are needed as well as 
their corresponding measures. The performance prism has been adopted in 
the UK’s National Health Service. However, in this researcher’s view, this 
methodology seems somewhat mechanical, in that it does not capture the 
softer aspects of performance measurement that she seeks to explore.  
Third, from a combination of strategy and management doctrines, this author 
is able to identify with the ‘public service value’ (PSV) approach created by 
Cole and Parston (2006). The methodology was especially created for public 
service organisations and essentially equates PSV as the sum of outcomes 
and cost effectiveness. This author considers that as each ARA has already 
identified specific building blocks the model illustrated in Figure 2.2, provides 
a useful conceptual framework for her research. However, she only plans to 
use this framework to an extent. There are tasks around establishing the 
cost-effectiveness of ‘filtered-metrics’ that go beyond her research question. 
The next chapter contains some proposals on which this framework might 
serve as a guide during the research. 
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Figure 2.2: The PSV model 
 
 Source: Cole and Parston, 2006  
2.4 A staged approach to data collection 
Data collection took place in stages. To begin with, this researcher took time 
to appreciate the general literature on performance measurement as 
reflected in the next chapter. To inform this literature review, this author 
relied on journal rankings in the Academic Journal Quality Guide, issued by 
the Association of Business Schools (ABS) in 2010. For a start, she reviewed 
relevant articles from two top journals, Public Administration Review and 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, that are rated as a 4 
– meaning that: (1) “they publish the most original and best evaluated 
research”; and (2) they have the “highest citation impact factors within their 
field”. Initial articles reviewed, provided some useful references to other 
articles, reports and books, which this author mined into. She also explored 
the publications of both eminent and emerging academics and practitioners 
in the field. In addition, to reviewing working papers, reports and books, she 
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published in journals that the ABS (2010) ranks as 3 or 2 – implying that they 
are “original and well executed” or “original and of an acceptable standard” 
respectively. 
The literature review offered a foundation for establishing the extent to which 
secondary data from 10 ARAs by way of documented plans, media releases, 
other statements of intent and accountability reports could be linked back to 
the broader literature and at the same time provide a basis for further 
enquiry. In addition to KRA, SARS and TRA, seven other ARAs were 
selected for this exercise on the basis that they are English speaking with 
strong ties with the UK (USA), and/or that their countries belong to the 
Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, Mauritius, New Zealand, Singapore, 
United Kingdom) “a voluntary association” that works towards the 
achievement of common goals.4 Furthermore, 9 out of the 10 ARAs are 
members of the Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA), 
which “helps member countries through training programmes, technical 
conferences and knowledge sharing to develop effective tax administrations 
that promote sustainable development and good governance over the long-
term”.5  This researcher therefore considered there would be merit in 
exploring the similarities and differences in performance measurement 
practices in these countries. She purposively selected ARAs to represent 
various continents, and countries taking on the basis of their levels of 
economic development. 
                                                     
4 See www.thecommonwealth.org   
5 See www.catatax.org  
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  24 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
The initial stages of work above enabled this researcher to refine her primary 
data collection instruments – a survey questionnaire, interview questions for 
internal stakeholders and a topic guide for external stakeholders (see Annex 
A). The questionnaire comprises close-ended questions, in which 
respondents were asked to rank the importance of performance measures 
using ordinal five-point Likert scales. On the contrary, the interview questions 
for both internal and external stakeholders were mostly open-ended 
questions. 
For each ARA, this researcher had the opportunity to interview a combination 
of the following stakeholders in Dar Es Salaam, Nairobi and Pretoria: (1) its 
executives (internal stakeholders) comprising senior management (at Chief 
Executive, Commissioner/Director level or their immediate reports); and (2) 
its external stakeholders (represented by academics, taxpayer associations, 
professional bodies, think tanks and tax professionals). Both sets of 
respondents were selected using two ‘non-probability sampling techniques’, 
namely purposive and snowballing sampling to select internal and external 
stakeholders respectively (Denscombe, 2007). In the case of ARA 
executives, as all the organisations’ departments are in principle, responsible 
for coining strategic plans (including its performance measures), she 
requested each institution to ensure that they were represented. With respect 
to external stakeholders, the researcher identified through internet sources 
and her past experience, a few institutions in each country for interview, and 
thereafter relied upon “a process of reference from one person to the next” 
(Denscombe, 2007: 17). 
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This researcher’s target number of respondents to be surveyed was a 
minimum of 45, made up of 15 executives from each ARA. A total of 51 ARA 
executives completed the survey questionnaire by requesting them to rank 
39 key performance indicators using five options on a likert scale (with 
1=very important (or strongly agree) and 5=not important at all (strongly 
disagree)). The survey instrument is at Annex A and draws on the KPIs 
identified in Chapter 4: Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.6. Thereafter ARA executives 
met with the researcher to justify their responses. These face-to-face 
interviews also provided a basis for validating the answers given. The 
researcher also met key ARA staff involved in corporate planning and the 
management of performance management systems to discuss areas such 
as: performance measurement practices; the reliability of performance 
measures; the demand for performance information; processes/routines; and 
enhancing the performance measurement framework. 
In addition to the above, the researcher also interviewed 17 external 
stakeholders in the three countries using a topic guide (at Annex A). The 
topic guide contains nine questions around: annual performance reporting by 
the ARA; preferred mediums for disseminating reports; priority performance 
information expected by external stakeholders; most valuable information 
reported by the ARA; effectiveness of annual reports’ presentation, structure, 
readability; the ways in which performance reports can be improved; 
accessibility of the ARA to follow up questions; and awareness of 
performance reporting arrangements in other ARAs. 
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2.5 Approach to data analysis  
The reader of this thesis document should take note that data analysis 
begins in the next chapter with a synthesis of the extensive literature on the 
conventional views around the foundations, limitations and gaps with respect 
to performance measurement. A subsequent chapter analyses the same 
issues with specific reference to ARAs. Chapters 5 to 8 of this thesis are 
based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of primary data collected 
from interviews and surveys of ARA representatives and their stakeholders 
as well as ARA documents.  
Chapter 5 analyses questionnaire responses from ARA executives in SPSS, 
and external stakeholders’ answers to questions in the topic guide, to 
establish priority performance measures. The chapter presents a mixture of 
frequencies and narratives. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 adopt a descriptive 
framework to develop country cases for South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya 
as a basis enabling the researcher to identify ‘causal links’ (Yin, 2009: 131). 
To enable comparisons to be made, each country case is documented using 
the same themes. The cases are built on the review of various ARA and 
government documents, media releases, outputs of research and interviews 
with ARA executives. Table 2.2 illustrates how the literature review 
influenced data collection and thereafter the development of each case 
study. 
Chapter 9 draws on the work of Ragin (2000: 7) to aid a “dialogue between 
ideas and evidence” using fuzzy-sets. A fuzzy-set is defined as “a ‘class’ (or 
set) with a continuum of grades of membership” (Zadeh, 1965: 339). 
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According to Zadeh, fuzzy sets provide a method by which to assign class 
membership where precisely defined criteria are absent. A lack of clear 
definitions is common in the study of socially constructed phenomena where 
most theory is verbal (descriptive) as opposed to mathematical, linkages 
tend to be causal and on the whole ‘asymmetric’ (one way), and 
memberships do not fall tidily into crisp sets (Ragin, 2008: 29, 97, 102). 
Table 2.2: The literature review and its bearing on the case studies 
Case study structure Covers Informed by  
History 9 Rationale for 
establishment 
9 Enabling legislation 
9 How has performance 
measurement changed 
over time  
9 Section 1.1, with ARA specific 
details in reports and documents 
9 Enabling legislation 
9 Literature on strategic planning 
(Sections 4.2 and 4.3) 
9 An analysis of the extent to which 
the 12 priority KPIs in Chapter 5 
were utilised over various strategic 
planning periods  
Current goals and KPIs 9 Latest strategic planning 
period 
9 Any lessons drawn from 
best in class 
organisations 
9 An analysis of the extent to which 
the 12 priority KPIs in Chapter 5 
have been adopted 
9 The rationale for any new goals 
and KPIs 
9 Topic guide and Sections 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6 and 4.7 
Service request KPIs in 
charter 
9 The use of service 
charters, mechanisms in 
place for reporting 




9 Section 4.3 (literature on charters) 
9 Section 3.6 (gaming as an 
inadvertent effect of performance 
measurement) 
Processes and routines 9 Framework in place and 
how it operates from 
strategic planning to 
performance reporting 
9 Topic guide which draws on 
Sections 3.3 (goal, KPI and target 
setting) , 3.4 (involvement of 
various stakeholders, capacity, 
resource availability) and 3.7 (any 
measures in place to avoid 
negative effects such as 
independent verification) 
Lessons learnt, challenges 
and areas for further 
consideration 








9 Identifies gaps in 
performance measures 
9 Topic guide which draws on 
Sections 3.5 (challenges around 
measuring performance) and 3.6 
(gaming as an inadvertent effect of 
performance measurement) 
9 Highlights any missing priority 
KPIs listed in Chapter 5 
 
Source: This researcher’s analysis 
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On the basis of the literature review, and data collected in Chapter 9 this 
researcher analysed eight factors that appear to influence the adoption of 
performance measurement to establish possible connections based on 
theory and the evidence provided from the research (Chapters 5 to 8). This 
type of analysis enabled the development of ‘set-theoretic connections’ using 
qualitative comparative analysis where there are “several different 
combinations of causal conditions” instead of ‘correlational connections’ 
(Ragin, 2008: 23). The benefit of a fuzzy set method is that it enables: 
“More systematic comparison and interpretation of rich qualitative case 
data. On the one hand the approach respects the distinctive value and 
insights achieved (only) from the in-depth study of a relatively small 
number of instances. But on the other hand it seeks to provide well-
founded and well-codified rules for considering how cases may be 
sorted into sets, and how these sets may be combined and 
characterized” (Dunleavy et al., 2006: 66). 
Chapter 9 assesses the impact of eight causal conditions (independent 
variables ଵܺ ݐ݋ ଼ܺ) on the outcome (dependent variable ܻ ) which is the 
adoption of performance measurement. The eight causal conditions are: (1) 
pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in setting performance 
measures; (2) good practices influence the choice of outcome KPIs ; (3) 
target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement; (4) policy and 
legislative requirements make a significant difference to the performance 
measurement regime; (5) the structure of the revenue base influences the 
choice of KPIs; (6) a performance culture has a bearing on the selection of 
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KPIs; (7) priority information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the 
choice of performance measures; and (8) data collection cost and quality are 
taken into account in selecting KPIs. Table 2.3 illustrates how these factors 
were determined during the research. 
Table 2.3: The eight causal conditions tied to findings 
Factor Findings  Reference
(1) Pragmatism is a dominant 
political economy driver in 
setting performance 
measures; 
9 Political economy influences are worthy further 
consideration, particularly how they affect the 
adoption of performance measures 
Section 
3.8 
(2) Good practices influence 
the choice of outcome KPIs 
9 It is important to identify key performance 




(3) Target setting is a chief 
feature of performance 
measurement 
9 Targets lead to public service improvement” and 
are therefore vital (Boyne and Chen, 2007: 14) 
Section 
3.3 
(4) Policy and legislative 
requirements make a 
significant difference to the 
performance measurement 
regime 
9 In 1998/99 following the promulgation of the 
Public Finance Act, and in line with the 
requirements set out in Section 40, SARS began 
to produce an annual report 
9 Section 26 (3) of the TRA Act requires the 
authority to submit a copy to the Minister of 
Finance within six months after each financial 
year end 
9 A GoK policy directive of 2004, instituted 
performance contracting in all public sector 




(5) The structure of the 
revenue base influences the 
choice of KPIs 
9 There is need for variety in KPIs as a means for 
taking into account different goals/services (De 
Bruijn, 2002) 
9 The legislative frameworks of ARAs in select 
countries indicates that their functions and 
associated capabilities are specified in the laws 
establishing them 









(6) A performance culture 
has a bearing on the 
selection of KPIs 
9 Performance information is utilised if the 




(7) Priority information 
demanded by external 
stakeholders impacts the 
choice of performance 
measures 
9 Measures seeking to ‘promote’ a PSO’s 
performance are likely to be of greatest interest to 
external stakeholders 
9 It is good practice to craft KPIs in collaboration 
with stakeholders  
9 Measures should be politically acceptable in that 
they can be trusted by stakeholders 




(8) Data collection cost and 
quality are taken into account 
in selecting KPIs 
9 Measures should be: “valid, reliable… sensitive to 
data collection costs,…focus on important” 
(Ammons, 2007: 5) 
Section 
3.3 
Source: This researcher’s analysis 
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The same chapter uses a mathematical framework developed by Zadeh 
(1965) to ‘calibrate’ set membership in each causal condition using values on 
a continuum between 0 and 1. This researcher therefore applied five value 
codes to define a fuzzy set for each factor (or concept) that shapes 
performance measurement. The five codes which define the extent to which 
each ARA fits within a set are: (1) fully in= 1; (2) more in than out= 0.75; (3) 
neither in nor out= 0.5; (4) more out than in= 0.25; and (5) fully out= 0 
(Ragin, 2000: 156). In assigning case membership to each set, the 
researcher developed and applied criteria on the basis of research findings 
and the relevant literature. 
Chapter 10 uses fuzzy algebra to analyse the sets identified in the Chapter 9. 
The analysis covers minimum and maximum membership scores. The 
chapter also analyses relationships between sets, and aims to establish the 
extent to which some causal conditions are subsets of others. The chapter 
also assesses various solutions, that is configurations of sets and 
combinations of configurations, to establish:  
‘Solution consistency’ –“the degree to which membership in each 
solution term is a subset of the outcome”; ‘solution coverage’ – “the 
proportion of memberships in the outcome that is explained by the 
complete solution”; ‘necessity’ – the condition(s) “must be present for 
an outcome to occur”; and ‘sufficiency’ – the condition “can produce a 
certain outcome” (Ragin et al., 2008: 42, 86). 
The analysis in Chapter 10 is informed by theories developed by Goertz 
(2006) and refined by Ragin (2008) on ‘necessary or sufficient conditions in 
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social science’, which quantitative techniques are not able to appraise. In 
particular, using mathematical concepts the following are analysed – whether 
there is: (1) fuzzy-set theoretic consistency of the causal condition (X) – 
expressed by the equation ሺ ௜ܺ ൑ ௜ܻሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ௜ܻሻሿ/∑ሺ ௜ܺሻ; (2) causal 
necessity – expressed by the equation ሺ ௜ܻ ൑ ௜ܺሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ௜ܻሻሿ/∑ሺ ௜ܻሻ; (3) 
set-theoretic coverage of the outcome (Y) by the causal condition (X) – 
expressed by the equation ሺ ௜ܺ ൑ ௜ܻሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ௜ܻሻሿ/∑ሺ ௜ܻሻ; (4) set-
theoretical coverage of the causal condition (X) by the outcome (Y) - 
expressed by the equation ሺ ௜ܻ ൑ ௜ܺሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ௜ܻሻሿ/∑ሺ ௜ܺሻ; (5) partitioning 
coverage (Ragin, 2008: 52, 53, 57, 61); and (6) truth tables which test all 
possible combinations of causal conditions (k) expressed as 2௞. 
In undertaking the analysis above, this researcher used fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) software which is freely available at the 
University of Arizona’s website.6 This researcher also benefited from a user 
guide on fsQCA to analyse the data generated in Chapter 9 to establish: 
necessity; sufficiency; consistency; and coverage (Ragin et al., 2008).  
It could be argued that fsQCA was an inappropriate tool considering the 
small number of cases used. Then again, the literature reviewed suggests 
that the solutions generated by fsQCA are plausible. What is more a larger 
number of cases may not necessarily have led to different results as 
“naturally occurring data are profoundly limited in their diversity…especially 
when the number of conditions is more than a few” (Ragin, 2008: 207). 
Nonetheless this researcher anticipates that these arguments can be tested 
                                                     
6 http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml [Accessed 11 April 2012]. 
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by extending this research to cover at least another 10 ARAs. The fuzzy-set 
membership sets developed as part of this research, together with fsQCA 
provide a sound basis for taking such research forward. 
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3 A select review of the literature on 
performance measurement in a 
public sector environment 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents this author’s understanding and reflections on 
particular aspects of the existing literature on performance measurement. 
Given that the management of performance has prevailed for at least three 
centuries, efforts have been necessarily focused on the dimensions of 
performance measurement, and associated issues that are relevant to her 
research. In particular, this author sought to widen her knowledge base by: 
establishing the ideas that others have worked on; ensuring that she has the 
breadth and depth of intellectual insights in readiness for data collection; and 
determining the performance measurement issues that arise in the public 
sector. The chapter offers perspectives on: why performance measurement 
matters; the mechanics of performance measurement, monitoring and 
reporting; and which factors influence the use of performance information. 
The chapter then presents an analysis of the challenges and inadvertent 
effects of performance measurement. The concluding sections of this 
chapter highlight recommended actions for strengthening performance 
measurement, and the gaps in the literature, which seem amenable to this 
research. 
3.2 Why performance measurement matters 
The history of performance measurement, dates back to the eighteenth 
century when according to Scott (1998: 15), statistics on state forestry 
production were collected in Germany with a view to estimating “inventory, 
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growth and yield”. In the early 1900s, performance measurement was 
influenced by: the social survey methodology developed by the British 
philanthropist, Charles Booth; the practice of collecting statistics; the 
revamping of accounting methods in the United States; developments in 
scientific management; and so forth (Williams, 2003). In addition, Taylor’s 
scientific management methods, particularly the setting of output quotas, 
were adopted by the former Soviet Union. “Quantitative target systems were 
also used in Britain for the management of munitions and other war 
production in the 20th-century world wars” (Hood, 2007: 98).  
The subsequent use of performance measurement in the twentieth century is 
estimated to have spanned until the 1940s. The next epoch straddling from 
the 1950s to the 1970s, was motivated by high levels of debt and 
government employment in the United States of America (USA) (Van Dooren 
et al., 2010). A Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch 
(Hoover Commission) was appointed to establish ways in which government 
could be rationalised. One of the Commission’s recommendations was that 
“attention should shift away from government inputs…[to] outputs – its 
accomplishments, activities and other related costs” (GAO, 1997: 30). It is on 
the basis of this recommendation that the governments in the USA and later 
elsewhere, attempted to implement performance measurement through 
initiatives such as management by objectives, programme budgeting and 
zero based budgeting. 
The current era of performance measurement can be traced back to the 
1980s when there was a global economic recession. Again, governments in 
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countries such as Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom (UK) were 
faced with high and unsustainable expenditures which needed to be 
reduced. As a result, the new public management (NPM) doctrine emerged. 
One of NPM’s components was “explicit standards and measures of 
performance” – in other words clear goals, targets and indicators “preferably 
expressed in quantitative terms” (Hood, 1991: 4). Since then, performance 
measurement systems have been adopted by many governments around the 
world, as they are perceived to facilitate in the delivery of the ‘right promises’ 
including attaining value for money, and enabling “citizens to see and 
understand the results of government” programmes (Ingraham, 2005: 391). 
The growth of performance measurement systems has also been aided by 
advances in information and communication technology ((Hood et al., 2009); 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004)). 
In contemporary times, performance measurement in the public sector is 
amenable to many uses. Van Dooren et al. (2010) list 44 uses of 
performance information – for example, such information can facilitate 
accountability to legislators and citizens, and guide a public sector 
organisation (PSO) in setting programme priorities, the allocation of 
resources, enhancing its responsiveness to clients, in reporting and 
monitoring activities etc. In addition, a survey of representatives of local 
governments in North America reports that performance measures are used 
to support six key managerial processes: (1) planning and management; (2) 
operations management; (3) budgeting; (4) procurement; (5) personnel 
evaluation; and (6) monitoring and evaluation (Kinney and Ruggini, 2008). 
Moreover, in the UK, performance measures have been applied “to foster or 
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generate pseudo-competition, for example, where purchasers in health care 
buy care from providers” (Propper and Wilson, 2003: 4). 
Similarly, Behn (2003) identifies eight purposes that public managers have 
for performance measures (see Table 3.1), but at the same time, pinpoints 
the need to improve performance as the single most important use. In 
contrast, according to the same author, measures seeking to ‘promote’ a 
PSO’s performance are likely to be of greatest interest to external 
stakeholders. To enable external stakeholders to judge a PSO’s 
performance, the same measures from similar organisations are useful 
comparators. Benchmarking/comparing measures with similar organisations 
also offers an opportunity for a PSO to learn about its strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Table 3.1: Eight purposes that public managers have for measuring performance 
The 
purpose 
The public manager’s question that the 
performance measure can help to answer 
Characteristics of performance 
measures 
Evaluate How well is my public agency performing? Outcomes, combined with inputs and with 
the effects of exogenous factors 
Control How can I ensure that my subordinates are 
doing the right thing? 
Inputs that can be regulated 
Budget On what programs, people or projects should 
my agency spend the public’s money? 
Efficiency measures (specifically 
outcomes or outputs divided by inputs) 
Motivate How can I motivate line staff, middle 
managers, non-profit and for-profit 
collaborators, stakeholders, and citizens to do 
the things necessary to improve performance?  
Almost-real time outputs compared with 
product targets 
Promote How can I convince political superiors, 
legislators, stakeholders, journalists, and 
citizens that my agency is doing a good job? 
Easily understood aspects of performance 
about which citizens really care 
Celebrate What accomplishments are worthy of the 
important organizational ritual of celebrating 
success?  
Periodic and significant performance 
targets that, when achieved provide 
people with a real sense of personal and 
collective accomplishment 
Learn Why is what working or not working? Disaggregated data that can reveal 
deviances from the expected 
Improve What exactly should who do differently to 
improve performance? 
Inside-the-black box relationships that 
connect changes in operations to changes 
in outputs and outcomes 
Source: Behn, 2003: 588 and 593  
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It would seem that in sum, performance measures serve three key goals. 
First, they are utilised to ensure accountability by a PSO, particularly when it 
is granted autonomy (De Bruijn, 2002). Second, they play an important role 
in ensuring equity (Smith, 1995). Third, performance measures are applied to 
manage, assess and improve services (Behn, 2003). However, there can be 
complexities around adopting measures which meet all goals. A single focus 
on measures of productivity (or output expressed as a ratio of input), may be 
sufficient in meeting accountability requirements demanded by politicians 
and citizens, but are unlikely to offer limited or no “managerial or policy 
value” (Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008: 308). It is therefore preferable to use 
measures of efficiency and effectiveness (or outcomes) which respond to 
both goals ((Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008); (Bromberg, 2009); (De Bruijn, 
2002)). 
3.3 Ways in which performance is measured, monitored and 
reported 
In deciding what aspects of performance to measure, an organisation needs 
to set a context for the type of data to be collected and information to be 
generated (Theurer, 1998). In this regard, PSOs are guided by various 
techniques including: management models (e.g. the European Foundation 
for Quality Management’s Excellence Model); trees of objectives (e.g. 
developed through a strategic planning process); an analysis of stakeholders 
to identify their concerns; programme logic; programme theory; and so forth 
(Van Dooren et al., 2010). However, irrespective of which technique is used, 
Johnston and Pongatichat (2008: 943) draw on the literature to offer the 
perspective that measures developed “need to be derived from, and support, 
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an organisation’s strategic intent”. Moreover, performance measures should 
ideally be realigned to take into account any changes in strategy. 
As part of the process of mapping a strategy, conventional knowledge 
suggests that a PSO should clearly articulate its mission or what it seeks to 
accomplish. Thereafter, the organisation “needs to determine what key 
failure is keeping it from achieving its mission: What is our most 
consequential performance deficit?” (Behn, 2006: 9). According to Behn, this 
question is best addressed by identifying gaps in service delivery (and 
associated inputs, processes and outputs), that need to be closed in order to 
contribute to the achievement of outcomes/goals/objectives. For example, 
gaps may evolve around one or more of the following: insufficient inputs (e.g. 
staff or equipment); inefficiencies such as a low level of outputs produced 
relative to resources consumed or cumbersome processes; and 
ineffectiveness (in terms of minimal impact, poor quality, client dissatisfaction 
etc). 
Once an organisation’s leadership has identified a set of gaps to be 
eliminated, it should also identify how it will realise improvements in the long-
term. This intent is typically articulated in vision and outcome statements, 
which inform that particular strategies and interventions to be implemented 
(Marr, 2009). Thereafter, it is important to identify key performance indicators 
(KPIs) and associated targets to be achieved (Behn, 2006). Kendrick (2011: 
63) suggests that KPIs are needed at outcome, output, process and input 
levels to ensure that there is ‘vertical balance’. Furthermore, KPIs should be 
horizontally balanced to enable them to be “viewed in a set” that tells a story. 
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It is also good practice to craft KPIs in collaboration with stakeholders 
(UNDP, 2002). In addition, such measures should be: “valid, reliable, 
understandable, timely, resistant to undesired behaviour, sensitive to data 
collection costs,…focus on important facets of performance” (Ammons, 
2007: 5); tend towards being objective rather than subjective – as objective 
measures are “impartial, independent, and detached from the unit of 
analysis” (Andrews et al., 2006: 16); and politically acceptable in that they 
can be trusted by stakeholders (Lu, 2008).  
Empirical evidence points to the fact that “targets lead to public service 
improvement” and are therefore vital (Boyne and Chen, 2007: 14). To assess 
whether targets have been met, baseline and trend data for each measure 
are collected through a variety of methods such as mining existing data 
repositories, surveys, expert panels, key informant interviews, and extraction 
from other data sources. “The essential points are that data should be 
collected and used close to the source and that data collection be cost-
effective and reliable” (World Bank, 1996: 24). Moreover, to ensure that data 
collected are reliable, PSOs should have: (1) a collection plan in place, which 
facilitates replication by others; and (2) procedures guiding the maintenance 
of records which are regularly validated to ensure compliance (Kendrick, 
2011).  
To ensure accountability, PSOs should as a matter of course, report actual 
performance against targets through various media. An annual report is one 
medium of dissemination. The publication of league tables with composite 
scores, which rank performance across countries and between similar PSOs, 
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is commonly used by institutions and in countries such as the World Bank 
and UK respectively. In the UK’s education system, for instance, league 
tables serve to incentivise “schools to improve their students’ educational 
attainment and to provide information on individual school performance to 
inform parental choice” (Propper and Wilson, 2003: 10). Another mode for 
broadcasting results is a PSO’s website. In North America Washington state 
provides “an extensive real-time performance measurement dashboard on 
the internet”, whereas other institutions use “similar if less extensive, Web-
based approaches” (Kinney and Ruggini, 2008: 17).  
Published performance results offer a rational basis for giving accolades to 
or shaming PSOs, awarding bonuses, renewing public managers’ contracts, 
apportioning more financial resources to high performing institutions and 
“granting of ‘earned autonomy’ (from detailed inspection and oversight) to 
high performers” (Bevan and Hood, 2005: 6). Furthermore, for a performance 
measurement system to be effective, it is also vital that a PSO’s leadership 
regularly monitors results in order “to verify that people are pursuing their 
targets in ways that do, indeed, further the mission”, and reallocate 
resources, and/or make modifications to the mission, measures, processes 
and targets as necessary (Behn, 2006: 18). Smith (1995: 279-280) describes 
this cycle as “managerial cybernetics” – “the notion of feedback as serviced 
by the system of” KPIs. 
3.4 Factors that influence the uptake of performance 
management systems 
Whilst the previous sections provide the case for measuring performance, 
and offer a flavor of the range of potential uses and benefits of performance 
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measurement information, organisations do not automatically embrace the 
tools and techniques available. Theories on this subject suggest that various 
factors influence the design and operationalisation of performance 
measurement systems. On the one hand, political scientists breakdown the 
utilisation of performance information into two stages: (1) adoption 
(developing measures – coined as ‘symbiotic action’); and (2) 
implementation (using measures) (De Lancer Julnes and Holzer, 2001). 
According to the same authors, these two stages are biased by a 
rational/technocratic and/or political/cultural perspective. The former position 
is underpinned by one or more of the following: managers need to be 
rational; resource availability; organisational capacity/know how; and any 
legal or other requirements. The latter standpoint is reinforced by one or 
more features such as: whether internal interest groups perceive any benefit 
from using performance information or have been involved in developing the 
same; the influence of external interest groups and unions; and/or if the 
organisation embeds a risk taking culture that rewards innovation. An 
empirical study by De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) found that from a 
rational/technocratic angle, internal leadership and a goal orientation, only 
promote the adoption of KPIs; whereas, implementation requires resource 
availability as well as the requisite capacity. Furthermore, from a 
political/cultural outlook although upfront ‘internal political activities’ led by an 
organisation’s management, promote the adoption of KPIs, to facilitate 
implementation, this effort must be reinforced by external interest groups and 
unions.  
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On the other hand, management scholars suggest issues around people, the 
organisational context and the external environment, have a bearing on the 
application of performance information. If one examines the specifics around 
these factors, there are similarities with the political science view. Ammons 
and Rivenbark (2008) assert that top management support, interest by 
politicians, participation by citizens in the development and collection of 
performance measures and their integration into key management systems 
(e.g. strategic plans, work plans and budgets) as key factors. A study by 
Moynihan and Pandey (2010), that seeks to explain the factors which 
influence management’s use of performance information, identifies the four 
key dynamics and underlying hypothesis as shown in Table 3.2. The same 
authors test these hypotheses using data from a survey of senior managers 
in local governments in the USA. Their findings are that the use of 
performance information is high: (1) when there are high levels of altruism in 
public service (ܪ௣1); (2) among specialised managers vis-à-vis generalist 
ones (ܪ௣4); (3) when such information is available and tied to management 
systems (ܪ௣5); (4) if the organisational culture is ‘open, innovative, and risk-
taking’ (ܪ௣6); and (5) when managers have flexibility to make decisions 
(ܪ௣7).  
Table 3.2: Factors influencing the adoption of performance management systems: 
Key dynamics and associated hypothesis 
Dynamic Hypothesis (ܪ௣) 
Public service 
motivation (PSM) 
ܪ௣1: Managers with higher levels of Public Service Motivation (PSM) are more 
likely to use performance information 
Job attributes ܪ݌2: Managers who perceive a link between extrinsic rewards and 
performance are more likely to use performance information 
ܪ݌3: Task-specific leaders are more likely to use performance information than 
generalist leaders 
ܪ݌4: Managers with greater task-specific experience are more likely to use 
performance information. 
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Dynamic Hypothesis (ܪ௣) 
Organizational 
factors 
ܪ݌5: Managers who perceive performance information is available and tied to 
management systems are more likely to use it  
ܪ௣6: A developmental organizational culture fosters performance information 
use  
ܪ݌7: Managers who perceive decision flexibility are more likely to use 
performance information 
ܪ݌8: The willingness of budget staff to adopt an adversarial stance affects 
performance information use 
External factors ܪ௣9: Perceptions of citizen participation affects performance information use 
ܪ݌10: Managers influenced by professional organizations are more likely to 
use performance information 
Source: Moynihan and Pandey, 2010: 5-9  
3.5 The challenges around measuring performance 
There are at least seven key challenges around measuring performance. 
First, it appears that in many PSOs, performance measures do not line-up 
with strategy. Specifically, when strategy is revamped to accommodate 
changes in the internal and external environments, performance measures 
remain the same as their “alignment requires management attention, time, 
effort and commitment” which may not be readily at hand (Johnston and 
Pongatichat, 2008: 946). Furthermore, following case study research in 
Thailand, the same authors found that this disconnect can also be explained 
by: (1) the fact that some of the activities as well as objectives contained in 
operational plans had no link with strategy; (2) various performance 
measures contained in strategy documents were specified to demonstrate 
that agencies were trying to meet stakeholder expectations around 
modernising government; (3) a view that long-term objectives were more 
difficult to measure and less easy to control than milestones and 
intermediate outcomes planned for the short term. Smith (1993), De Bruijn 
(2002) and Boyne (2010b) concur with the latter perspective. 
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Second, PSOs sometimes introduce performance measurement systems to 
serve ‘minimalist’ purposes such as a public relations instrument and/or to 
report on outputs. Such a system has limited utility in enabling an 
organisation to monitor and manage “service efficiency, quality and 
effectiveness or outcomes” (Ammons, 2010: 64). Third, there are various 
levels of outcomes – in particular: (1) intermediate outcomes, which a PSO 
has some control over; and (2) ultimate or societal outcomes, which demand 
active participation by communities. According to Kloby and Callahan (2009: 
20) societal outcome measures around “economic vitality, a healthy and 
clean environment,..safe communities” and so on can inform public 
managers about any service enhancements required. However, the same 
authors are of the view that frequently “performance measures are designed 
to capture agency or program performance with an emphasis on determining 
outputs and efficiencies” (Kloby and Callahan, 2009: 20). 
Fourth, even when a PSO directs its efforts around monitoring outputs and 
realising efficiencies, the methodologies used to set associated targets can 
be flawed. For example, it is difficult to set a target for a new performance 
measure until its characteristics (e.g. baseline value at a particular point in 
time) are appreciated. Furthermore, setting an ‘extreme value target’ (e.g. no 
client will wait for more than 1 hour to be served), implies that when just a 
single client spends more than an hour “the target is foregone, and thereafter 
irrelevant” (Bird et al., 2005: 9).  
Fifth, once a PSO aptly sets appropriate target measures for inputs, 
processes and outputs, it still has to contend with the issue of outcome 
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attribution. It is argued that such performance measures cannot 
unequivocally explain a desired performance improvement. There is also the 
unanswered question that persists around the counterfactual – it is not clear 
“what would have happened without many public interventions” (Talbot, 
2005: 503).  
Sixth, question marks lurk around the validity and reliability of some 
performance measures used by PSOs. In the case of composite measures, 
Hood (2007) identifies four potential factors that contribute to performance 
measurement errors as follows: (1) simple mistakes (‘clerical error’); (2) 
sampling errors; (3) incorrect categorisation; and (4) gaming (see next 
section). It is noteworthy that all these errors are typical examples of human 
error or manipulation – “a major source of performance data error” (Talbot, 
2010: 41).  
Seventh is the issue of whether there is sufficient demand for performance 
information, particularly, by both PSO staff and external stakeholders. One of 
four Ps coined by Moynihan (2009) to classify information use, is a scenario 
where a PSO’s staff are ‘passive’ in that they publish and disseminate 
results, but make no use of them: due to the necessary incentives being 
absent; or because no sanctions are enforced for non-compliance. Also, a 
lack of interest in, and/or, capability to interpret performance information by 
members of the public was observed in local governments in the UK. When 
the public is invited to formally meet and discuss performance, “there is a risk 
that such meetings are dominated by unrepresentative pressure groups” 
(Pidd, 2005: 487). Besides, according to Smith (1993: 138), an individual 
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elector would need to be able to grasp the varying dynamics of PSOs (e.g. 
objectives, their environments, accounting practices and levels of efficiency), 
which is a “formidable task if he or she is to develop a good understanding of 
performance”. 
3.6 The inadvertent effects of performance measurement  
Besides the challenges presented above, performance measurement is 
associated with a number of adverse impacts. Smith (1995: 283) depicts 
eight ‘unintended behavioural consequences’ that can arise from the 
dissemination and use of performance information namely: “(1) tunnel vision; 
(2) sub optimization; (3) myopia; (4) measure fixation; (5) misrepresentation; 
(6) misinterpretation; (7) gaming; and (8) ossification”. The author indicates 
that tunnel vision occurs when a PSO focuses on a limited number 
quantifiable performance measures and ignores qualitative dimensions. Sub 
optimization occurs when a government’s high level objectives are out of 
synch with those of a PSO with devolved responsibilities. Myopia is 
associated with the quest for “short-term targets at the expense of legitimate 
long term objectives” (Smith, 1995: 288). Measure fixation involves devising 
ways to enhance a reported performance measure so that a PSO appears to 
be meeting targets. Misrepresentation arises when data are intentionally 
altered either through ‘creative reporting’ or ‘fraud’. Misinterpretation takes 
place when a public organisation rationalises performance results and makes 
the wrong policy choices or analyses them to their benefit. Gaming entails 
public managers ensuring that the possibility of enhanced productivity in 
future years is minimised. Ossification results when public managers fail to 
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alter the performance measurement system to accommodate changes in the 
environment. 
Studies on performance measurement in the public sector confirm that 
almost all of the eight unintended consequences above are common. For 
example, myopia has a political economy angle associated with it. In a quest 
to demonstrate the results of service improvement initiatives, political 
leadership often embraces performance measurement as a means to show 
case successes and value for money. Yet, political parties in modern times 
do not serve for long enough to associate themselves with outcomes and 
impacts ((Propper and Wilson, 2003); (Talbot, 2005)). And neither do public 
servants. This might explain the preference for short-term results by both 
groups.  
In addition to the above, the possible causes for the occurrence of two other 
phenomena have been observed in practice. Ranking PSOs using league 
tables and composite measures is intended to “organize and simplify data” to 
enable users to interpret, track and compare results (Talbot, 2010: 43). 
However, league tables and composite measures seem to promote tunnel 
vision and measure fixation. For instance, Propper and Wilson (2003) refer to 
the analysis of the consequences of school ranking systems in the UK and 
USA, by Wiggins and Tymms (2002), Deere and Strayer (2001) and Jacob 
(2002), which led service providers to change aspects of processes (e.g. 
narrowing the curriculum or a focus on particular tests), as a means for 
enhancing scores. In the case of England, the amount of time allocated to 
“subjects such as music, [Physical Education] PE and technology [had] been 
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reduced, and this may have long-term negative consequences, for example 
in respect of health and employability” (Wiggins and Tymms, 2002: 45). 
Although it is argued that by having many targets, a PSO minimises the 
unintended effects of performance measurement, such as tunnel vision and 
myopia, the chances are that a range of measures widen the scope for 
information overload. Information overload can contribute to misinterpretation 
as “users of the information can no longer see the wood for the trees” (Van 
Dooren et al., 2010: 160). The same authors deem that the generation of 
large volumes of performance information can be a deliberate ploy on the 
part of a PSO as it easily enables a PSO to increase its prospects of 
achieving some targeted results. However, many measures contribute to 
difficulties in ranking and weighing such achievements (Boyne and Chen, 
2007). It is also the case that a single KPI is also open to different and 
inconsistent interpretations. Furthermore, to ensure that reported 
performance is positive, public servants may be tempted to “interpret 
definitions in a way that is most favourable to the agency” (Franceschini et 
al., 2007: 196).  
Smith (1993) is of the opinion that misrepresentation can occur in specialised 
fields such as medicine in which doctors have significant freedom to take 
certain decisions. The author refers to the work of Bardsley et al. (1987), who 
suggest that doctors may allocate patients to specific ‘diagnosis-related 
groups’ with a view to amplifying workload. De Bruijn (2007: 18) offers a 
more perverse example from the Dutch Prosecution Service, which was 
tasked to reduce the number of cases prosecuted leading to one of its 
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officers deleting “a large number of offences from the computer at the police 
station”. In return for this ‘decrease’, the service received a financial award 
from the responsible Minister.  
There are three types of distortions associated with gaming: (1) the ratchet 
effect which takes place when public managers try to keep performance 
targets from being raised; (2) the threshold effect where an institution has no 
incentive for surpassing targets; and (3) output distortions which arise when 
an institution only focuses on the initiatives which offer incentives (Bevan and 
Hood, 2005). According to the same authors, gaming is most likely to be 
practiced by a small percentage of ‘reactive gamers’ and ‘rational maniacs’. 
Reactive gamers somewhat buy-into the targets set, but will manipulate 
results when they have an opportunity or a cause to do so; where as rational 
maniacs are not committed to targets, and direct efforts to covering up their 
activities. 
The practice of gaming can be traced back to the former Soviet Union where 
the key indicator used to gauge success and subsequently award bonuses, 
was fully executing plans which were largely quantitative. This arrangement 
promoted the ratchet effect. Managers avoided surpassing planned targets 
by “too wide a margin, for fear of… [an] upward adjustment in the year 
following”, and therefore penalising honesty and rewarding deception (Nove, 
1958: 4).  
In more recent times, Propper and Wilson (2003) identify a number of 
‘creaming strategies’ used by schools to eliminate weak students, such as 
preventing them from sitting examinations or complicating their admissions 
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processes – in other words gaming by output distortions. Another real life 
example of gaming by way of output distortions was observed in National 
Health Service (NHS) Trusts in the UK. The motivation for gaming may have 
been driven by the quest to obtain favourable rankings on the star rating 
system which categorised trusts using a scale of 0 (poor performer in 
meeting targets) to 3 (high performer) on the basis of their ability to meet 
targets in a number of performance areas. So for example, patient focussed 
performance measures included “waiting times for inpatient treatment, 
outpatient appointments, casualty and cancer treatment, delayed discharge, 
cancelled operations and patient experience of care” (Mannion et al., 2005: 
19). 
Following a directive that inpatients would not wait for more than six months 
to be treated, the National Audit Office (NAO) (2001: 1) reported that “nine 
NHS trusts inappropriately adjusted their waiting lists, …affecting nearly 
6,000 patient records” by for instance deleting and/or deliberately taking 
more time to add names to lists. Bevan and Hood (2005) argue that this sort 
of gaming arises as a result of an invalid assumption that a priority set of 
good measures and targets, as well as imperfect measures, are sufficiently 
representative of the whole (‘synecdoche’). However, this assumption 
ignores measures and targets which are considered less important, or those 
that do not have any useable data available. These latter measures can offer 
vital indicators which are not taken into consideration when assessing overall 
performance. In the case of the star rating system in the UK, for example, 
“there was a general view… [that targets] did not represent a ‘rounded’ or 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  51 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
‘balanced scorecard’ of their own organisation’s performance” (Mannion et 
al., 2005: 20). 
De Bruijn (2007) offers a practical example of ossification, whereby 
researchers in a university who are specialised in public finance, and 
particularly, the area of levies, churn out many publications on the subject 
without much effort, in return for rich rewards from the performance 
measurement system. Smith (1993: 147) uses the focus on waiting times in 
the UK’s health sector by politicians, members of the public and public 
managers at the expense of including other performance measures (e.g. 
post-operative care), to illustrate ossification – in particular, “there may be no 
incentive for managers to respond outside the purview of the” performance 
measurement system, unless it is revamped. 
In addition to the above, adverse reports on performance often result in the 
attribution of blame to politicians or a PSO’s management and staff, 
particularly since service recipients, citizens and other external stakeholders 
are cognitively ‘wired’ to focus on “negative than to positive information” – 
this wiring is referred to as a ‘negativity bias’ (Hood, 2011: 9). For these 
groups of officeholders, blame could result in: them not being re-elected; or 
the loss of a bonus; or being bypassed for promotion; or damaging their 
reputations. As a result, there are three strategies that the public sector uses 
to avoid blame which evolve around: presentation through “spin, stage 
management, and argument”; agency – by delineating lines of responsibility 
across various government institutions; and policy which focuses on 
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decision-making arrangements and the work done by particular officers 
(Hood, 2011: 18).  
An example of spin occurred during the first five years of the New Labour 
regime in the UK. When faced with slumping popularity due to protests over 
fuel prices, the government “played the National Health Service card”. 
Government’s spin doctor at the time writes that: “we got some excellent 
NHS people to visit some of the picket lines and directly accuse protestors of 
doing damage to essential services” (Campbell, 2008: 472). Alistair 
Campbell also illustrates the consequences of not adopting an agency 
strategy as follows: 
“Clark won’t delegate so he risks being swamped by events. And he is 
not good at explaining strategy when there is one. Why those targets? 
What are we trying to achieve? You always need answers to those 
questions” (2008: 378).  
3.7 Options for ameliorating the negative effects of 
performance measurement 
Slightly over fifty five years ago, Ridgway (1956: 247), observed that “the 
motivational and behavioural consequences of performance measures are 
inadequately understood”, and proposed that more research was required on 
this subject. Subsequent lessons of experience and, studies have identified a 
range of options for ameliorating the adverse effects of performance 
measurement. Van Dooren et al. (2010) are of the view that with the 
hindsight of experience, a PSO is better able to rationalise the number of 
performance measures to an optimal level. Franceschini et al. (2007) 
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recommend fostering a common interpretation of KPIs by clearly defining 
them, and through training. 
On the basis of an empirical study of the school system in the USA, Bohte 
and Meier (2000: 175 and 181) consider that cheating by way of “cutting 
corners [gaming], lying [misrepresentation] and biasing samples [measure 
fixation]” could be reduced by instituting organisational norms which take into 
consideration “the full set of goals” rather than a “narrow incentive system”, 
the complexity of tasks assigned to jobholders, a broad range of criteria for 
determining rewards and multiple KPIs instead of composite scores. The 
authors also recommend that norms should be backed up by complementary 
procedures and structures. 
De Bruijn (2002) emphasises the need for: (1) ‘interaction’ as a means for 
engendering trust by making trade-offs and fostering ownership; (2) ‘variety’ 
in the way performance is measured and reported as a means for 
accommodating different goals/services and multiple stakeholders; and (3) a 
‘dynamic framework’ for performance measurement, which caters for 
changes in the environment. In practice, the same author proffers that these 
three principles imply the need to offer a PSO’s management latitude to get 
away from a system’s outputs by limiting the number of initiatives that are 
subject to appraisal using performance measures; and through the 
assessment of performance using a variety of sources. 
Bevan and Hood (2005) propose four steps that can be taken to avoid 
gaming, as follows: (1) where KPIs and targets are set centrally, PSOs 
responsible for achieving the results should not have access to detailed 
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specifications on the measurement methodology; (2) the timetable for 
independent monitoring and evaluation of performance in PSOs should not 
be predictable; (3) face-to-face interactions between PSOs and institutions 
reviewing their results should be encouraged; and (4) performance data 
should be independently audited. With respect to the last measure, it is 
noteworthy that several supreme audit institutions have widened their scope 
of “work beyond questions of regularity and legality,…to embrace more 
sophisticated concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and service quality” (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004: 92). In order to ensure data quality, Bird et al. (2005: 
11) suggest that: sample audits are necessary for confirming that 
measurement data represent an accurate gauge and are not corrupted; and 
it is important to pinpoint those “individual values that are 
incorrectly…[posted to records] or which are subject to misunderstanding 
and which may seriously distort final conclusions”. 
Hood (2011) suggests that there are certain blame avoidance strategies that 
have positive effects, which at a glance seem somewhat unusual. A 
presentational strategy which seeks to engage various stakeholders can 
foster policy debate – in other words what the author coins as a ‘winning 
argument’. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in 2006, when confronted with 
debts of over UK£600m in the NHS and possible job losses, the Minister of 
Health (Patricia Hewitt) used a winning argument by retorting that the service 
had “its best year ever”. Her statement led to widespread discussions and 
diverse views expressed among nurses, think tanks and the media (Jones, 
2006). Also, an agency strategy which clearly allocates responsibility 
(through ‘hard delegation’) is helpful in isolating which person or institution is 
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accountable. Furthermore, Hood (2011: 176) suggests that “the forms of 
policy strategy that are most likely to have a transparency-increasing effect 
are abstinence or protocolization approaches”. According to the same 
author, agencies can either simply abstain from offering information and 
other forms of service provision or play “by the book”.  
3.8 A perspective on the gaps in the literature 
It would appear that the vast majority of the literature on performance 
management (including measurement) is focused on developed countries 
(particularly in North America and Western Europe). Furthermore, the 
available empirical study results seem to evolve around state and local 
governments, service delivery in education (school systems) and health 
(hospitals). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004: 91) suggest this focus on service 
delivery units has been deliberate as “the powerful have been better able to 
postpone or deflect the tide of measurement than other groups”. In addition, 
a review of empirical studies by Boyne (2010b: 224) reports that whilst 
“available evidence is consistent with the view that performance 
management works” only 2 out of the 14 propositions listed in Table 3.3 have 
been tested.  
Table 3.3: Direct testing of propositions on performance management 
Proposition (P) Tested? 
(Yes/No) 
1. Performance indicators are more likely to lead to better service results if 
they focus on outcomes rather than outputs or activities  
No 
2. The positive relationship between indicators that focus on outcomes and 
service results will be weaker when such outcomes are viewed by 
managers as ‘uncontrollable’ 
No 
3. The relationship between the number of indicators and service 
performance resembles an ‘inverted u’ 
No 
4. Performance indicators are adjusted for ‘degree of difficulty’ will have 
stronger positive effects than raw performance indicators 
No 
5. The positive effect of performance indicators that are adjusted for ‘degree 
of difficulty’ will be stronger if they can be easily interpreted by internal and 
No 
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Proposition (P) Tested? 
(Yes/No) 
external stakeholders 
6. A target boosts performance on the indicator that is targeted Yes 
7. A target cuts performance on indicators that are not targeted No 
8. The relationship between the number of targets and service performance 
resembles an ‘inverted u’ 
No 
9. The relationship between targets and performance is moderated by 
gaming 
No 
10. Consultation with staff responsible for achieving a target is likely to 
moderate the link between target setting and performance; in particular, 
the relationship between the extent of consultation and service 
performance will resemble an inverted – U. 
No 
11. The positive effect of a target is strengthened by budgetary incentives for 
organizations 
No 
12. The impact of a target is moderated by perceptions of the fairness of 
distribution of pecuniary rewards 
No 
13. The impact of monetary rewards is moderated by service motivation No 
14. The provision of incentives for meeting targets is negatively related to the 
performance on the criterion of equity 
Yes 
Source: Boyne, 2010c  
Several of the propositions listed constitute important aspects of this author’s 
enquiry into ARAs. The most relevant propositions (P) are probably P2, P3 
and P6. However, her line of enquiry is exploratory, and as much if not more 
driven by qualitative aspects of performance measurement than empirical 
quantitative data. Besides, some of the propositions that remain untested 
probably demand a longitudinal study (P1) or a detailed appreciation of 
outputs and inputs of a PSO. From this author’s perspective, a detailed study 
of output and input KPIs represents a hefty and unjustifiable investment – 
especially in the context of ARAs, which seem to be largely driven by at best 
some intermediate outcomes to support the attainment of the ultimate targets 
– percentage point increases in national tax revenue collections as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Practices at different levels of government and in various sectors, industries 
and institutions are likely to vary. In this regard, Boyne and Walker (2010) 
highlight the fact that national contexts make a difference. For example, a 
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cross-country study of performance measurement practices in executive 
agencies found that on the one hand British respondents were driven by 
“specific targets and indicators”, whereas the focus by Swedish Managers 
was on “maintaining interstakeholder relationships”(Pollitt, 2006: 31) . It can 
therefore not be assumed that all the findings from this literature review 
necessarily apply to an African ARA environment. Still, the findings provide a 
useful basis for testing some of the ideas. 
It is also noteworthy from the literature review (see Section 3.3) that the 
process by which KPIs are selected appears to be a management driven 
process. In this regard, Bovaird (1996) puts forward an argument that the 
choice of KPIs is influenced by disciplines such as engineering, statistics, the 
systems approach, management accounting, quality management and 
consumer marketing. However, these disciplines are largely divorced from 
political economy paradigms. Yet, according the same author, models of 
political economy “influence not only the definition of public sector 
performance but also conclusions about…the level of performance exhibited” 
(Bovaird, 1996). Political economy influences are therefore worthy further 
consideration, particularly how they affect the adoption of performance 
measures. 
Besides efforts by institutions such as the OECD, United Nations and World 
Bank that benchmark aspects of development and governance using sets of 
common KPIs, cross-country comparisons of performance measurement in 
similar PSOs is generally lacking the literature. As a result in the case of 
ARAs, there does not seem to be a consensus on a set of suitable measures 
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of efficiency and effectiveness or even whether such a menu of KPIs is 
practical. A study of performance measurement in tax administration in Chile 
by Serra (2005) has limitations in that it uses data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to correlate a few productivity measures to the maximum feasible tax 
revenue that can be collected. Another study by Moesen and Persoon (2002) 
of 289 tax offices in Belgium, uses DEA and free disposal hull techniques to 
establish the relationship between inputs (personnel) and outputs (audited 
returns). However, the authors do not seek to justify the rationale for the use 
of particular indicators and not others.Therefore, the next chapter presents 
this researcher’s initial quest into identifying similarities and differences in the 
performance measurement frameworks used by 10 ARAs. 
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4 An overview of the features of 
performance measurement in tax 
administration 
4.1 The case for delving further into theory and practice of 
performance measurement 
The previous chapter sought to discern the history, characteristics, theory, 
perspectives, issues and gaps around performance measurement in a public 
sector environment. This chapter aims to delve into the specifics of 
performance measurement frameworks adopted by ARAs by drawing on: 
some of the findings from the previous chapter; direction provided by 
institutions such as the IMF and OECD; relevant peer reviewed journal 
articles; books; and documents (such as strategic plans, taxpayer charters 
and annual reports) produced by 9 select ARAs from the Commonwealth 
(Australia, Canada, Kenya, Mauritius, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, 
Tanzania, and UK) and 1 English speaking country USA with strong ties to 
the UK. The chapter identifies: the benefits and limitations of processes such 
as strategic planning; the extent to which the building blocks used to inform 
the selection of outcomes and KPIs in ARAs are common or different; any 
missing links; and unanswered questions. The outputs from this chapter 
informed the design of data collection instruments used for primary data 
collection in the three ARAs covered by this author’s research.  
4.2 Strategic planning – a dominant feature in ARAs’ 
management processes 
Strategic planning was adopted in government from the nineteen seventies 
largely as a result of pressures to address macro-economic imbalances 
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(Bryson and Roering, 1988 ). However, it was not until the late nineteen 
nineties, that the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department began to advocate for tax 
administrations to develop and implement reform strategies over the long-
term. Specifically, its advice was that “tax administrators need to diagnose 
the tax administration’s principal problems, design a strategy for actions to 
be taken, and agree on…scope and timing” (Silvani and Baer, 1997: 12). 
Further to assess advances made, the IMF also promotes the use of 
arrangements for monitoring, evaluation and control. It is therefore the norm 
for ARAs in both developed and developing countries to have in place 
medium-term strategies running for periods of three to five years. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that in the case of developed countries, an OECD 
(2001: 3) practice note states that “good revenue authorities are strategically 
focussed and responsive to changes in their environment and that of their 
taxpayers”. 
Despite the benefits articulated thus far, there is a view by some authors that 
strategic planning is too rational or resource intensive or is a politically 
sensitive process (Boyne, 2010a). Mintzberg (1994: 111) argues developing 
strategy “is an immensely complex process, which involves the most 
sophisticated, subtle, and at time, subconscious elements of human 
thinking”. Lindblom (1959: 80) suggests that in depth environmental scanning 
and analysis to inform goal setting is futile as practitioners “expect to achieve 
their goals only partially”. An empirical study by Bryson and Roering (1988 ) 
on strategic planning in city governments supports Lindom’s views. In 
addition, the authors draw parallels between making a quilt and effective 
strategic planning – in that all the pieces must be identified before a PSO 
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“can stitch together an interesting pattern” (Bryson and Roering, 1988 : 
1002). It can again be argued that such an undertaking smacks of rationality 
and knowing all the facts in contexts that are fluid. 
Against the backdrop above, there is view that strategic planning works best 
when an incremental approach is adopted constituting step changes 
((Lindblom, 1959); (Quinn, 1978); (Behn, 1988); (Poister, 2010)). For 
instance, Behn (1988: 652) is of the view that managers are more effective at 
testing as opposed to planning ideas – in other words “establish a goal and 
some intermediate targets. Then get some ideas and try them out”. In 
addition, Poister (2010: s249) defines ‘logical incrementalism’ as coined by 
Quinn as the process of “shaping, implementing, and managing an agency’s 
strategic agenda on an ongoing rather than episodic basis”. This perspective 
might explain why some ARAs review and revamp their strategic plans as 
often as every year. 
A further review of the literature on strategic planning suggests that only a 
limited number of empirical studies have been undertaken to establish its 
utility in a public sector setting. In this regard, for example, Boyne and Gould-
Williams (2003: 130) confirm that “planning leads to service improvement” in 
Welsh local governments. Also, a study of practices in federal agencies in 
the USA by Chun and Rainey (2005: 549) concludes that “high-quality 
strategic planning provides one path toward goal clarification”. In addition, 
Boyne (2010a) on the basis of his review of eight empirical studies surmises 
that there is some indication that strategic planning has stronger positive 
than negative effects on a PSO’s performance. 
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4.3 Strategic plans and other building blocks underpinning 
public service value 
The mission statement which is often part and parcel of an ARA’s strategic 
plan constitutes a key building block in deriving its outcomes and associated 
KPIs. So do its legislative framework and the service standards that are 
commonly incorporated in a charter. A mission statement “explains why the 
organization exists and what would be lost to society if the organization 
suddenly disappeared” (Cole and Parston, 2006: 68). A mission statement 
can provide a strong foundation for stepping up performance, if it is clear, 
has an “activist tone” and is focussed (Weiss and Piderit, 1999: 197). 
On the whole, the mission statements of the 10 ARAs covered as part of the 
review of secondary data sources are fairly similar (see Table 4.1). In this 
regard, for instance, four ARAs’ mission statements are explicit about: (1) 
promoting/ensuring compliance; and (2) providing quality services/ meeting 
standards. Staff competency and motivation is also specified as important, 
so are values such as fairness and integrity which according to Weiss and 
Piderit (1999: 196) enable “employees to make the connection between their 
values and the collective values of the agency”. 
Table 4.1: Mission statements of 10 ARAs 
ARA Mission statement 
Australian Tax Office 
(ATO) 
To optimise voluntary compliance and make payments under the 
law in a way that builds community confidence.  
Canadian Revenue 
Agency (CRA) 
To administer tax, benefits, and related programs, and to ensure 
compliance on behalf of governments across Canada, thereby 
contributing to the ongoing economic and social well-being of 
Canadians.  
Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC) 
To make sure that the money is available to fund the UK’s public 
services and help families and individuals with targeted financial 
support.  
Inland Revenue Authority 
of Singapore (IRAS) 
Act as an agent of the Government and provide service in 
administering, assessing, collecting and enforcing payment of taxes. 
 
Advise the Government and represent Singapore internationally on 
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ARA Mission statement 
matters relating to taxation. 
Inland Revenue 
Department of New 
Zealand (IRD) 
To collect 85% of the Crown's revenue as well as collecting and 
disbursing social support programme payments and providing the 
government with policy advice. 
Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) USA 
Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them 
understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law 
with integrity and fairness to all 
Kenya Revenue Authority 
(KRA) 
To promote compliance with Kenya’s tax, trade, and border 
legislation and regulations by promoting standards set out in the 
Taxpayers Charter and responsible enforcement by highly motivated 
and professional staff thereby maximizing revenue collection at the 
least possible cost for the social- economic well-being of all Kenyans. 
Mauritius Revenue 
Authority (MRA) 
To continually reform and modernise revenue administration in order 
to manage and operate an effective and efficient revenue 
organisation comprising of highly motivated and skilled staff.  
South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) 
To optimise revenue yield, to facilitate trade and enlist new tax 
contributors by promoting awareness of the obligation to comply with 
tax and customs laws, and to provide a quality, responsive service 
to the public . 
Tanzania Revenue 
Authority (TRA)  
To be an effective and efficient tax administration which promotes 
voluntary compliance by providing high quality customer service 
with fairness and integrity through competent and motivated staff. 
Sources: ATO, 2010a, CRA, 2010b; HMRC; http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/who-we-are/ [Accessed 9 April 2011]; 
IRAS, no date; IRS, 2009; KRA, 2009b ; MRA, 2011 ; http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=201 [Accessed 9 April 
2011]; TRA, 2008b. 
A review of the legislative frameworks of ARAs in select countries indicates 
that their functions and associated capabilities are specified in the laws 
establishing them ((Government of Canada, 1999); (Government of Kenya, 
1995); (Government of Mauritius, 2004); (New Zealand Government, 1994)). 
Core functions typically entail: administrative aspects such as assessment, 
collection, enforcement, accounting and reporting on tax and non-tax 
revenues; provision of advice on tax matters; and border protection. It is 
worth mentioning that ARAs countries such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the UK have the mandates to administer various social security 
programmes. This function is not prominent in African ARAs. However, 
SARS is expected to support the implementation of government’s social 
security and wage subsidy initiative. Also the ARAs in the USA, Canada and 
Australia do not have a mandate to protect borders. 
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In addition to their strategic plans, most ARAs typically articulate what 
standards of service and treatment their stakeholders can expect as well as 
their rights and obligations in charters. The use of charters was spearheaded 
by HMRC in the UK, which developed its first taxpayer charter in 1986 
(James et al., 2005). Thereafter, the OECD (1990) issued a practice note on 
the subject of taxpayers’ rights and obligations, and a model charter. It is 
noteworthy that ARAs, such as the Australian Tax Office (ATO), have 
periodically revised their charters to reflect stakeholder feedback. In its most 
recent charter, the ATO (2010b) informs its stakeholders that they should 
count on: receiving fair and reasonable treatment; being assumed to be 
honest unless they act otherwise; professional service and assistance; 
privacy and confidentiality; ease of compliance; and their rights to make 
complaints. The same principles underpin the charters of other ARAs, 
including but not limited to Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) (2007), Mauritius 
Revenue Authority (MRA)7, South African Revenue Service (SARS)8 and 
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA)9.  
4.4 Performance measurement at an outcome level 
It is apparent that the building blocks above influenced the determination of 
the outcomes in the 10 ARAs reviewed. It is also significant that if one 
excludes social security contributions, which fall outside the scope of this 
research, the 11 broad outcomes sought by the 10 ARAs, fall within 10 key 
result areas presented in Table 4.2. It is not clear what the positive and 
                                                     
7 http://www.gov.mu/portal/sites/mra/download/taxpayercharter1.pdf [Accessed 11 April 
2011]. 
8 http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=54195 [Accessed 12 June 2011]. 
9 http://www.tra.go.tz/documents/TRA%20TAXPAYERS%20CHARTER-ENG.pdf [Accessed 
4 April 2011].  
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negative linkages between outcomes are. However, through a simple 
process of induction, it would appear that outcomes around modernisation, 
improved taxpayer services, ease of paying taxes and enforcement are 
expected to contribute to increased revenue collection for development. In 
contrast investments in modernisation, strengthening ARA staff capacity and 
enhancing the work environment could lead to increased operational costs 
and an initial reduction in the levels of revenue available for development. 
At least seven of the broad outcomes listed in Table 4.2 are sought by the 
vast majority of ARAs. For instance, it is not surprising that with the 
continuous innovations in information and communication technology, that 
modernisation through automation, is a broad outcome sought by 90% of the 
ARAs covered by this researcher’s review of planning trends. On the other 
hand, as some  ARAs have only been in existence since the 1990s and 
2000s (e.g. KRA, MRA, SARS and TRA), they probably have a greater need 
to focus on aspects around institutional strengthening and not those targeted 
by the other long established authorities. It is also noteworthy that some 
ARAs have more than one outcome presented in composite mission 
statements. For example, Inland Revenue Department (IRD) of New 
Zealand’s (2010: 19) intermediate outcome statement “revenue is available 
to fund government programmes through people meeting payment 
obligations of their own accord” could be broken down into broad outcomes 1 
and 4 in Table 4.2.   
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Table 4.2: Matrix of key result areas and broad outcomes sought by various ARAs 
 
Key – NE= Not Explicit; Sources: ATO, 2010a, CRA, 2010b; HMRC; http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/who-we-are/ [Accessed 9 April 2011]; IRD, 20 
10; IRAS, no date; IRS, 2009; KRA, 2009b ; MRA, 2011 ; http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=201 [Accessed 9 April 2011]; TRA, 2008b. 







• O1 – Increased revenue collections 
for development
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 NE 9 9
2. Modernisation • O2 – Operations modernised through 
automation
9 9 9 9 9 9 NE 9 9 9
3. Taxpayer
services
• O3 – Improved taxpayer services 9 9 9 9 9 9 NE 9 9 9
4. Compliance • O4 – Taxpayers f ind it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
5. Enforcement • O5 – Deliberate non-compliance 
ef fectively addressed through 
enforcement
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
6. ARA costs • O6 – The ARA operates ef f iciently & 
ef fectively
9 9 9 NE 9 9 9 NE 9 9
7. Protection of  
borders & trade 
facilitation
• O7 – Size of  the illicit economy 
minimised
NE 9 NE NE NE 9 NE NE NE NE
• O8 – Legitimate trade enhanced NE 9 9 NE NE NE NE NE 9 9
8. ARA internal 
capacity
• O9 – Staf f  capacity &/or 
administrative systems strengthened
9 9 9 9 9 NE NE 9 9 9
9. ARA work 
environment
• O10 – An enabling work environment 
in place
9 9 9 NE NE NE NE 9 9 9
10. Good
governance
• O11 – An ARA with a strong corporate 
image & which is well governed
9 9 9 NE NE NE NE NE NE 9
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Yet, overall, there is significant variety in the types of KPIs employed (see 
Annex B for a full list). On the one extreme, Mauritius’s ARA specifies around 
120 KPIs - several of which measure inputs (e.g. ‘number of Client 
Relationship Managers in the large taxpayers department’) and outputs (e.g. 
‘number of business notes prepared’); and others which do not appear to 
measure specific aspects (e.g. ‘training of frontline officers’ and ‘self service 
options through ITAS’) (MRA, 2011). In contrast the IRD of New Zealand 
assigns only two KPIs for its revenue outcome (IRD, 2010). Tax revenue 
collected per annum expressed in currency terms or as a percentage of 
GDP, and the cost of tax administration as a percentage of revenue collected 
seem to be a universally applied. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 list the KPIs for the 
various broad outcomes sought that are: (1) commonly applied in a few 
ARAs; and (2) published globally by institutions such as the World Bank and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but not 
used by at all by ARAs in their strategic plans. It is noteworthy that there are 
no globally specified KPIs across the 10 ARAs reviewed for the last four 
broad outcomes. 
Table 4.3: KPIs that are applied in more than one ARA 
Outcome  KPI
O1 – Increased revenue 
collections for development  
• Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue 
O2 – Operations modernised 
through automation  
•  Percentage (%) uptake in electronic filing (eFiling) 
•  % of ARA transactions which are processed using 
automated systems  
O3 – Improved taxpayer services  •  % uptake in eFiling  
• Average processing turnaround time for tax returns and 
refunds 
•  % taxpayer satisfaction with services/information & 
tools provided by ARA 
•  % of calls/correspondence answered within a target 
timeframe 
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 O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply  
•  Reduction in taxpayer/trader compliance burden 
•  Voluntary compliance rate or fiscal value of non-
compliance 
•  The level of collectable debt/ cash recovered from debt 
book  
• % of tax returns received by the filing due date 
• Returns as a % of registered taxpayers  
O5 – Deliberate non-compliance 
effectively addressed through 
enforcement  
•  % of actual audits compared to plan/ registered 
taxpayers 
•  No of non-compliant cases uncovered as a result of 
audits 
•  No of cases recommended for prosecution/ successfully 
prosecuted  
 O6 – The ARA operates efficiently 
& effectively  
•  Amount spent for every dollar of tax collected or 
administrative costs as a % of revenue collected  
• % of digitised records with the ARA 
•  % increase in timeliness / accuracy of processing 
•  % reduction in escalated service queries  
Sources:  ATO, 2009;  CRA, 2010a; HRMC; IRAS, no date; IRD, 2010; IRS, 2009; KRA 2009b; MRA 2011; SARS 
2011b; TRA 2008b 
This researcher identified six universal indicators (excluding the cost of 
collection expressed as a percentage of revenue collected) (see Table 4.4). 
First, Corporate Income Tax Productivity (CITPROD) indicates how well CIT 
does in terms of producing revenue, given the prevailing tax rate.  It is 
calculated by dividing total corporate income tax revenues by GDP and then 
dividing this by the general corporate income tax rate. Second, Personal 
Income Tax Productivity (PITPROD) attempts to provide an indication of how 
well the personal income tax in a country does in terms of producing 
revenue. It is calculated by taking the actual revenue collected as a 
percentage of GDP, divided by the weighted average PIT rate. Third, VAT 
Gross Compliance Ratio (VATGCR ) is a measure of how well the VAT 
produces revenue for the government. It is computed by dividing VAT 
revenues by total private consumption in the economy and then dividing this 
by the VAT rate. Fourth, is the ratio of tax staff in an ARA to a country’s 
population. All indicators and associated data are maintained by the United 
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States Agency for International Development (USAID) on an online 
‘Collecting Taxes’ website. A review of USAID’s database by Crandall 
(2010a: 7) reports that CITPROD, PITPROD and other KPI data maintained 
are useful for cross-country comparisons. 
Table 4.4: KPIs that are available almost universally, but not utilised by ARAs 
Outcome  KPI
O1 – Increased revenue collections for 
development  
• Productivity of revenue indicators (e.g. PITPROD 
and CITPROD) 
O3 – Improved taxpayer services  • Global ease of paying taxes ranking  
 O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay taxes 
and hence comply  
• Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes 
(in hours) 
•  VAT Gross Compliance Ratio (VATGCR)  
O9 – Staff capacity &/or administrative 
systems strengthened 
• Tax staff per population 
Sources: www.doingbusiness.org and http://www.fiscalreform.net [Accessed 24 June 2011] 
Fifth, the ease of paying taxes ranking is issued annually by the World Bank 
as part of its Doing Business Report, and covers 183 countries – it is a 
composite measure which takes into account factors such as the number of 
payments, time taken to comply and overall tax rate for a medium-sized 
company. So is the sixth indicator - time taken by a company to prepare, file 
and pay various taxes. Both these indicators are used in assessing a 
country’s overall ease of doing business ranking, which policymakers all over 
the world “pay attention to…[and] design policies aimed at doing better on” 
their overall country ranking (Høyland et al., 2008: 1). 
4.5 Reporting performance and disseminating results 
Table 4.5 confirms that the majority of ARAs account for progress in 
achieving outcomes and outputs in annual reports, which are on the whole 
available for download by members of the public, businesses and other arms 
of civil society at their respective websites. Annual reports are available for 
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several years. However, there are some exceptions – Kenya’s ARA 
publishes quarterly performance reports online, which primarily focus on 
financial metrics, but with some KPI data (e.g. number of taxpayers that used 
e-Filing) and narratives on progress with respect to implementation of 
reforms (KRA, 2011a). Tanzania publishes an annual report in hard copy, 
with some data on KPIs. A search on its website suggests that the IRS in the 
USA does not make its financial statements accessible to the public through 
this medium. 
Annual reports, which can run into several hundreds of pages (e.g. ATO), 
also frequently contain audited financial statements. A review by this 
researcher of some of these reports identified four unique features. First, 
Canada’s ARA rates whether performance targets for each KPI were met, 
mostly met or not met (CRA, 2010a). In addition, it reports various 
volumetrics in the narrative parts of its annual report such as the number of 
enquiries handled during the year, the volume of tax-related visits to its web-
site, number of returns processed, the total dollar value of tax liabilities in 
dispute and so on. Second, the UK also compares actual performance 
against baseline and target data for each KPI (HMRC, 2009). South Africa 
adopts a similar style as the UK, and also provides a commentary to explain 
any significant variances between actual and targeted results (SARS, 
2010a).  
Table 4.5: Annual reporting of performance in the 10 ARAs 
ARA Produces annual 
report? 
Annual report 
available at its 
website? 
Reports data for 
KPIs 
ATO 9  9  9  
CRA 9  9  9  
HMRC 9  9  9  
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ARA Produces annual 
report? 
Annual report 
available at its 
website? 
Reports data for 
KPIs 
IRAS 9  9  9  
IRD 9  9  9  
IRS – USA 9  9  9  
KRA 9  9  9  
MRA 9  9  9  
SARS 9  9  9  
TRA  9  8  9  
Sources: ARA websites and reports 
Third, in the USA, an independent office within the IRS, The Taxpayer 
Advocate Service (TAS), reports to Congress on an annual basis on key 
issues faced by taxpayers, including concerns around their rights, and those 
to do with tax administration. Its feedback appears to be largely qualitative. 
TAS also advocates for policy and administrative changes. In a report 
reviewed at the time of writing this document, TAS commented on the 
adequacy of the IRS’s KPIs. It expressed concerns around the unintended 
consequences of performance measurement – in particular that:  
“Measures place disproportionate emphasis on cycle time...[creating] 
incentives for IRS employees to take actions quickly, even where doing 
so produces inaccurate results or delays the final resolution of 
problems” (TAS, 2010: 5). 
Fourth, Australia identifies areas where actual results have stagnated or 
dipped and specifies what measures it has taken in the past year, or will take 
the following year to improve performance (ATO, 2010a). It also reports the 
results of any ameliorating measures taken in the past year – so for example, 
in its 2010 annual report, the ATO indicates that measures taken to address 
the timeliness of private tax rulings resulted in “a number of improvements, 
but [we] were still below par in relevant service standards” (ATO, 2010a: vi). 
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In addition, the ATO provides a schedule of comparative information to 
enable certain KPI data to be used for benchmarking purposes by the 
OECD. KPI data cover six dimensions: revenue collection; tax debt 
collection; return filing; taxpayer service delivery; administration cost; and 
staff. The ATO’s report flags some additional KPIs and associated targets 
that appear amenable for universal application (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: KPIs that are amenable to universal application 
Outcome  KPI
O3 – Improved taxpayer services  • % of electronic tax returns processed within 14 days 
of receipt 
• % of paper returns for individuals and non-individuals 
processed within 42 and 56 days of receipt 
respectively  
• % of correspondence sent to the automated reply 
email reply service addressed within 3 working days 
• % of correspondence sent through normal channels 
addressed within 3 working days 
• % of electronic and paper amendment requests 
addressed within 28 days and 56 days of receiving all 
the necessary information respectively 
• % of taxpayers notified of the outcome of audits 
within 7 days of the ATO making a decision 
• % of clerical or administrative errors fixed within 21 
days 
• % of complaints resolved within 21 days 
 O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply  
• % of taxpayers who agree that the ATO has made it 
easier to complete an income tax return 
•  % of taxpayers who think it is easier now than in the 
past to deal with the tax system 
Sources: ATO, 2010a and 
http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.aspx?menuid=0&doc=/content/25940.htm&page=2#P21_949 [Accessed 
26 June 2011] 
4.6 Prospects for benchmarking performance 
If all ARAs used the same KPIs, then there would be a basis on which to 
benchmark many aspects of their performance. Benchmarking is “a 
systematic process for identifying and measuring ‘performance gaps’ 
between one’s own outputs and processes, and those of others” (Vázquez-
Caro and Bird, 2011: 2). In this regard, there have been several initiatives to 
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benchmark performance in ARAs both quantitatively and qualitatively. The 
World Bank’s paying taxes indicators and USAID’s measures of productivity 
illustrated in Table 4.4 above are two such examples. USAID’s measures are 
informed by the work of Gallagher (2005: 142) who argues that 
benchmarking provides counsel to ARAs “on what needs to be done to 
improve their tax administrations and international” comparisons are useful. 
In addition, an initiative by the International Tax Dialogue (ITD) benchmarks 
aspects such as institutional arrangements, tax and non-tax assignments, 
staff numbers, management practices, funding arrangements and revenue 
performance in 13 ARAs in Sub-Saharan Africa (ITD, 2010). Indicators used 
for comparative purposes are largely qualitative, with a focus on inputs, 
processes and outputs as opposed to outcomes. 
There has also been an initiative financed by the development institutions 
including the World Bank and European Commission and Governments of 
the United Kingdom, France, Norway and Switzerland to improve public 
financial management (PFM) particularly in developing countries through a 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Review (PEFAR). The 
PEFAR “framework specifies 28 indicators to be used to evaluate each 
country’s PFM system” (Kariuki and Kiragu, 2011b: 137). The following four 
indicators relate to tax administration: (1) aggregate revenue out-turn 
compared to original approved budget; (2) transparency of taxpayer 
obligations and liabilities; (3) effectiveness of measures for taxpayer 
registration and tax assessment; and (4) effectiveness in collection of tax 
payments (PEFA Secretariat, 2011: 9). A recent review of the PEFAR 
framework which sought to establish the feasibility of designing a drill-down 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  74 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
tool for tax administration assessed the current indicators to be incomplete. 
The reviewer suggested that there is scope to expand the review to cover 
aspects such as: 
“Taxpayer services and education; returns, filing and payment; 
information technology and integrated tax administration systems; 
compliance strategies including segmentation of taxpayers by size and 
other characteristics; self assessment, voluntary compliance, and 
functional organization structures; audit and enforced collection results; 
autonomy, governance, human resources management and ethics; 
rights and obligations of taxpayers and the tax authority; strategic and 
operational planning; and performance reporting” (Crandall, 2010a: 9). 
The European Commission (EC) has also developed a ‘blueprint’ to be used 
to rank an ARA using qualitative criteria set along dimensions such as an 
ARA’s: framework, structure and basis; human behavioural issues; systems 
and functioning; taxpayer services; and support. So for example, one 
blueprint under framework, structure and basis is ‘overall framework of a tax 
administration’ which contains seven strategic objectives. Under strategic 
objective 2 (‘the obligations of the tax administration are clearly translated 
into its mission, vision and objectives’), one of the key performance 
indicators is “are the tasks of the tax administration in line with its mission 
and vision?” (EC, 2007: 13). 
Vázquez-Caro and Bird (2011) are critical of both quantitative and qualitative 
benchmarking techniques for three main reasons. First, the authors are of 
the view that benchmark measures are often drawn up by external parties 
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(e.g. donors), and rarely have the buy-in of ARA managements, and could 
therefore lead to some of the perverse behaviours described in Chapter 3 of 
this document. Second, benchmarks do not flag contextual issues – so for 
example the cost of collection as a percentage of revenue collected does not 
enable one to appreciate whether revenue collection potential in a particular 
country is significantly higher. Third, although benchmarks can be helpful in 
pinpointing problem areas “they cannot and do not tell us exactly what 
happened, why it happened, or how it can be fixed” (Vázquez-Caro and Bird, 
2011: 3).  
Instead a systematic benchmarking is preferred (Vázquez-Caro and Bird, 
2011). This latter approach entails identifying good strategic and operational 
practices together with their associated KPIs, and thereafter modifying them 
to suit an ARA’s legal framework, modus operandi, resource constraints, 
capacity and so forth. Furthermore, the same authors suggest that to achieve 
a more effective tax administration, successful ARAs have shifted towards 
‘cooperative’ as opposed to ‘adversarial’ relationships with taxpayers, 
implying the need to address the strategic success factors shown in Table 
4.7. The third column in the table represents an attempt by this researcher to 
link each success factor with the broad outcomes listed in Table 4.2. The 
authors suggest a combination of qualitative and quantitative result indicators 
for the various benchmarks presented in Table 4.7. In addition, benchmarks 
are underpinned by the need to have adequate capacity in place by ensuring 
that the ARA adequately develops its staff. 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  76 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
Table 4.7: Towards a cooperative approach 
Success 
factor 
Main features Covered by broad outcome (see Table 
4.2) 
Benchmarks Result indicators 
Structured risk 
management 
ARA takes advantage of technology 
and data collection to analyse and 
appreciate the risks associated with 
non-compliance by various 
taxpayer segments. 
O2 – Operations modernised through 
automation 
O5 – Deliberate non-compliance 
effectively addressed through 
enforcement 
O6 – The ARA operates efficiently & 
effectively 













- Basic internal control 
systems of tax 
administration 
 
• Reduction of non-compliance due 
to deterrence 
• Higher effectiveness of tax audit 
targeting 
 
• The possibility of deep 
computerized audits 
• Dissuasive effects generated by 
the contents of forms 
• Establish protocols of intervention 
• Manuals 
• Definitions of operational practices 
 
• Efficient and accurate operation of 
these systems 
• Deterrence of fraud and corruption  
Viewing the 
taxpayer as a 
customer 
ARA offers one-stop services 
through dedicated offices (e.g. for 
large taxpayers). ARA sets service 
standards  
O3 – Improved taxpayer services 
O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply 




- Higher concern for equity 
than maximisation of 
collection 
• Improved services 
• Enforceable service standards  
• Focussed audit interventions by 
segments 
• Higher horizontal equity 
• Higher compliance 
• Proper collection levels 
The quality of 
the tax laws 
The country’s tax laws are 
simplified to enable easy 
interpretation and ensure fairness 
O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply 
- Participation in shaping of 
legal framework 
• No of legal initiatives drafted by tax 
administration 
• Number of interventions of tax 




ARAs collaborate and share 
information on transactions 
O1 – Increased revenue collections 
for development 
- Internationalization of tax 
administration 
• Higher horizontal equity 
• Better compliance (collection) 
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Success 
factor 
Main features Covered by broad outcome (see Table 
4.2) 
Benchmarks Result indicators 
networking O8 – Staff capacity &/or 
administrative systems strengthened 
O11 – An ARA with a strong 
corporate image & which is well 
governed 
levels from international payers 
A wide range 
of consultative 
arrangements 
ARA consults taxpayers and other 
tax administrations on the tax 
system 
O1 – Increased revenue collections 
for development 
O11 – An ARA with a strong 
corporate image & which is well 
governed 
- Knowledge networking in 
society: consultative 
arrangements 
• No of private-public institutions 
dealing with taxation 
• No of administrative general 
rulings conceived collectively with 
civil society  
• No of meetings with knowledge-





ARA introduces web-based 
technologies to keep transaction 
costs low and improve services. It 
also actively collects information of 
taxpayers 
O2 – Operations modernised through 
automation 
O3 – Improved taxpayer services 
O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply 
O8 – Staff capacity &/or 
administrative systems strengthened 
- Migration to web-based 
interactive processes 
• No of totally automated interactive 
transactions 







Knowledge and staff development 
are given priority  
 
O9 – Staff capacity and/or 
administrative systems strengthened 
O10 – An enabling work environment 
- Development of 
knowledge organization 
(across departments) 
• Training impact on tax 
administration performance 
Source: Vázquez-Caro and Bird, 2011:18-26 and this author 
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4.7 The missing links and answered questions 
The review of the literature on theory and practices in ARAs was beneficial in 
facilitating this author to identify what is in place as well as several missing 
links and unanswered questions. The universal KPIs used by the World Bank 
and USAID appear to be reasonable proxies for some of the broad outcomes 
sought, while associated data is readily available, and hence cost effective to 
collect. Still, it is not clear why ARAs do not use them, especially since the 
World Bank’s KPIs form a key dimension in assessing a country’s overall 
business environment. Are such measures ignored because they have been 
devised by external parties? 
There are also underlying processes which are not easily discernible without 
verbal exchanges with the actors involved. For instance, it is not obvious how 
KPIs are identified, or their associated targets set. With respect to targets, 
there is one exception – Canada, where the ARA explicitly states that it sets 
“targets by analyzing affordability constraints, historical performance, the 
complexity of the work involved, and the expectations of Canadians” (CRA, 
2010a: 9). Moreover, the costs and routines associated with collecting KPI 
data are not articulated in the publically available documents that this author 
has reviewed.  
The work by Vázquez-Caro and Bird (2011), provides food for thought 
around strategies and performance measures that could be used by an ARA 
that decides to adopt a cooperative approach. In fact, almost all the broad 
outcomes sought by the ten ARAs reviewed by this author can be matched 
to elements of the cooperative approach – the exception being O7 – Size of 
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the illicit economy minimised. However, some unanswered questions linger 
as follows: What are the implications if any of a systematic benchmarking 
approach? Does benchmarking performance measures against the best in 
class limit African ARAs scope for innovation? 
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5 Stakeholders’ assessments of 
performance measures and reports  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses stakeholder assessments of performance measures 
and the way in which they are reported. The chapter first analyses rankings 
from executives (internal stakeholders) in the three ARAs (KRA, SARS and 
TRA) with respect to commonly and uncommonly used KPIs, obtained 
through the administration of the questionnaire presented in Annex B. The 
focus of the analysis of internal stakeholders’ views is on: (1) three tiers of 12 
measures that are most frequently rated as very important (2) good practice 
indicators listed in Chapter 4 Table 4.6; and (3) the key measures for which 
stakeholders hold no strong opinion. Detailed frequency tables are presented 
in Annex D. 
A penultimate section of this chapter analyses external stakeholder views 
and preferences with respect to ARA annual reports and performance 
measures incorporated in them. This latter section also compares internal 
and external stakeholder priority KPIs. The final section delves into two 
critical areas of revenue administration, debt management and audits, whose 
KPIs did not feature as high priority. 
5.2 First tier of four most highly ranked KPIs 
Overall across the three ARAs, the indicators that are ranked by internal 
stakeholders as most (very) important in order of frequency are: (1) actual 
revenue compared to forecast revenue (84.3%); (2) voluntary compliance 
rate (74.5%); (3) percentage of taxpayers satisfied with services/information 
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and tools provided by the ARA (72.5%); and (4) percentage uptake in 
electronic filing (70.6%). Table 5.1 maps these four KPIs to the broad 
outcomes identified in the previous chapter (see Table 4.2). 
Table 5.1: First tier KPIs categorised by broad outcome sought 
KPI Outcome
Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue O1 – Increased revenue collections for 
development 
Voluntary compliance rate O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay taxes and 
hence comply 
Percentage of taxpayers satisfied with 
services/information and tools provided by the 
ARA 
O3 – Improved taxpayer services 
Percentage uptake in electronic filing  O2 – Operations modernised through 
automation 
Sources: Internal stakeholder questionnaire and Table 4.2 
The weight accorded to actual revenue compared to forecast revenue is 
attributable to a number of factors such as: (1) it is a measure of economic 
independence; (2) for ministries of finance in developing countries, revenue 
is key for development - the national budget depends on how much revenue 
is collected; (3) it measures the extent to which the ARA is contributing to 
meeting its mandate – one respondent indicated that “it is the language 
discussed here every day’”; and (4) it is a proxy for gauging compliance.  
It is noteworthy that some respondents pointed out that the rate of voluntary 
compliance is of utmost importance, but there is no way of fully measuring it 
at the moment. This might explain why it is rated as the second most 
important KPI. Engendering a culture of compliance is a key agenda across 
the ARAs surveyed as it can be used to determine taxpayer engagement, 
and implies that there is less need to chase them up to pay taxes that are 
due. As a result, voluntary compliance removes negative views about the 
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ARA’s enforcement/policing activities. Furthermore, if voluntary compliance 
is high, resources can be freed to widen the tax base (e.g. in the informal 
sector). Still a few respondents pointed out that access to third party 
information is critical to gauging voluntary compliance. 
Taxpayer satisfaction is rated relatively high, but surprisingly ranks more 
than 10 percentage points lower than ‘actual revenue compared to forecast 
revenue’ given that in discussions with several respondents, they 
underscored its worth. Some respondents reiterated that it is the most 
important measure. Other respondents suggested that this KPI can provide a 
number of messages such as: (1) if an ARA’s tools are user friendly, uptake 
will be quite high resulting in increased levels of compliance; and (2) an ARA 
can use this measure to gauge whether services/tools have been accepted, 
and to continually improve taxpayer services.  
Modernisation through electronic filing (eFiling) was ranked as very important 
by a large percentage of respondents. Respondents that rated eFiling as a 
priority KPI were of the view that it underpins the future, especially as it 
reduces the taxpayer burden and ARA processing times, and it is therefore a 
good proxy for compliance and administrative efficiency (in terms of reducing 
human input and processing errors, enhancing transparency and 
strengthening controls) respectively. Moreover, according to some 
respondents, high levels of eFiling enable an ARA to minimise corruption 
through limited interactions with taxpayers, and focus on: those falling 
outside the tax net or who are not aware of their obligations; and on 
enforcement. Still, it is noteworthy that at the time internal stakeholders were 
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surveyed, eFiling was only limited to a number of tax heads (e.g. income tax 
and VAT), and taxpayers (e.g. who pay presumptive taxes or in rural areas) 
are excluded. The success of eFiling is also dependent on a solid 
infrastructure. In this latter regard, some respondents, particularly from KRA 
and TRA, highlighted limitations created by power interruptions and a narrow 
broadband infrastructure both of which limit access. 
However, as Figure 5.1 illustrates, there are variations in the frequency of 
very important ratings across the three ARAs. For instance, 93.3% of the 
respondents from TRA consider that ‘actual revenue compared to forecast 
revenue’ is very important where as only 76.5% and 84.2% of KRA and 
SARS executives surveyed respectively, rate the same measure as very 
important. Some respondents from KRA shared their concern about the 
credibility of forecasts which are set by the Treasury. In particular, forecasts 
do not seem to take into account KRA’s capacity and other exogenous 
variables (such as data on the informal sector are not available). On the 
other hand some SARS executives suggest that revenue forecasting is more 
of an economic exercise outside the control of the ARA. 
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Figure 5.1: The frequency with which internal stakeholders rank the first tier 
KPI s as very important  
 
Source: Internal stakeholder questionnaire responses 
Another stark variation is in the magnitude attached to voluntary compliance. 
Only 52.6% of respondents at SARS rank voluntary compliance as very 
important in comparison to 88.2% and 86.7% executives surveyed at TRA 
and KRA respectively. Two respondents from SARS suggested that the 
absolute value of this indicator is influenced by the national culture. In 
particular, in the case of South Africa there is need to keep an eye on 
revenue, as tax morality is low (compared to say Sweden). What is more, 
this absolute value will only increase with better segmentation, education, 
service and enforcement. An alternative perspective is that this KPI can only 
be properly gauged when an ARA has access to third party information on 
taxpayers. 
In the case of the third and fourth most highly ranked KPIs, it is worth 
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important’, rated these measures as ‘quite important’. For example, 11.8%, 
36.8% and 20% of internal stakeholders from KRA, SARS and TRA consider 
that the percentage of taxpayers satisfied with services/information and tools 
provided by the ARA is quite an important KPI. The exceptions are KRA and 
TRA where 5.9% and 6.7% of respondents hold no strong opinion. 
5.3 Second tier of four priority KPIs  
68.6% of respondents rate the following four KPIs as very important: (1) 
average processing turnaround time for tax returns and refunds; (2) 
reduction in taxpayer/trader compliance burden; (3) amount spent for every 
dollar collected; and (4) percentage increase in accuracy of processing. 
Table 5.2 plots these four KPIs to the broad outcomes identified in the 
previous chapter (see Table 4.2). 
Table 5.2: Second tier KPIs categorised by broad outcome sought 
KPI Outcome
Average processing turnaround time for tax 
returns and refunds 
O3 – Improved taxpayer services 
Reduction in taxpayer/trader compliance 
burden 
O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay taxes and 
hence comply 
Amount spent for every dollar collected O6 – The ARA operates efficiently and 
effectively 
Percentage increase in accuracy of processing O6 – The ARA operates efficiently and 
effectively 
Sources: Internal stakeholder questionnaire and Table 4.2 
Internal stakeholders interviewed pointed out that the average processing 
turnaround time for tax returns and reforms, enables an ARA to undertake 
swift follow-up or analysis. It is also a useful measure of fairness as well as 
taxpayer costs and service experience. Taxpayers should be willing and 
happy to pay taxes, if, their interactions with the ARA, are fruitful (e.g. they 
obtain timely feedback). Some respondents expressed the view that if 
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processing times are long, taxpayers may be tempted to bribe or evade 
taxes. It is noteworthy that respondents from both KRA and TRA indicated 
that this KPI is particularly significant for processing VAT refunds. Prompt 
processing of VAT refunds can incentivise compliance as it boosts taxpayers’ 
cash flows, thus enabling them to meet other financial obligations. However, 
the two ARAs receive a fixed allocation for refunds from their ministries of 
finance, which tends to be less than the actual amounts to be paid out to 
taxpayers. As a result, there can be long delays in effecting VAT refunds.  
 A reduction in the taxpayer/trader compliance burden is considered by ARA 
staff to be an important KPI for a service oriented organisation as it signals 
simplicity, effort in terms of time and cost minimisation for both the ARA and 
taxpayers. Tax is a ‘grudge payment’. Therefore, getting the process right, 
especially in a self-assessment regime, is at the heart of a positive value for 
this KPI. In other words, a low compliance burden promotes voluntary 
compliance and therefore reduces the need for enforcement.  
The amount spent for every dollar collected is considered to be a measure of 
thriftiness/ fair use of resources. More specifically, respondents indicated that 
ARAs are under pressure to contain the cost of collecting taxes other than 
when there are capital outlays (particularly following their establishment). It is 
also a useful KPI for benchmarking. However, several respondents from 
KRA consider that a very low cost of collection ratio implies that an ARA has 
insufficient resources to administer and collect taxes. In contrast, in line with 
a government policy to create employment, SARS’s cost of collection is 
higher than it needs to be as it carries excess staff. 
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Accurate processing is at the core of an ARA’s endeavour to seek 
continuous improvement by saving costs and reducing incentive not to 
comply. Accuracy in processing also stops repeated interactions with 
taxpayers which are time consuming, frustrating and encourages graft. In the 
case of SARS, accurate processing is monitored especially with respect to 
audits and services provided at the call centre, encouraged through the use 
of tools such as intelligent and pre-populated forms. 
Figure 5.2 presents the aggregated and disaggregated frequencies for the 
second tier KPIs. Again there are variances in the extent to which the three 
ARAs rate the importance of the four measures.  
Figure 5.2: The frequency with which internal stakeholders rank the second 
tier KPI s as very important 
 
Source: Internal stakeholder questionnaire responses 
94.1% of respondents from KRA consider a reduction in the taxpayer/trader 
compliance burden to be very important, where as only 66.7% and 47.7% of 
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remainder of the executives surveyed at TRA (33.3%) and SARS (52.6%) 
consider this KPI to be quite important. Similar trends can be observed for 
the other three measures. 
5.4 Third tier KPIs 
Respondents rated the following four KPIs, which have been categorised as 
third tier KPIs: (1) time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes (64.7%); 
(2) global ease of paying taxes ranking (60.8%); and (3) percentage uptake 
in electronic filing (56.9%), and number of cases successfully prosecuted 
(56.9%). The first two KPIs are universal measures developed and used by 
the World Bank. Table 5.3 links these four KPIs to the broad outcomes 
identified in the previous chapter (see Table 4.2). 
Table 5.3: Third tier KPIs categorised by broad outcome sought 
KPI Outcome
Time taken to prepare, file and pay various 
taxes 
O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay taxes and 
hence comply  
Global ease of paying taxes ranking O3 – Improved taxpayer services 
Percentage uptake in electronic filing O3 – Improved taxpayer services  
Number of cases successfully prosecuted O5 – Deliberate non-compliance effectively 
addressed through enforcement  
Sources: Internal stakeholder questionnaire and Table 4.2 
Internal stakeholders consider that the first two KPIs are useful for 
benchmarking tax administrations, in that they pinpoint countries where an 
ARA can draw on good practices. In addition, some respondents expressed 
the view that the ‘time taken to prepare, file and pay for various taxes’ is 
gaining prominence in ARAs as it is a handy measure of the simplicity of the 
tax system and efficiency of services. In other words, there is a need to keep 
this particular KPI low to promote taxpayer compliance. To this end, a few 
respondents identified: the simplification of forms (e.g. VAT returns in Kenya) 
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and automation, as critical contributors to reducing the absolute value of this 
measure. 
Respondents also associated the global ease of paying taxes ranking with a 
country’s reputation and attractiveness for foreign investment. Also, in the 
case of Kenya and Tanzania, for example, the ARA’s vision is to be the 
leading authority. Therefore two respondents suggested that the global ease 
of paying taxes ranking is a good measure of whether its vision is likely to be 
attained. However, some respondents cautioned that the global ease of 
paying taxes ranking could be misleading. In particular, an ARA could move 
up the rankings but taxpayers may still be dissatisfied. A few respondents 
also expressed ignorance about the methodology used to arrive at rankings. 
One respondent was of the opinion that rankings may not be realistic as they 
are based on consultants’ perceptions as opposed to surveys of taxpayers. 
Furthermore, ARAs are not consulted during the evaluation process. 
It is noteworthy that respondents ranked the importance of the percentage 
uptake in eFiling in the context of achieving improved taxpayer services 
(56.9%) much lower than the same KPI used as a means for gauging the 
success of modernising operations (70.6%). Whilst there was 
acknowledgement that eFiling offers a convenience to taxpayers who do not 
have to queue, a consistent reservation articulated by respondents 
(particularly from KRA and TRA), revolved around the narrow national 
infrastructure and access. System downtimes and low levels of ICT capacity 
by taxpayers were some of the recurring examples of the obstacles faced in 
each of countries. 
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Respondents identified the number of cases prosecuted to be the most 
important KPI under the broad outcome ‘deliberate non-compliance 
effectively addressed through enforcement’ as it deters tax evasion. 
According to one informant, a major weakness in Africa is that tax evaders 
do not get prosecuted. Yet, irrespective of efficiency and good services, 
there will still be taxpayers who deliberately do not comply. It is therefore 
important that an ARA is seen to take action. However, it was suggested by 
a few respondents that an indicator such as ‘no of cases successfully 
prosecuted as a percentage of total cases prosecuted’, may be a more 
informative measure. Moreover, the cases selected for prosecution should be 
well thought out, as losses send the wrong signals. Also, successful 
prosecution is dependent on a strong and efficient judiciary – this is a major 
impediment in all three countries. Besides, penalties and fines levied by the 
courts, need to be sufficiently punitive. 
Figure 5.3 presents the frequency with which respondents rated each third 
tier attribute as very important. On the whole, the range of opinions across 
the three ARAs is fairly consistent for three KPIs. In this regard, the 
variances in frequencies for the ‘global ease of paying taxes ranking’ and 
‘percentage uptake in electronic filing’ are small. The widest differences in 
opinion centre on ‘the ‘time taken to prepare, file and pay for various taxes’. 
Only 42.1% of respondents from SARS rate this KPI as very important as 
compared to 80% and 76.5% of executives from TRA and KRA respectively.  
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Figure 5.3: The frequency with which internal stakeholders rank the second 
tier KPI s as very important 
 
Source: Internal stakeholder questionnaire responses 
Informants from SARS were generally not familiar with this World Bank 
indicator, where as, there were signs from the other two ARAs which receive 
project financing from the same institution, that this measure is increasingly 
the focus of attention. Still it is worth pointing out that 47.4% of respondents 
from SARS rated this measure as quite important. 
5.5 Views on good practice KPIs 
Respondents from the three ARAs were also asked to provide their opinions 
on the ten good practice measures listed in Table 4.6 in Chapter 4. Figure 
5.4 presents the four most highly ranked measures that the majority of 
internal stakeholders strongly agree can be applied on a universal basis by 
ARAs. The measure of the ‘percentage of taxpayers who think it is easier 
now than in the past to deal with the tax system’ has the highest frequency 

















0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Overall KRA SARS TRA
Time taken to prepare, file and 
pay various taxes
Global ease of paying taxes 
ranking
Percentage uptake in 
electronic filing
Number of cases successfully 
prosecuted
% that rank the KPI as very important
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  92 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
to assess outcome 4 (taxpayers find it easy to pay taxes and hence comply). 
It is worth noting that the vast majority of respondents from SARS (73.7%) 
strongly associate with this measure as it seeks direct views from taxpayers. 
In particular, this KPI is associated by several respondents with a treasured 
attribute, SARS’s reputation/image. It also measures the success of 
modernisation in terms of fulfilling taxpayer needs. High levels of taxpayer 
satisfaction are expected to lead to increased compliance. 
Figure 5.4: The frequency with which internal stakeholders strongly agree that 
KPIs can be applied on a universal basis 
 
Source: Internal stakeholder questionnaire responses 
In comparison to SARS, only 58.8% and 60% of respondents from KRA and 
TRA respectively strongly agree that the ‘percentage of taxpayers who think 
it is easier now than in the past to deal with the tax system’ can be 
universally applied in ARAs. Some of the respondents who strongly endorse 
this measure, consider that good client service is fundamental to promoting 
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type of client feedback. For instance, recurring views are that: taxpayers 
refuse to acknowledge positive changes; or when taxpayers say something 
is good, there could be a loophole; or most taxpayers have a negative 
opinion about paying taxes – so feedback may not be objective 
A few respondents remarked that the KPIs under outcome 3 (improved 
taxpayer services) are not particularly novel. Several of them are already 
contained in ARAs’ client service charters as service standards. 
Nevertheless, several respondents remarked that service requests are 
always important. Specifically, KPIs that focus on automation such as the 
‘percentage of electronic tax returns processed within x days of receipt’ are 
accorded higher priority than those that address manual processes as “paper 
management is tedious”. Still, a view was expressed by more than one 
respondent that this and other measures such as the ‘percentage of 
taxpayers notified of the outcome of audits within x days of your ARA making 
a decision’, are lacking in that they do not gauge quality. For example, one 
respondent remarked that SARS’s call centre has caused a lot of frustration 
by its lack of capacity to resolve queries. Thus, it is important to measure 
whether issues/queries get resolved. 
5.6 Main KPIs for which stakeholders hold no strong opinion 
Internal stakeholders indicated their indifference to a number of KPIs. At the 
top of the list are: (1) tax staff per population (35.3%); (2) number of cases 
recommended for prosecution (31.4%); (3) percentage of paper returns for 
individuals and non-individuals processed within x and y days of receipt 
respectively (23.5%); (4) CITPROD (21.6%) and PITPROD (21.6%). 
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Figure 5.5 presents the entire respondent population’s views on the KPIs 
listed above. Tax staff per population, seeks to establish the extent to which 
broad outcome 9 (staff capacity and/or administrative system strengthened) 
is achieved. Although some internal stakeholders perceive that this measure 
has some utility (e.g. for activity based costing purposes), a significant 
proportion of respondents were nonchalant about it for a number of reasons. 
First, ‘tax staff per population’ does not measure skills, knowledge, roles or 
the quality of tax administration staff or their productivity. Second, as all 
ARAs are currently undergoing modernisation, tax staff requirements should 
be reviewed in tandem with the level of automation, and not in isolation. 
Third, other more appropriate measures could be used. In this regard, for 
example, some respondents argue that tax staff as a proportion of registered 
(or active) taxpayers are better measures, as taxpayers in many African 
countries are much fewer than the total population.  
Figure 5.5: KPIs with relatively sizeable ‘no strong opinion’ ratings10 
 
Source: Internal stakeholder questionnaire responses 
                                                     
10 Excludes ‘percentage of paper returns for individuals and non-individuals processed within 
x and y days of receipt respectively’ which has a different likert scale. 
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Whilst the majority of respondents (62.7%) consider that the ‘number of 
cases recommended for prosecution’ is a quite and very important KPI for 
assessing the achievement of broad outcome 5 (deliberate non-compliance 
effectively addressed through enforcement), some internal stakeholders 
suggest it is a rather process oriented measure. In other words greater 
efforts should go towards monitoring throughput. So for instance, an ARA 
could hand over many cases for prosecution to the judiciary with no action 
taken, or taxpayers who have the money can litigate forever. This 
explanation might explain why the measure ‘number of cases successfully 
prosecuted’ takes higher priority. There is also the option of alternative 
dispute resolution through a tax tribunal. 
Similarly the vast majority of respondents consider ‘CITPROD’ (74.5%) and 
‘PITPROD’ (74.5%) to be quite and very important as they are indirect 
measures of compliance, and can also be used for in-country time series 
analysis and cross-country benchmarking purposes. However, a few 
respondents question the accuracy of GDP figures, which is the denominator 
used to calculate the ratio. Others are of the view that both measures relate 
more to tax policy, and therefore the Treasury has greater ownership of 
these KPIs. Besides at an individual country level, year-on-year changes are 
likely to be minimal.  
5.7 External stakeholder views and preferences on 
performance reporting 
The primary channel used by ARAs to communicate its results to the public, 
is through annual reporting. Therefore, this researcher solicited external 
stakeholder views around aspects such as the merits of such reports, best 
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media of communication, priority performance information preferences and 
the effectiveness of reports. Table 5.4 summarises external stakeholders’ 
perspectives on the merits of the three ARAs’ annual performance reports. 
Accountability (5), awareness creation (3), promoting taxpayer confidence (2) 
and transparency (2), were the most commonly cited merits expressed by 
external stakeholders. 
Table 5.4: External stakeholder views on the merits of annual performance reports 
What if any are the merits of your tax office/authority reporting its annual performance? 
Performance reporting keeps an ARA accountable, creates public confidence and promotes 
cooperation 
Annual performance reports promote awareness creation 
They provide useful information on my ARA’s activities and major concerns. Reports are also good for 
accountability 
The key merit of annual reporting is accountability, and its sub-set transparency (or disclosure). 
Reporting engenders confidence in my ARA 
Reports are an important mechanism for communicating my ARA’s activities – in other words they 
promote transparency 
To increase compliance it is important to increase taxpayer awareness and know what has been 
completed 
It is good to be aware of developments at my ARA in terms of modernisation, taxpayer services, 
compliance, capacity and good governance 
Reports offer important feedback on: the my ARA’s ability to collect tax effectively; measures taken to 
improve services and compliance; and trends in taxpayer behaviour 
Reports enable taxpayers to make government accountable to them. For example whether government 
has the capacity to fund services through own sources 
Reports inform civil society about domestic financing sources and my ARA’s modernisation initiatives 
Civil society wants to know what my ARA is doing and how. Is it making progress? 
Tax revenue belongs to taxpayers. An annual report is a cumulative account of developments 
Annual performance reports are useful for the purpose of analysis 
Source: External stakeholder interviews 
The majority of 13 out of 1811 (or 72%) respondents indicated that they read 
reports as a matter of interest and for research purposes. Seven out of the 
12 that read ARA reports, rank them as very effective and effective for 
research and reference purposes. Another two respondents expressed no 
strong opinion, and two stakeholders rated reports as ineffective on account 
that they did not find the information they were looking for or information was 
poorly presented. In addition, a few respondents indicated that they go 
                                                     
11 One respondent gave feedback on two ARAs. 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  97 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
through them in a cursory manner – as reports in their view, are public 
relations documents. The remaining external stakeholders interviewed 
admitted that they have never read annual performance reports. 
Then again, it is noteworthy that despite the variety of advantages listed 
above, a few external stakeholders remarked that public access and/or 
interest in the reports is limited. Table 4.5 indicates one ARA (TRA) only 
distributes its annual performance reports in hard copy. The majority of 12 
out of 17 (or 71%) respondents were of the view that the ARA’s website 
would be the best medium for disseminating reports, especially for urban 
populations and for research purposes. In addition, popular versions in local 
languages and with simple messages that make information more digestible 
should also be distributed to ordinary taxpayers through the mass media. 
Table 5.5 compares the priority performance measures from the point of view 
of external and internal stakeholders. The performance measures specified 
by external stakeholders are not in any order of priority. However, the 
numbers shown in brackets indicates the frequency with which external 
stakeholders listed each measure. The table also denotes that there are six 
common priority indicators demanded by both internal and external 
stakeholders. Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue’ appears to be 
the most frequently cited KPI, followed by various proxies of the voluntary 
compliance rate. Still it is pertinent that in their pursuit of accountability, more 
than one external stakeholder mentioned the need for KPIs covering equity, 
ARA capacity, governance, and the tax gap and tax expenditure.  
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  98 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
Some respondents interviewed indicated that there is a perception that the 
rich do not pay their fair share of taxes. It would therefore be beneficial for 
ARAs to report on the distribution of the tax burden (e.g. gender, by rural/ 
urban split or different occupational groups or company sizes). However, it 
may be argued that the equity dimension does not easily fit within the broad 
outcomes sought by an ARA. According to Vázquez-Caro and Bird (2011), 
this dimension depends on the quality of a nation’s tax laws. Although ARAs 
are expected to contribute to tax and legislative policy development, 
Ministries of Finance have the overriding responsibility for these functions. 
With respect to capacity (broad outcomes 8 and 9), some KPIs proposed by 
external stakeholders evolve around staff turnover, personnel development 
and the extent to which parallel systems have been eliminated. On the issue 
of governance (broad outcome 10), stakeholders suggested KPIs around the 
volume of complaints and taxpayers’ perceptions on corruption would add 
value.  
Table 5.5: Priority performance measures 
External stakeholders Internal stakeholders 
1. Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue 
(7) 
2. Expansion/contraction of the tax base - no of 
registered taxpayers disaggregated by 
sector/industry and gender and compliance 
levels (6) 
3. Results of taxpayer surveys (2) 
 
 
4. Tax gap/ growth projections (3) 
5. Average processing turnaround time for tax 
returns and refunds (during filing season) (3) 
 
6. Equity indicators which show the extent to 
which the tax system is progressive and pro-
poor (5) 
 
7. Cost of collection (1) 
8. Percentage reduction in error rates (1) 
 
1. Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue 
 




3. Percentage of taxpayers satisfied with 
services/information and tools provided by the 
ARA 
4. Percentage uptake in electronic filing 
5. Average processing turnaround time for tax 
returns and refunds 
 




7. Amount spent for every dollar collected 
8. Percentage increase in accuracy of 
processing 
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External stakeholders Internal stakeholders 
9. Tax expenditure/ exemptions (2) 
 
 
10. Governance/corruption indicators (3) 
11. Measures which indicate the extent to which 
the ARA has strengthened its capacity in 
terms of staffing and ICT (4) 
12. Statistics on the handling of service queries 
(1)  
9. Time taken to prepare, file and pay various 
taxes 
 
10. Global ease of paying taxes ranking 
11. Percentage uptake in electronic filing 
 
 
12. Number of cases successfully prosecuted 
Source: This author using data from key informants 
The results of the survey and interviews with internal and external 
stakeholders respectively are consistent with recent findings by the OECD. 
Specifically, the OECD (2011:75) identifies the following comparable priority 
outcome KPIs: (1) the timeliness of service delivery; (2) the trend of 
measures of taxpayer satisfaction with the services; (3) rates of taxpayer 
compliance; and (4) reductions in compliance/administrative burden. 
Moreover, according to the same publication “it appears that much greater 
attention is being given to reducing administrative costs”. It is however 
evident that one measure identified in the OECD report, ‘perceptions of 
employee engagement/satisfaction’, which is a possible indicator broad 
outcome 10 (an enabling work environment in place), does not feature 
among the priority KPIs listed above. 
External stakeholders also recommended measures that ARAs could take to 
improve their reporting of performance information. First, reports should be 
made more public. In the case of two ARAs (KRA and TRA), one needs to 
formally request for copies of annual reports. Second, ARAs should 
introduce/strengthen mechanisms for follow up questions on annual reports. 
Table 5.6 presents stakeholder comments on the latter proposal. Third, to 
ensure that readers of reports can access comprehensive data sets, ARAs 
should try as much as possible, to report on the same KPIs each year. 
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Fourth, the inclusion of benchmark data from other ARAs would be beneficial 
to stakeholders for comparative purposes especially since most respondents 
are unaware of developments in other jurisdictions. Fifth, there is need to link 
performance data to policy priorities such as a nation’s broader national 
development goals. 
Table 5.6: Views on ARAs’ accessibility to follow-up questions 
How accessible is your ARA to follow up questions? 
If you know someone at my ARA, it is easy to access him/her with follow up questions, If not the 
process can take a while. Besides there is no contact person listed in the report 
I have never tried calling my ARA. Generally other government departments in the country do not 
pick up phones. I assume this is the same practice in my ARA 
It is very difficult to engage my ARA. One keeps getting referred. No one wants to take 
responsibility 
The Large Tax Office has been helpful in relationship management. However, the call centre is 
unable to resolve issues 
It is easier to try and fill data gaps through other channels 
My ARA is increasingly accessible 
Source: External stakeholder interviews 
5.8 Debt and audits: problematic areas or shaky KPIs? 
Many of the comments made by the internal stakeholders surveyed, 
suggested that these operational aspects in the three ARAs may be 
problematic and/or critical to ensuring that revenue targets are met. An 
analysis of the survey results indicates that the vast majority of respondents 
consider debt and audit KPIs to be very (and quite) important. Yet, none of 
the KPIs on collectable debt or audits are within the top 12 priority measures. 
Internal respondents acknowledge that the three ARAs have sizeable debt 
books, and therefore ‘the level of collectable debt’ is not only an important 
measure of effective management of cash flow but could also signify a 
low/high rate of voluntary compliance (see Figure 5.6). In an ideal scenario, 
where there is a high level of tax morality, there should be no debt - to 
paraphrase one respondent “cash in hand is more important than what is 
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collectable”. In other words, according to another respondent, “the more debt 
an ARA carries, a lesser amount is deposited in the coffers” – this has 
adverse fiscal consequences.  
Furthermore, the ‘level of cash recovered from the debt book’ is considered 
to be an important measure of the intensity of efficiency in collection. 
Nevertheless, a general perspective shared is that focus should be on debt 
prevention. In particular administrators need to dedicate their efforts on 
following up and monitoring: the cleaning up of the debt book; calls to 
taxpayers to inform them of imminent payments; returns submitted with 
payments vis-à-vis returns received; assessments and payments; rolling 
payments; and the levels of real debt by assessing what is collectable and 
not collectable. With respect to the last point, one ARA executive commented 
that “the level of collectable debt needs to be realistic not just based on the 
law”. 
Figure 5.6: The frequency with which internal stakeholders rank debt KPI s as 
very and quite important 
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Tax audits are a cause of trepidation amongst taxpayers. However, from the 
perspective of the tax administrators interviewed, aspects of enforcement 
encourage voluntary compliance in countries where levels of voluntary 
compliance are low. What is more, audits are a source of additional tax 
revenue (see Figure 5.7). So for example, a few respondents were of the 
view that the ‘number of non-compliant cases uncovered as a result of 
audits’ is a measure of declaration compliance. Still a more widely shared 
observation is that in an environment where human resources are 
constrained, a robust planning process tends to be absent and risk analysis 
processes are inadequate, audits tend to be flawed and subjective. For that 
reason, measures of hit rate and quality audits are more important.  
Figure 5.7: The frequency with which internal stakeholders rank audit KPI s as 
very and quite important 
 
Source: Internal stakeholder questionnaire responses 
A more effective indicator of audit efficiency would be the percentage of risk 
engine12 exceptions uncovered, as according to two respondents: (1) “if 
                                                     
12 A risk engine is typically automated. It is designed to pick up anomalies in electronic 
returns/declarations. In the first instance, an ARA typically requests the taxpayer/trader to 
furnish additional documentation to resolve the issue. Unresolved issues require audits and 
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nothing is found, an opportunity is lost to audit another taxpayer”; and (2) if a 
taxpayer is flagged as high risk, “then the chances of being audited are high 
and could therefore persuade taxpayers to be honest”. Thus the absolute 
number of actual audits could be less –putting the message another way, 
“risk assessments are more important than coverage”. 
Two other respondents remarked that audits can be very expensive, so the 
outcomes of audits are more successful with large firms who are better 
organised than medium-sized firms which tend to be reluctant to furnish 
information. Therefore audits need to be well structured and sampling needs 
to be systematic.  
One respondent was of the view that a more powerful KPI than ‘percentage 
of actual audits compared to registered taxpayers’ would be, ‘percentage of 
actual audits compared to taxpayers targeted for audit’. Other respondents 
commented that it would be difficult to compare the ‘number of non-compliant 
cases uncovered as a result of audits’ with other ARAs as: there is no 
standard definition of an audit (light vis-à-vis heavy); registered taxpayer 
thresholds vary from country to country; and this KPI encompasses a very 
small percentage which does not change significantly. However, according to 
one respondent, this measure is used widely for benchmarking purposes. 
Still, at an individual country level, this percentage is unlikely to fluctuate. 
Therefore nothing is gained from a time series analysis.  
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6 Case 1: South African Revenue 
Service 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter delves deeper into the research of performance measurement 
in ARAs through the exploration of the first country case – SARS. It reflects 
back on the evolution of performance measurement, and how it has 
influenced the development of KPIs in SARS’s most recent strategic plan. 
The chapter then draws on information from government documents, 
meetings with executives and various reports generated by SARS to 
describe the processes that reinforce performance measurement. The final 
section discerns some key lessons learnt, challenges and considerations 
going forward. 
6.2 History of performance measurement 
At the point that South Africa gained her independence, there was a stark 
difference between the sophisticated formal economy and the informal 
economy, which was largely cash based (SARS, 2009b). Furthermore, there 
was a widely shared view that “apartheid era tax collection was characterised 
by high levels of avoidance” (Smith, 2003: 17). Therefore, the African 
National Congress’s (ANC’s) immediate priority in this area was to close the 
gaps as a means of funding its development agenda. To this end, the Katz 
Commission was appointed from 1994 to 1999, to offer advice on reforms to 
the tax system. One of the Commission’s early recommendations was to 
modernise the tax administration. 
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SARS was established in 1997 through an act of Parliament (Republic of 
South Africa, 1997). Shortly thereafter, SARS introduced the practice of 
strategic planning in 1997/98 by producing a brief three page document. The 
emphasis was initially on internal interventions (such as integrating 
administration, technology and offices), aimed at strengthening operational 
processes. But following a diagnostic study in 1999, focus soon shifted from 
an inside-out to an outside-in perspective. From 2000 onwards, SARS 
consistently focussed on outcomes such as ‘optimise revenue 
collection/yields’, ‘improved tax compliance’, ‘efficient processes’ and 
‘improved taxpayer/trader service/experience’.  
In 1998/99 following the promulgation of the Public Finance Act, and in line 
with the requirements set out in Section 40, SARS began to produce an 
annual report (Republic of South Africa, 1999). The first annual report 
contains 23 basic performance measures that centre “on areas that produce 
income and enforce compliance” such as: actual against forecast revenue; 
cases eligible for registration; number of employees trained; number of 
pieces of legislation prepared (SARS, 1999). Subsequent annual reports 
provide more sophisticated performance measurements. For example, the 
2005/6 annual report contains measures such as: a customer satisfaction 
index; percentage of complaints resolved; and percentage of senior 
management enrolled in leadership development programmes (SARS, 
2006). 
It is also noteworthy that SARS has monitored and reported on 10 out of the 
12 priority KPIs identified by ARA executives in Chapter 4 (see Table 6.1). In 
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this regard, it is remarkable that ‘actual against forecast revenue’ has 
withstood the test of time. Moreover, between 2005/06 and 2010/11 SARS 
consistently measured and reported on: (1) percentage uptake in eFiling; (2) 
average processing times for tax returns and refunds; (3) amount spent for 
every dollar collected; and (4) percentage of cases successfully prosecuted. 
In one year, 2009/10, SARS reported on one KPI related to the reduction in 
the taxpayer/trader compliance burden: 
“Over one million salaried individuals with simple tax affairs and an 
annual income below R120 000 no longer have to complete and submit 
tax returns, hence releasing capacity for auditing and reducing the 
taxpayer compliance burden” (SARS, 2010a: 29). 
Table 6.1: Regularity of reporting of the 12 KPIs in SARS’s annual reports (2005/6 to 
2010/11) 
KPI 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
1. Actual revenue compared to 
forecast revenue 
9  9  9  9  9  9  
2. Voluntary compliance rate  9  9  8  8  9  9  
3. Percentage of taxpayers 
satisfied with 
services/information and tools 
provided by the ARA 
9  8  8  9  9  9  
4. Percentage uptake in 
electronic filing 
9  9  9  9  9  9  
5. Average processing turnaround 
time for tax returns and refunds 
9   9  9  9  9  
6. Reduction in taxpayer/trader 
compliance burden 
8  8  8  8  9  8  
7. Amount spent for every dollar 
collected 
9  9  9  9  9  9  
8. Percentage increase in 
accuracy of processing 
9  9  8  8  9  8  
9. Time taken to prepare, file and 
pay various taxes 
8  8  8  8  8  8  
10. Global ease of paying taxes 
ranking 
8  8  8  8  8  8  
11. Percentage uptake in 
electronic filing 
9  9  9  9  9  9  
12. Number of cases successfully 
prosecuted 
9  9  9  9  9  9  
Sources: SARS, 2006; SARS, 2007; SARS 2008; SARS, 2009a; SARS, 2010a; SARS 2011a 
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From 2008/9, SARS surveyed taxpayers during the filing season to gauge 
levels of satisfaction, for example, with the eFiling software “e@syFile for 
employers”. Also in 2009/10, SARS established proxy indicators for the 
voluntary compliance rate such as: ‘the percentage increase in number of 
individual tax returns received in the correct year of assessment’; and ‘the 
percentage of returns submitted on time’.  
According to knowledgeable interviewees, until 2005/6, SARS was way 
ahead of other government entities in medium-range planning and 
performance reporting. From 2007, the Treasury Regulations made it 
mandatory for departments, trading entities, constitutional institutions and 
public entities to prepare three year strategic plans to cover the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework, and to be approved by Parliament (Republic 
of South Africa, 2007). These regulations prescribe the need for each 
organisation to articulate outcomes, outputs, KPIs and targets. They also 
recommend a programme/project orientation with a view to achieving 
improvements in services delivery.  
In addition to the above, in 2009 a policy on improving government 
performance was introduced. Thereafter, government organisations 
gradually shifted their orientation to outcomes based measurement. The 
overriding aim of government’s policy is to provide a basis for evaluating 
“institutional effectiveness and…the validity of policy”(Republic of South 
Africa, 2009a). In this latter regard, the policy document re-emphases the 
Auditor-General’s power under the Public Audit Act No 25 of 2004 to audit 
performance information and give an opinion as to whether: 
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“Reported performance against predetermined objectives is reliable, 
accurate and complete in all material respects, based on 
predetermined criteria” (Republic of South Africa, 2009b). 
6.3 Current strategic goals and KPIs 
In response to the government directive to accord precedence to an outcome 
measurement orientation, in 2011, SARS once again revamped its strategic 
plan for the period 2011/12 to 2013/14. For this period, SARS’s vision 
statement remained the same as that stated in the previous strategic plan – 
to be: 
“An innovative revenue and customs agency that enhances economic 
growth and social development, and that supports the country’s 
integration into the global economy in a way that benefits all South 
Africans” (SARS, 2011b: 10).  
The current plan consolidates the seven outcomes in SARS previous 
strategic plan into four core outcomes, which it considers will “stand the test 
of time”(SARS, 2011b:7). The four outcomes include: (1) increased customs 
compliance (O1, O5, O7 and O8); (2) increased tax compliance (O1, O5 and 
O4); (3) increased ease and fairness of doing business with SARS (O2, O3 
and O4); and (4) increased cost effectiveness, internal efficiencies and 
institutional responsibility (O6, O9, O10 and O11). On the, whole, these four 
outcomes cover the spectrum of broad outcomes listed in Chapter 4. 
The latest strategic plan specifies a total of 32 KPIs and associated targets 
(from 83 measures and targets in SARS’s previous strategic plan). It is 
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significant that the plan explicitly lists seven of the twelve priority KPIs 
identified by internal ARA stakeholders in Chapter 5 (refer to Table 5.5). In 
particular: (1) actual revenue compared to forecast revenue (ranked first); (2) 
voluntary compliance rate (ranked second); (3) percentage uptake in 
electronic filing (ranked fourth); (4) average processing turnaround time for 
tax returns and refunds (ranked fifth); (5) reduction in taxpayer/trader 
compliance burden (ranked sixth); (6) amount spent for every dollar collected 
(ranked seventh); and (7) percentage uptake in electronic filing (ranked 
eleventh). It is worth pointing out that the voluntary compliance rate is to be 
determined by computing the: 
“Number of CIT and VAT returns submitted in tax year due vs. Total 
number of CIT and VAT returns required in tax year” (SARS, 
2011b:43). 
One key KPI listed in Chapter 5 that has been omitted from the current 
strategic plan, is ‘percentage of taxpayers satisfied with services/information 
and tools provided by the ARA’. Yet 63.2% and 36.8% of respondents from 
SARS rank this measure as very important and quite important respectively. 
Moreover, this KPI was included in SARS’s previous strategic plan as well as 
in several annual reports. An explanation given for the non-inclusion of this 
measure is that in the past, SARS surveyed taxpayers on specific services 
such as eFiling, the call centre and interactive voice response system with a 
view to identifying areas for improvement. Surveys were not annual, sample 
sizes small and no composite measure of taxpayer satisfaction was 
developed. Therefore, from 2012/13, SARS intends to use the results of 
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compliance surveys to identify appropriate indicators and targets for taxpayer 
satisfaction. 
In line with an OECD (2011) observation in a few ARAs, SARS has devised 
a specific outcome and associated KPIs around customs which is a non-tax 
function. According to one respondent from SARS, the Accredited Economic 
Operator (AEO) and other compliance schemes are important mechanisms 
for reducing the burden on traders. This rationale probably explains why 
SARS has chosen to monitor the ‘percentage of trade volume coverage by 
preferred traders’. One other ARA surveyed in Chapter 4 uses “reduce the 
administrative burden of audit and inspections on compliant business 
customers” as a measure of whether “customers’ experiences of HMRC and 
the UK business environment [has] improved” (HMRC, 2009: 50). 
Slightly over half of the KPIs (17 out of the 32 or 53%) in the strategic plan, 
were scheduled for development in 2011/12. Digitisation beyond eFiling is 
fundamental to SARS’s strategy to ensure cost effectiveness and internal 
efficiency through the reduction in human intervention in processing 
particularly among “medium revenue generation taxpayers and traders”, and 
with a view to increasing the “ease and fairness of doing business” with the 
ARA (SARS, 2011b: 24). To this end, SARS plans to explicitly define how to 
measure the percentage of files digitised within SARS. According to one 
SARS executive, measuring its impact (e.g. on service and compliance), in 
isolation can be an objective in itself (see Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: The desired impact of digitisation illustrated 
 
Source: SARS 
A second measure, percentage reduction in escalated service queries, 
assessed by the majority (96%) of ARA executives surveyed as very (and 
quite) important, was under development. According to SARS executives 
queries are to be addressed through four tiers: (1) automation (e.g. through 
interactive voice response or via the web); (2) human interaction at the 
agent/consultant level; (3) human interaction through subject matter 
specialists; and (4) the policy tier at which a ruling or interpretation is made 
or a policy is formulated. The percentage reduction in escalated service 
queries seeks to promote ‘first time resolution’ at the lowest tier possible, 
through service monitoring. What is more SARS intends to include an 
additional measure to gauge the ‘percentage first contact resolution in 
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At least another four KPIs contained in the strategic plan will be determined 
on the basis of benchmarks. In this regard, at the time that this research was 
undertaken, SARS was participating in a third international tax benchmarking 
study. The benchmarking exercise typically covers aspects such as cost, 
time, quality and effectiveness. It will provide a basis for developing 
measures and baselines in 2011/12. 
In addition, one executive interviewed indicated that “SARS has bitten the 
bullet and undertaken to develop new outcome indicators”. In this regard, the 
current strategic plan identifies the following seven ‘ideal’ outcome indicators: 
(1) percentage increase in the customs compliance index (per tax product); 
(2) percentage decrease in the size of the illicit economy; (3) the tax 
compliance index; (4) reduction in taxpayer compliance burden; (5) reduction 
in trader compliance burden; (6) unit cost per process; and (7) productivity 
per employee (SARS, 2011b:42). According to executives at SARS, the 
compliance index, tax burden indicators and cost effectiveness indicators will 
be based on a model, surveys and activity based costing respectively. The 
compliance index is expected to cover four stages: identification; filing; 
declaration; and payment/performance. However there are challenges 
around setting assumptions and data collection. Therefore, in order to ensure 
adequate preparation, these KPIs will not be introduced until 2013/14.  
6.4 Service request KPIs in charter 
Over the years SARS has consistently reported its achievements against the 
standards of service it has committed to achieve in its service charter which 
was fully implemented in 2005/6. The first feedback SARS gave to readers of 
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its annual reports on implementation progress was in 2006/7, when it 
provided results for KPIs such as: (1) percentage of income tax returns and 
refunds processed within 90 and 30 days of receipt respectively; (2) 
percentage of calls answered within 20 seconds; (3) percentage of 
correspondence answered within 21 days; and (4) percentage of visitors 
walking into branches attended to within 15 minutes (SARS, 2006). The first 
and third KPIs are incorporated as good practice indicators in the Chapter 5. 
In 2007/8 and 2008/9, SARS’s focus was on service request KPIs: at the call 
centre and branches such as first time call resolution; and turnaround times 
for processing Bills of Entry in Customs. 
In 2010, SARS revised its charter to reflect “appropriate measures…[centred 
on] SARS’s improved service standards” (SARS, 2010c: 39). The new 
charter specifies specific service targets for when taxpayers call SARS, visit 
walk-in centres, write to the organisation, submit tax returns either through 
eFiling or manually, are due a repayment, register and make a complaint 
(see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: SARS’s revised service standards 
Select KPIs when a taxpayer… 
Telephones – we aim to 
• Answer 90% of the calls within 20 seconds (non-peak) 
• Answer 80% of the calls within 2 minutes (peak) 
• Provide resolution via interactive voice response for 90% of calls within 3 minutes 
• Provide resolution through our call centre agents to 90% of the calls within 10 minutes  
Walks-in – we aim to: 
• Attend to 90% of taxpayers within 15 minutes of waiting time (non-peak) 
• Attend to 90% of taxpayers within 30 minutes of waiting time (peak) 
• Serve 90% of taxpayers within 10 minutes 
• Provide first time resolution to 90% of taxpayers 
Writes – we aim to: 
• Respond to 80% of all correspondence received within 21 days of receipt 
• Inform you when and why resolution is not possible, and when you can expect a full reply 
Submits a tax return – we aim to: 
• Process and assess 90% of correctly completed and signed paper based income tax returns within 
30 days 
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Select KPIs when a taxpayer… 
• Process and assess 90% of correctly completed and signed electronic income tax returns (walk-in as 
well as electronic channel) within 3 days 
• Process all correctly completed and signed VAT/PAYE returns within 15 days of receipt 
• Process 90% of all electronically submitted export and import returns within 2 hours of receipt 
• Process all manually submitted export and import returns within 24 hours of receipt 
Is waiting for a refund – we aim to: 
• Process VAT refunds within 21 days of receipt 
• Process income tax refunds (when no audit is required) within 7 days of receipt 
• Process income tax refunds (when audit required) within 30 working days from the assessment date 
• Notify you within 15 days when a refund is subject to review 
Registers – we aim to: 
• Process correctly your completed and signed registration accurately within 10 days 
Makes a payment – we aim to: 
• Process your payment within 5 working days of receipt 
Makes a complaint – we aim to: 
• Register your complaint within 3 business days 
• Notify you if the complaint can not be resolved within 3 business days 
Disagrees with an assessment and request an adjustment – we aim to: 
• Notify you of the outcome of your electronic request for an adjustment within 10 business days 
• Notify you of the outcome of your request for a reduced assessment (when you believe SARS has 
made an error) within 20 business days 
Source: SARS, 2010b 
The spectrum of KPIs specified above is fairly comprehensive, based on 
SARS’s experience, and are comparable with the good practice measures 
used in the survey of ARA executives (refer to 5.5). Still on the basis of the 
literature reviewed, some of the targets, for instance, those relating to 
telephone and walk-in service requests, remain unchanged. And therefore, 
inferences could be made that there is gaming through the ‘ratchet effect’ 
(See Chapter 3 Sub-section 3.6). A follow-up discussion with SARS on this 
observation established that the service charter is considered by its 
management to be out of date. In particular, the standards contained in the 
charter are not aspirational enough, and have not kept up with the pace of 
modernisation. Therefore, the charter needs to be revamped and key 
aspects included in SARS’s strategic plan. 
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6.5 Performance measurement process and routines 
According to SARS executives, in the past performance measurement was 
an annual event with very limited connection – in other words there was no 
golden thread. Currently, performance measurement is part of the 
organisation’s day-to-day activities. In this regard, an Enterprise 
Performance Management Framework (EPMF) has been operational since 
2008 (see Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2: SARS’s EPMF 
 
Source: SARS 
SARS’s strategic plan must be signed off by Parliament. The 
Commissioner’s scorecard is based on the strategic plan prepared on a three 
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and Risk Division.13 The strategic plan also specifies strategic priorities and 
their expected deliverables (outputs) which form the basis for preparing the 
MTEF. Strategic priorities inform the development of one-year divisional 
business plans which often include special initiatives. Any special initiatives 
contained in the business plan should support SARS’s strategic priorities, 
and must be approved by the Strategic Council. Divisional performance 
metrics constitute the next level of management (Chief Officers’) scorecards, 
which contain a maximum of 20 KPIs. Chief Officers cascade down targets to 
staff in their divisions. A Business Planning Section within SARS reviews a 
sample of scorecards for consistency. Individual scorecards guide the staff 
appraisal process. It is noteworthy that SARS limits targets for KPIs in 
individual scorecards to a maximum of 20, each with a weighting of no more 
than 5%. 
Divisions own various KPIs in their business plans. Divisions are required to 
report implementation progress to the Strategy and Risk team on a monthly 
basis – reports must be supported by source documents. On the basis of a 
performance measurement/management protocol, the Enterprise Business 
Enablement Division within SARS assists other units in report design and 
generation, as well as information management. The unit is staffed with 10 
people to support the backend processes and another 100 people in 
production. Report design is governed by four criteria: clarity; rules; 
assumptions and the data set. 
                                                     
13 In line with a government directive, from 2012/13 strategic plans will cover a five year 
period, to coincide with the Presidential term. An annual plan will be updated every year. 
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The Enterprise Business Enablement Division initially prepares reports in 
Excel using data from the data warehouse and automatic scripts. Care is 
taken to ensure data accuracy through triangulation. Thereafter 
spreadsheets are exported to dashboards which transmit key performance 
information via software such as SharePoint and Roambi (for Ipad and 
Blackberry). Staff can also access dashboards through SARS’s internal 
portal. It has many types of dashboards in place which are refined as and 
when needed. For instance: 
“The management dashboard is an extremely powerful executive 
engine which collates over 1,000 performance measures across all 
levels of SARS. This creates the basis for consistent and continuous 
review of key indicators, especially lead indicators, making it possible to 
predict results and facilitates continuous proactive planning, 
measurement, and fine-tuning, thus reducing re-work, lost time, and 
missed opportunities”(SARS, 2006: 29) . 
The Strategy and Risk team: prepares reports on a monthly basis to the 
Minister of Finance; prepares a quarterly report (as required by statute) 
which is submitted to the Treasury; and prepares reports annually for 
presentation by SARS’s Chief Executive (Commissioner) to Parliament. The 
report to the Minister of Finance, which also contains dashboards, presents: 
an overview of performance covering an account of total revenue collections 
against targets; progress in achieving the outcomes specified in the strategic 
plan; update on modernisation, SARS’s finance and human resources; and 
an overview of any recent initiatives. The Minister of Finance uses 
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information contained in monthly reports in his engagements in Parliament 
and to prepare budget speeches. The Minister is known to occasionally ask 
for additional information and/or suggest changes to reporting formats. Over 
the years, SARS has modified reports to meet the Minister’s needs. 
Treasury is interested in returns on investments made in modernising SARS, 
and the progress made particularly with respect to the ease of doing 
business. SARS’s Commissioner tables to the Parliamentary Committee on 
Finance, the same annual report that is made available to the public. The 
annual report provides details of: performance and organisational highlights; 
progress against SARS’s three-year strategic priorities; performance 
information; aspects of governance; and financial statements (which include 
a report by the Auditor-General). SARS’s annual reports promote marketing 
of the institution. They represent an opportunity for SARS to publish 
achievements.  
AGSA audits the chapter in the annual report entitled performance 
information, which focuses on performance measures. The Auditor-General 
reports findings in a management letter, for which representations must be 
sought from SARS’s management. SARS must thereafter clear adverse audit 
findings. In addition, the annual report incorporates the Auditor-General’s 
findings on the performance information chapter. So for example, in SARS’s 
2010/11 annual report, the Auditor General reports that: 
“There were no material findings on the annual performance report 
concerning the presentation, usefulness and reliability of the information” 
(SARS, 2011a: 69). 
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6.6 Lessons learnt, challenges and areas for further 
consideration 
There are probably four core lessons that can be discerned from SARS. 
First, historically there have been some unintended consequences of target 
setting especially around under declarations on returns, where targets were 
set to, for instance, encourage SARS’s auditors to undertake additional 
assessments, irrespective of a taxpayer’s ability and willingness to pay. This 
measure resulted in a rise in debt book values and interest, of which, a 
substantial proportion was not collectable. There was also a tendency by 
auditors to cherry-pick easy cases instead of focussing on high risk/value 
cases – a form of ‘gaming’ the numbers. SARS has since abandoned a 
substantial number of such volumetric measures (more than 100). 
Second, SARS is careful in its target setting – it endeavours to ensure that 
targets are realistic (neither too high nor low). According to SARS’s 
executives, data accuracy has improved dramatically since 2006. For the 
measures that have been place for five or more years there are high levels of 
trust in the data. Whereas when data has only be collected for two or less 
years, there are issues around its reliability. In particular at the time this 
research was undertaken: 50% of indicators had complete data; 30% of KPIs 
were populated with some data but not all of it was accurate; and 20% of 
KPIs had no data at all. Automation has been a key facilitator in this process. 
Third, before the EPMF was introduced, and the Enterprise Business 
Enablement Division established, reporting within SARS was not as 
methodical. Reporting was not consistent in that formats used, varied by 
division. There were “different interpretations and views of the same 
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performance measure” and measures “to correct…non-performance [were] 
not reported and reviewed regularly”14. The rationalisation of KPIs, 
development and implementation of a performance measurement/ 
management protocol and improved coordination of the process has enabled 
SARS to promote understanding, accuracy and consistency, and drive 
action. In this regard, it is noteworthy that a ‘Reference Guide to Measures in 
the Strategic Plan’ was developed in 2011/12 in collaboration with SARS’s 
frontline staff and other ARAs. The guide defines each corporate level KPI 
and provides a baseline. SARS’s staff have been sensitised in the 
importance of performance measurements in highlighting operational glitches 
and enabling appropriate decisions to be taken. 
Fourth, SARS is transparent in its reporting. Specifically, it is upfront about 
achievements and missed targets, which is not a usual practice even in the 
private sector. Annual reports trickle through to the press (see Box 6.1). As a 
result, SARS is regularly invited to present at conferences and share lessons 
of experience with other government departments. 
Box 6.1: Excerpts from the media on SARS’s annual report  
“It costs the SA Revenue Service (SARS) 1,1c to collect R1 of tax. Yes, 1,1c for each R1. Last year 
SARS collected R674 billion and spent R7,4 billion, which gives the institution a cost ratio of 1,1%. This 
is more efficient than the 1,2% to 1,5% seen in the UK and Canada, although the US is leading the 
pack with a cost base of 0,5%. The 1,1c was the standout number in the SARS annual report which 
Commissioner Oupa Magashula tabled in Parliament this week. It proves that there are pockets of 
excellence in government which are comparable to international best practice. It shows that SARS’s 
cost efficiencies adhere to international standards and is after the national budget only the second 
positive news story about government’s financial management to hit headlines this year… 
 
The annual report is surely the best annual report coming out of a government agency this year. It was 
available on SARS’ website within minutes of Magashula’s speech in parliament. Just out of interest, 
the Department of Trade and Industry tabled its annual report the previous day, and it is not yet on its 
website. SARS’s annual report is extremely detailed with virtually all activities measured against targets 
and benchmarks. There are some areas where targets were not met, but this was justified with clear 
explanations”. 
Source: Van Niekerk,2011 
                                                     
14 www.nihilent.com/casestudies/SARS(lLamat).pdf [Accessed on 28 January 2011]. 
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An area worthy further consideration revolves around incorporating a few 
more KPIs even if they are volumetrics. Specifically, there is almost certainly 
merit in accommodating external stakeholders’ demand for performance 
measures to do with equity and corruption. SARS in collaboration with the 
National Treasury already produce a comprehensive set of tax statistics, 
which could be readily extrapolated to present a summary of the 
progressiveness of major taxes as part of the annual report’s chapter on key 
performance and organisational highlights (Republic of South Africa, 2010).  
With respect to corruption, there is evidence that “the level of corruption [in 
ARAs]… generally parallels that in the [public service] as a whole” and can 
play a substantial part in revenue leakage (Purohit, 2007: 288). SARS’s 
latest strategic plan alludes to this same point. The plan also specifically 
states that as part of achieving its fourth outcome, ‘increased cost 
effectiveness, internal efficiencies and institutional responsibility’, there is 
need to “eliminate corruption”(SARS, 2011b: 25). Yet the document does not 
specify a corruption measure to be monitored over time. In the past, SARS 
presented volumetrics with respect to anti-corruption initiatives such as the 
number of dismissals and convictions in a particular year (SARS, 2008: 63). 
A follow-up discussion with SARS revealed that corruption is currently 
monitored internally at the highest levels. This practice will prevail until SARS 
is better able to explain corruption trends.  
Another volumetric worthy further reflection evolves around debt (see 
Section 5.8). In early annual reports, SARS reported on its efforts to reduce 
tax arrears as a percentage of total tax revenue, including how it exercised 
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the conditions under Section 91A of the Income Tax Act to write-off or 
adjourn tax debts (SARS, 2007). In its most recent annual report (2010/11), 
SARS only reports “debt collected on assessments raised” in currency terms 
(SARS, 2009a: 23). Yet, there are indications that SARS has a fairly 
substantial debt book. 
Finally, it would seem that the greatest challenge for SARS going forward 
has to do with the development and implementation of its seven outcome 
KPIs. Although SARS has made a gallant step in terms of developing these 
unique outcome indicators, it recognises that for the foreseeable future they 
will probably be “technically more difficult to measure, [due to their 
complexity and the fact that they] involve the interaction of many factors, 
planned and unplanned” (SARS, 2011b: 41). Therefore, in the medium-term, 
SARS output measures will continue to be a dominant source of 
accountability. In any case, as alluded to in Section 6.5, SARS has 
institutionalised mechanisms for collecting, validating, monitoring and 
reporting such measures. 
In addition to using existing and new output measures, SARS could consider 
using the two priority universal measures presented in Table 5.5. The World 
Bank compiles and publishes data on ‘the time taken to prepare, file and pay 
various taxes’ (outcome KPI) and the ‘global ease of paying taxes ranking’ 
(outcome KPI) on an annual basis at no cost. As SARS further develops its 
new outcome measures to assess the attainment of the result ‘increased 
ease and fairness of doing business with SARS’, these two indicators could 
serve as useful KPIs. 
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7 Case 2: Tanzania Revenue Authority  
7.1 Introduction 
This case study covering TRA also starts with a review of the organisation’s 
history of performance measurement, as a basis for exploring the context 
and trends. The subsequent sections analyse: the thrust of TRA’s current 
corporate plan, and KPIs emphasised; whether the KPIs used in its service 
charter are monitored and reported; and performance measurement 
processes. The final section seeks to determine any lessons and challenges 
from Tanzania, and the way forward. 
7.2 History of performance measurement 
By the late 1980s there were clear indications that tax evasion was rampant 
in Tanzania. “Public participation in economic activity…[was also said to 
have] contributed to low tax collections” (Osoro, 1995: 6). To ameliorate 
these problems, a Presidential Commission on Taxation and Expenditure 
was established in 1989, and in 1991 made its recommendations with 
respect to tax policy as well as tax administration reform including the 
establishment of an authority (Morrissey, 1995). The authority which was 
established through ‘The Tanzania Revenue Authority Act No 11 of 1995’ 
commenced operations in 1996. At the time that TRA was formed: 
“A large proportion of staff from the former revenue departments who 
were considered inept or corrupt were retrenched…At the same time 
there was a strong drive to recruit and develop new professionals” 
(African Development Bank Group, 2010c: 6). 
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At the outset TRA’s key aims were: to establish “a sustained revenue base to 
enable Tanzania to finance its [public] expenditure needs without being 
excessively dependent on external aid”; and to develop a “transparent, 
effective and conducive” tax regime which promotes trade and investment 
(TRA, 1998: 3). To these ends, an action plan was drawn up for each of the 
three major departments of TRA” (IMF, 1999: 26). Box 7.1 illustrates some of 
the initial priority actions taken. 
Box 7.1: Some of the initial reforms at TRA  
“TRA was able to identify a range of administrative measures it could take to enhance tax 
collections, particularly through vigorous identification and collection of tax arrears, but also through 
steps to enforce future tax collections. Many of these steps focused on the petroleum sector, and 
included requiring all petroleum product imports to pass through limited entry points and be 
discharged into bonded warehouses, as well as stricter monitoring of transit trade…  
 
Supported by the World Bank and bilateral donors, the TRA is continuing its medium-term program 
of strengthening tax administration, in addition to the large number of specific steps being taken to 
address the current revenue shortfall. The TRA has already established a new unit for the 
centralization of the control of exemptions. Following IMF technical assistance, a new duty 
drawback system will be in place by March 2000. Preparations are under way to establish a unified 
tax appeals mechanism by August 2000”. 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, 2000  
In addition to government funding, the World Bank and other international 
agencies (e.g. from the European Union, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom), financed TRA’s first corporate plan (1998/99 
to 2002/03) through a Tax Administration Project (TAP). TAP’s planned 
outcomes were to “improve effectiveness and efficiency of [the] tax and 
customs administration” and “increase tax revenues”. Originally eight 
intermediate outcome KPIs together with their baselines were specified for 
these goals (see Table 7.1). However, the KPIs were later revised “to be 
aligned with the objectives of the corporate plan” (World Bank, 2007: 8). As 
shown in the table, some of the revised KPIs mirror two of the priority 
measures identified in Chapter 5. 
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Table 7.1: KPIs under TAP 




• - • Number of registered taxpayers 
 
Effectiveness • Number of declarations as a 
percentage of registered 
taxpayers 
• On-time declarations as a 
percentage of total 
declarations 
• Arrears recovered as a 
percentage of beginning of 
year arrears 
• Total revenue collected as a percentage 
of revenue target for the year (ranked 
first in Chapter 5) 
Efficiency • Registered taxpayers per 
employee 
• Collections per employee 
• Tax arrears as a percentage 
of annual revenue 
• Average number of days to identify stop-
filers 
• Percentage of customs clearances made 
within 24 hours 
• Percentage of VAT refunds made within 
one month (ranked fifth in Chapter 5) 
• Percentage of income tax refunds made 
within 45 days (ranked fifth in Chapter 5)  
• Percentage of duty drawbacks made 




• Tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP 
• Increase in tax revenue collected 
Sources: World Bank 1999: 10 and World Bank 2007: 8 
In its second corporate plan (2003/04-2007/08), TRA’s main focus was on 
modernisation through the attainment of five key results: (1) increased but 
cost effective revenue collection; (2) integrated operations; (3) high quality 
and responsive customer service; (4) increased tax compliance; and (5) 
improved staff competence, motivation, integrity and accountability (TRA, 
2004). Rather than assign KPIs to specific outcomes, the second corporate 
plan initially used the same eight measures listed in Table 7.1 above, to track 
performance. In addition, TRA planned, monitored and reported on various 
initiatives under each outcome. Typically reports on initiatives indicate the 
implementation status, scope of coverage and their effects(s) on operations. 
So, for example, as a means of ensuring that TRA provides high quality and 
responsive customer service, it launched a stakeholders’ forum in 2003/04. 
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One of the actions taken as a result of feedback received from stakeholders 
attending the forum’s meetings was to: 
“Review the procedures relating to handling of VAT repayment claims. On 
the basis of this, all VAT repayment claims are classified into three 
categories of gold, silver and non-gold silver with effect from 1st October 
2004” (TRA, 2005a: 9). 
It is worth mentioning that during the implementation of its second corporate 
plan, TRA continued to receive financial and technical support from 
international development agencies through a Tax Modernisation Project 
(TMP). TMP was “designed to reflect the five (5) strategic goals of the 
corporate plan” (World Bank, 2006: 4). In the same year that the TMP was 
launched, TRA restructured its performance measurement framework at a 
corporate level, resulting in an expansion in the number of KPIs from 8 to 16. 
Instead of clustering KPIs by the four areas shown in Table 7.1, it segmented 
them by the following departments: Domestic Revenue, Large Taxpayers, 
and Customs and Excise, which contribute 18%, 40% and 42% of total 
revenues collected respectively (TRA, 2011b). TRA also began to monitor an 
additional four KPIs as follows: (1) percentage of refunds made within the 
year; (2) average time taken to clear goods (days); (3) percentage of 
declarations subjected to yellow or red channel; and (4) number of active 
importers. 
7.3 Current strategic goals and KPIs 
TRA is currently implementing its third corporate plan (2008/09 to 2012/13). 
The plan is aligned to targets and strategies articulated in the National 
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Development Plan (MKUKUTA). MKUKUTA has goals that fall under three 
clusters: (1) growth and reduction of income poverty; (2) improvement of 
quality of life and social well-being; and (3) governance and accountability. 
The relevant strategies under cluster 1 include: continue to strengthen tax 
administration; reduce tax evasion and corruption; eliminate harassment of 
taxpayers; and reduce tax evasion and corruption (TRA, 2010c: i).  
In its third corporate plan TRA expounds on its vision “to become a modern 
tax administration” by identifying four features of such an ARA: (1) 
consistently meeting revenue targets; (2) providing services that meet 
taxpayer expectations; (3) applying tax laws in a fair and consistent manner; 
and (4) employing skilled and qualified staff with “high levels of integrity” 
(TRA, 2008b: 8). What is more, the goals sought in TRA’s existing plan have 
been refined, and include: (1) increase revenue collection in a cost effective 
way (O1, O5 and O8); (2) modernise TRA operations (O2); (3) provide high 
quality and responsive customer services (O3); (4) promote voluntary tax 
compliance (O4); and (5) enhance staff performance management system 
(O9). Goals are broken down into strategic objectives (19) and strategies 
(about 230). Almost every strategy has a corresponding output measure. The 
third corporate plan also contains a list of KPIs to be used to monitor the 
achievement of TRA’s intermediate outcomes (goals). This list of KPIs which 
builds on the one used in the second corporate plan, contains a total of 22 
measures.  
The plan incorporates three new taxpayer perception KPIs to do with 
awareness, responsiveness by TRA and corruption. In addition, following a 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  128 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
time release study carried out in 2009, five new measures around processing 
times, checks and error rates have been introduced for the Customs and 
Excise Department, and one input KPI (number of active importers) dropped. 
For example, a new KPI introduced in the third corporate plan for 
transactions in customs is ‘percentage of declarations subject to errors 
committed by clearing and forwarding agents (CFAs)’ as a means of gauging 
how well TRA facilitates trade, and controls over revenue. The rationale for 
this measure is that the 2009 time release study identified that CFAs are 
prone to making errors and omissions on customs declaration forms, 
contributing to clearance delays. “Therefore more efforts are required to 
improve the performance standards of” CFAs (TRA, 2009b: 67). 
Overall, TRA’s strategic plan incorporates 7 of the 12 priority measures 
identified by ARA executives in Chapter 5 (see Table 7.2). Actual revenue 
compared to forecast revenue, and turnaround times for processing tax 
refunds, have been prominent KPIs throughout the years. In contrast, the 
voluntary compliance rate is a new measure. TRA intends to collect baseline 
and trend data on the voluntary compliance rate by commissioning regular 
studies from fiscal year 2011/12 (TRA, 2010c: 38). Also, the plan does not 
feature an explicit measure of taxpayer satisfaction. However, there are 
plans to conduct taxpayer perception surveys, and institutionalise a 
mechanism for analysing such feedback.  
Table 7.2: Application of the 12 priority KPIs in TRA’s third corporate plan  
KPI Included in plan? 
1. Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue 9  
2. Voluntary compliance rate  9  
3. Percentage of taxpayers satisfied with services/information and tools 
provided by the ARA 
8  
4. Percentage uptake in electronic filing 9  
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KPI Included in plan? 
5. Average processing turnaround time for tax returns and refunds 9  
6. Reduction in taxpayer/trader compliance burden 8  
7. Amount spent for every dollar collected 9  
8. Percentage increase in accuracy of processing 9  
9. Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes 8  
10. Global ease of paying taxes ranking 8  
11. Percentage uptake in electronic filing 9  
12. Number of cases successfully prosecuted 8  
Source: TRA, 2010c  
Debt management and the revenue generated from audits remain key 
metrics at TRA (see Section 5.8). ‘The amount of previous year’s arrears 
collected as a percentage of total arrears at the beginning of the year’, is 
measured in both the Domestic Revenue and Large Taxpayers’ 
Departments. The targets set for each department vary, and are presumably 
lower in the Domestic Revenue Department, on account of the fact that debts 
are more difficult to collect among the small and medium taxpayer segments. 
On the other hand, ‘total revenue realised from audits as a percentage of 
revenue collected’, is only monitored at the corporate level for small and 
medium taxpayers. According to a TRA executive, the Large Taxpayers’ 
Department scrutinises the same measure at an operational level. 
7.4 Service request KPIs in charter 
TRA launched its first Taxpayer’s Charter in 2005. The initial charter 
specified four service standards as follows: (1) response to written and email 
requests within 7 days; (2) objections determined within 6 months; (3) 
taxpayer attended to within 30 minutes of arrival at TRA’s office when no 
appointment has been made; and (4) taxpayer attended to within 15 minutes 
of arrival at TRA’s office when an appointment has been made (TRA, 2005b: 
6). TRA assessed the extent to which these standards were met through 
stakeholder perception surveys. For instance, the feedback from a large 
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taxpayer survey conducted in 2006/7 was that TRA should “improve 
complaints procedures by providing more explicit information in the 
Taxpayer’s Charter” (TRA, 2007: 9).  
The Taxpayer’s Charter has undergone several revisions. The latest version 
is a fourth edition, which contains many more service request KPIs (around 
25) (see Table 7.3). It is noteworthy that a few of the good practice KPIs 
listed in Table 4.6 are incorporated in TRA’s revised service charter. Over 
and above standards to do with responding to written requests, TRA 
endeavours to notify taxpayers of the outcome of audits within 21 days of 
completing such an exercise. 
Table 7.3: TRA’s revised service standards 
Service KPIs when a taxpayer… 
Telephones – we will: 
• Pick telephone calls from callers within 3 ringing tones 
Walks-in – we will: 
• Start to attend to enquiries and complaints of walk-in visitors and those with appointments within 30 and 
15 minutes respectively from the time of arrival 
Writes – we aim to: 
• Provide replies to tax enquiries or attend complaints, which require technical expertise within 7 working 
days after receiving a complaint or enquiry 
Objects – we aim to: 
• Acknowledge receipt of an objection within 7 days from date of receipt 
• Resolve simple objections within 3 months, and for complex ones, within 6 months from the date of 
receipt 
Is audited – we will: 
• Audit business records and finalize the audit within two months for simple cases and six months for 
complex cases 
• Issue the audit findings /recommendations 21 days after audit 
Or Informer provides information – we will: 
• Pay a reward within 30 days from the date of receipt of notice of confirmation of payment of tax liability 
Registers – we aim to: 
• Provide a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) or VAT registration within 1 and 10 days after lodgement 
of TIN/VAT application where the system is computerised and manual respectively 
• Register tax consultants within 15 days after receiving application forms 
• Licence customs agents upon fulfilment of requirements set by the Customs Department within 30 days 
• Register motor vehicles after meeting the requirements within 2 and 10 days where the system is 
computerised and manual respectively 
Requires a permit or license – we will: 
• Issue a driving / motor vehicle license within one day after receiving the application 
• Process and issue all the permits (for import of goods and motor vehicles/ for the exportation of goods/ 
transportation of goods) subject to fulfilment of the stipulated conditions and procedures within 24 hours 
• Issue permits for the release of goods from customs control within 8 hours 
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Service KPIs when a taxpayer… 
• Issue a license for transporters of transit goods/ a bonded warehouse within one month from the date of 
receipt of the application upon fulfilment of the required conditions 
Requires a customs valuation – TRA will: 
• Provide information through designated notice boards, Automated System for Customs Data++ 
(ASYCUDA++) system and through its customs office within 24 hours from the time the required customs 
documents are submitted 
• Conduct an examination of goods within three hours from receipt 
• Provide import clearance within 24 hours upon fulfilment of all required documentation 
• Verify goods subject to trans-shipment within 21 days after arrival of a vessel/aircraft 
• Conduct boarding and rummaging to a ship or an aircraft within one day on arrival and one day before 
departure 
Source: TRA, 2008a 
The ‘percentage of written enquiries attended to within seven days’, is 
monitored at a corporate level. A TRA executive also indicated that each 
department/region measures and reports service request KPIs in their 
operational reports. This researcher cited a consolidated report on ‘Service 
Standards Performance Measurement’, compiled by TRA’s Taxpayer 
Services and Education Department for the quarter ended 30 June 2010. 
The report, which is presented in tabular format: compares the actual 
volumes of service requests against those handled within the target 
timeframes set out in the charter; and where appropriate provides reasons 
for any variances (e.g. network failure, requirements not fully met, there was 
need to make references) (TRA, 2010b). The report reviewed by this author 
suggests that overall TRA is close to meeting all the service standards. 
However, there is no evidence of data having been independently verified. 
Therefore, there is a risk that data reported is distorted through gaming 
through the threshold effect (see Section 3.6). 
7.5 Performance measurement process and routines 
Corporate planning at TRA takes place every five years. The Commissioner 
General leads in setting the agenda. Thereafter managers at all levels 
participate in brainstorming sessions, and a report incorporating the outputs 
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of this exercise is prepared. TRA then solicits taxpayers’ views through the 
Stakeholders’ Forum. The views of managers and taxpayers are deliberated 
upon by TRA’s senior management and Board of Directors (BoD). Next the 
Planning and Modernisation Unit based at TRA’s headquarters prepares a 
first draft of the corporate plan for review by senior executives and BoD. The 
corporate plan is subject to several revisions. 
The corporate plan partly informs the performance management system for 
TRA staff. Performance is gauged on a combined weighting of competencies 
(40%), and performance perspectives (60%) based on the balanced 
scorecard. 
The determination of KPIs is largely dependent on the ease of data 
availability. Once KPIs have been agreed upon, TRA either uses the 
previous year’s actual data or the outputs from consultant’s reports to set 
baselines. After that management sets targets for the five year period of the 
corporate plan. Performance data is collected quarterly. Whilst data collected 
is not audited, TRA’s management assess whether data values are realistic.  
Corporate performance data is maintained on TRA’s Monitoring and 
Evaluation Database (TRAMED) launched in October 2008. “The TRAMED 
system allows key users in all departments to input data” on a quarterly basis 
(TRA, 2009a: 17). There are a variety of data sources such as the 
ASYCUDA++ and ITAX system used to support operations in customs and 
domestic revenue respectively, as well as manual records – however, work is 
underway to further develop TRA’s data warehouse. TRAMED is accessible 
to all managers via TRA’s local and wide area networks. 
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The Planning and Modernisation Unit draws on data stored in TRAMED to 
prepare quarterly reports within 15 days after the period-end, for presentation 
and discussion by TRA’s top management. Quarterly reports are also 
distributed to the BoD, Ministry of Finance and international development 
institutions. Following each year end (30th June), the Planning and 
Modernisation Unit is required to prepare an ‘Annual Implementation Report’ 
(AIR) by 20th of July of the following month. The AIR documents significant 
achievements and challenges in implementing the various initiatives under 
each goal in the corporate plan, in a fair amount of detail. An annex to the 
report presents actual against target results for the main KPIs. The AIR is 
circulated to the same stakeholders that are privy to quarterly reports. 
TRA’s Finance Department relies on the AIR to prepare management 
highlights for inclusion in TRA’s annual report. Although the annual report is 
available to the public, Section 26 (3) of the TRA Act requires the authority to 
submit a copy to the Minister of Finance within six months after each 
financial year end. Furthermore, the Act states that the: 
“Minister shall cause copies of the annual report of the Authority to be 
laid before the National Assembly within two months or at the next 
meeting of the National Assembly after he has received them” (United 
Republic of Tanzania, 1995:13) 
A review of a few annual reports suggests that some of the rich content 
provided in the AIR may be lost (see Table 7.4). Great emphasis is given to 
revenue metrics, with select information provided on TRA’s progress in 
implementing its corporate plan. A review of TRA’s annual report for 2009/10 
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indicates that it provides an account of only 23 out of 47 (or 49% of the) 
initiatives in the AIR. In addition, the report includes a table setting out actual 
against target results for the main KPIs (TRA, 2010a: 12-13). However, it 
could be argued that some of the initiatives (e.g. large taxpayers’ perception 
survey and informal sector study) were at the early stages of implementation, 
and therefore TRA probably considered it premature to incorporate them in 
the annual report. 
Table 7.4: An analysis of differences between the AIR and Annual Report (2009/10) 
Goal and results of initiatives reported in AIR In annual report? 
Goal 1: To increase revenue collection in a cost effective way - 
1. Revenue collection against targets 8  
2. Enhanced performance of the block management system 8  
3. Improved property tax collections 8  
4. Matching of pension scheme data to PAYE  8  
5. Automation of TRA operations in regions and districts 9  
6. Conduct study to minimise waste in the utilisation of resources 8  
Goal 2: Modernise TRA Operations - 
1. ITAX modules further developed 8  
2. ITAX interfaced with other systems 9  
3. Electronic filing of returns 9  
4. Electronic requests for staff imprest and advances 8  
5. Development of Electronic Revenue Collection and Accounting System 9  
6. Roll out of ASYCUDA++ web based functionality to stations 9  
7. Electronic record keeping and reporting for human resources and administration 8  
8. Provision of ICT facilities to all TRA operational offices 9  
9. Interface of ASYCUDA ++ with Central Motor Vehicle Registration System 
(CMVRS)  
9  
10. Introduction of Computerized Drivers Licence System 8  
11. Phase 2 of TRA data warehouse implementation  8  
12. Enhancement of TRA website 9  
Goal 3: Provide high quality and responsive customer services - 
1. TRA quality management system 9  
2. Implementation of Information Technology Infrastructure Library 8  
3. Second large taxpayers’ perception survey 8  
4. Second time release study 9  
5. Customs modernization strategy and action plan 9  
6. Diagnostic Study to Determine System requirements for Automation of Customs 
Procedures 
8  
7. TRA Tax Service Centres 9  
8. Corporate Communication Policy 8  
9. Revised taxpayer’s charter 8  
Goal 4: Promote voluntary compliance - 
1. Informal sector study 8  
2. Establishment of computer forensic laboratory 8  
3. Development of a cargo tracking system 8  
4. Opening of a Centralized Data Processing Office 9  
5. Introduction of Electronic Fiscal Devices for all VAT traders 9  
6. Introduction of an Enterprise-Wide Risk Management System 9  
7. Enhanced risk management in customs 8  
8. Development of a customs valuation database  
9. One Stop Border Post for Customs Operations 9  
10. Roll out Revenue Authority Digital Data Exchange 8  
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Goal and results of initiatives reported in AIR In annual report? 
11. Sectoral risk analysis in tourism and manufacturing 9  
12. Enhanced partnerships with tax practitioners 9  
13. Improve tax enforcement at Local Government 9  
Goal 5: Enhance staff performance management system - 
1. Introduction of Human Resource Management Information System 9  
2. Launch of Institute of Tax Administration’s strategic plan 8  
3. Review of TRA’s third corporate plan 9  
4. Review of organizational manning and skills levels 9  
5. HIV/AIDS Situational Analysis for TRA 8  
6. Implement staff charter and service level agreements 8  
7. Implement annual training plan 9  
Source: TRA, 2009a and TRA 2010a 
The remainder of the annual report contains financial statements as well as 
the auditor’s report. TRA publishes around 3,000 hard copies of its Annual 
Report, none of which are sent directly to taxpayers. Rather TRA sends 
copies to: Parliamentarians; the Treasury; Regional Managers; and each 
Head of Department. The Annual Report is not posted on TRA’s website. 
However, the public can access revenue reports at national and regional 
levels. Notwithstanding the limited circulation of the Annual Report, it is 
notable that TRA is acknowledged in professional circles for the quality of its 
financial reporting. In 2011 TRA received an award from the National Board 
for Accountants and Auditors for “the 'Best Presented Financial Statements 
Awards' under [the] Government Institutions Category” (East African 
Business Week, 2012). 
7.6 Lessons learnt, challenges and areas for further 
consideration 
The Tanzania case study illustrates how the development and use of 
performance measurement has been a gradual process. The adoption of 
various KPIs has been more informed in each subsequent corporate 
planning cycle, and in revised versions of the Taxpayer’s Charter. The 
maturity of performance measurement has also been enabled by automation, 
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especially in terms of providing source data, maintaining and analysing 
metrics, as well as for reporting purposes. 
TRA also measures more than half of the KPIs determined by ARA 
executives in Chapter 4 to be high priority. Given that TRA periodically 
undertakes taxpayer perception surveys and intends to assess the voluntary 
compliance rate, there is scope for including these measures for review at a 
corporate level. Moreover, TRA could readily make use of data available 
annually from the World Bank on the ‘time taken to prepare, file and pay 
various taxes’ and the ‘global ease of paying taxes ranking’. During the 
research, the issue of whether TRA can also make use of universal KPIs on 
trading across borders (e.g. time taken to export and cost to import (World 
Bank, 2011)) was mooted. A view shared is that such measures involve 
other actors such as the ports and road transport authorities, and therefore 
would not be appropriate to employ exclusively at TRA. 
It is also laudable that TRA has taken steps to monitor the level of corruption 
on the basis of stakeholder perceptions. Since its inception, TRA has 
implemented various measures to curb this practice including recruiting 
many of its top management from outside the public service, raising salary 
levels of its staff, strengthening systems and controls and so forth (Fjeldstad, 
2002). Moreover, the authority has been implementing an anti-corruption 
programme since 2010 (Mwachang`a, 2011). Still according to Transparency 
International’s (TI’s) league table in the East Africa Bribery Index of 2011, 
TRA ranks 33 most corrupt institution in the region out of a total of 115 
organisations (Transparency International et al., 2011). Therefore, it is 
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important that TRA keeps the corruption index KPI in check. In this latter 
regard, it is observed that no baseline or target data are specified in TRA’s 
corporate plan and periodic reports. 
In spite of the strides made in enhancing performance measurement, there 
may be a case for reviewing and/or rationalising the number of KPIs in use at 
TRA for a number of reasons. First, an attempt to match each of the 22 KPIs 
to the five goals in the third corporate plan, suggests that there may be a 
disproportionate concentration on the attainment of increased revenue 
collection. In particular, it appears that 11 (or half) of the KPIs (e.g. covering 
collections, arrears, stop-filers and audits) are proxies for this goal. Second, 
another seven KPIs (covering refunds, average processing times and 
stakeholder perceptions) probably aim to assess whether TRA is providing 
high quality and responsive customer services – but it is noteworthy that 
none of them capture the quality dimension.  
Third, it may be argued that one KPI, number of registered taxpayer, is an 
indirect measure of voluntary compliance. Nevertheless, none of the KPIs 
seem to be suitable measures for gauging whether operations have been 
modernised, and that the staff performance management system has been 
enhanced. Yet in its periodic reports, TRA presents statistics, for example, 
on the number of returns filed through the eFiling system (TRA, 2011a: 6). 
Fourth, if one takes into account service KPIs, TRA may have too many 
measures. This latter issue is explored in more depth in Chapter 11. 
Fifth, due to the structure of the economy and/or tax policy, there is probably 
a case for systematic and regular reporting of performance measures 
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evolving around tax exemptions, tax evasion and the informal sector. “The 
extent of tax exemptions can be seen as an indication of a government’s 
political will to fight fiscal corruption and tax evasion” (Fjeldstad and 
Heggstad, 2011: 70). In its three year review of implementation of TRA 
confirms that a study of tax exemptions found that they contribute to 
significant revenue losses in Tanzania (TRA, 2011a). In addition, as 
indicated above (see Section 7.5), TRA intends to gain a better 
understanding of the informal sector by estimating the actual size of the 
underground economy for taxation purposes, weighing up revenue potential 
and planning possible ways for its exploitation. 
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8 Case 3: Kenya Revenue Authority  
8.1 Introduction 
The case study covering KRA has the same structure as the other two ARAs. 
It reviews performance measurement practices at a corporate level from 
KRA’s establishment to the current strategic plan period. The chapter then 
examines service KPIs and standards in the authority’s charter, and 
thereafter processes and routines which support performance measurement. 
The case study concludes with lessons learnt, challenges and areas for 
further consideration.  
8.2 History of performance measurement 
By the early 1990s, on top of high levels of corruption, Kenya was 
experiencing negative economic growth and severe fiscal deficits as a result 
of “slow growth in tax revenue” (KRA, 2010b: 14). The Government of Kenya 
(GoK) therefore sought measures to enhance both tax policy and 
administration. With respect to administrative reform, the authority was 
formed following the enactment of the Kenya Revenue Authority Act of 1995. 
By consolidating the three departments within the Treasury (Customs and 
Excise, Income Tax and VAT), the Government of Kenya (GoK) anticipated 
that KRA would be able to operate more efficiently and effectively by closing 
“the widespread loopholes in the tax system…, [reducing] tax evasion, and 
[enlisting] as many eligible taxpayers into the tax net as possible” (Muriithi 
and Moyi, 2003: 10). 
In the first decade following its establishment KRA, focussed on rationalising 
and stabilising “its organisational structure and general administrative 
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systems, and coping with changes in tax policies” (African Development 
Bank Group, 2010a: 16). So for example, during implementation of its first 
corporate plan (2000/01-2002/03), besides measures taken to boost revenue 
(e.g. recruiting taxpayers, improved debt management, security printing of 
accountable documents), KRA right-sized the organisation, retrained staff 
and standardised processes. However, the “monitoring and evaluation 
framework of the…plan was poor since it did not have clear verifiable” KPIs 
(KRA, 2010b: 37). Some of the performance measures subsequently 
reported included: actual against forecast revenue; total taxpayers recruited; 
percentage reduction in objections to tax assessments; percentage reduction 
in the workforce; and number of staff trained (KRA, 2003). 
After a new government of the National Rainbow Coalition party, took over 
power in 2002, it specified priority areas for reforming KRA in the ‘Economic 
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation’ (ERS) blueprint. In 
particular, ERS called for interventions aimed at “reducing the tax burden 
particularly on businesses and [broadening] the tax base” such as 
modernising the “tax administration infrastructure of KRA” (Government of 
Kenya, 2003: 5). Using the balanced scorecard (BSC) approach, KRA 
identified the following seven outcomes in its second corporate plan which 
ran from 2003/04 to 2005/06: (1) enhanced revenue collection; (2) effective 
and efficient expenditure control measures; (3) quality services at least cost 
with maximum satisfaction to stakeholders; (4) revitalisation of human 
resources; (5) zero tolerance to corruption and fraud; (6) internal processes 
modernised; and (7) corporate social responsibility promoted (KRA, 2003). 
Each outcome incorporated between one and six strategic objectives, with 
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associated initiatives and measures. Most performance measures were 
output oriented – for example, a document to be produced, a new unit/office 
established, or a system enhanced etc.  
In 2004/05, KRA launched the Revenue Administration Reform and 
Modernization Programme (RARMP) aimed at facilitating ease of tracking 
“progress in the reform initiatives and enhance project ownership and 
acceptance to change from both internal and external stakeholders” (KRA, 
2006a). From 2006 KRA has received funding for RARMP from GoK’s Public 
Financial Management Reform Programme (PFMR) to enhance customs and 
domestic tax administration and strengthen taxpayer education interventions 
(Government of Kenya, 2009). RARMP which is still ongoing consists of 
seven projects covering the authority’s core operations as well as human 
resource management and business automation. The programme specifies 
numerous quantitative KPIs including for instance: revenue collection; 
voluntary compliance rate; cost of collection; customer satisfaction rating; 
and local and wide area network coverage. RARMP is coordinated by the 
Programme Management and Business Analysis Office (PMBO).  
A GoK policy directive of 2004, instituted performance contracting in all 
public sector organisations (Kariuki and Kiragu, 2011a). This arrangement 
was “introduced to revamp the public sector by ensuring performance was 
measurable and top managers could be held accountable for results” 
(Waweru, 2007: 3). From 2005/06, KRA’s Board of Directors signed annual 
performance contracts with the Treasury aimed at promoting continuous 
improvements to its operations. The performance targets specified in the 
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contract are anchored on Treasury guidelines and the authority’s medium-
term strategic objectives. Typically the plan specifies performance targets to 
be achieved under the following categories: finance and stewardship; service 
delivery; non-financial; operations; and qualitative dynamics. Each target is 
weighted. The total composite score is 100.  
KRA’s third strategic plan (2006/07-2008/09) which makes reference to the 
performance contracting regime, specifies four outcomes: (1) develop a 
dedicated and professional team; (2) reengineer business processes and 
modernise technology; (3) improve and expand taxpayer service; and (4) 
enhance revenue collection and strengthen enforcement. The four outcomes 
have a total of 68 KPIs, many of which have been devised by KRA’s 
Research and Corporate Planning function, and a few of which are drawn 
from RARMP – such as: cost of collection; customer satisfaction rating; local 
and wide area network coverage; and revenue collection. 
8.3 Current strategic goals and KPIs 
The development of the goals contained in KRA’s current (fourth) corporate 
plan (2009/10 to 2011/12), have been influenced by two factors. First, the 
national long-term development blueprint, Vision 2030, anticipates that the 
plans to rapidly expand the country’s infrastructure will be realised through 
GoK’s ability to collect the necessary tax revenues. Vision 2030 also 
articulates the case for improving the business environment – including filing 
of tax returns and encouraging firms in the shadow economy to formalise 
their businesses (Government of Kenya, 2007). Second, an internal 
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assessment by KRA points to the need for: bolstering staff capacity; 
acquiring specialised working tools; and combating corruption (KRA, 2009b). 
In the context of the above, the vision statement in KRA’s current corporate 
plan remains the same as statements specified in earlier plans: “To be the 
leading Revenue Authority in the world respected for professionalism, 
integrity and fairness” (KRA, 2009b: xviii). The current plan specifies six 
outcomes as follows: (1) a professional team that is well remunerated (O9); 
(2) an enabling work environment (O10); (3) full automation and integration 
of operations (O2); (4) transition to a fully functional organisation (O9 and 
O11); (5) customer compliance costs minimised and customer service 
enhanced (O2, O3 and O4); and (6) revenue targets achieved (O1, O5 and 
O8). The plan specifies around: 20 strategies for achieving the six outcomes 
as well as a mixture of output and outcome KPIs (and associated targets). 
So for example, one of the strategies for enhancing revenue collections is to 
‘reinvigorate the management of debt’ which is measured by analysing 
reductions in the debt to revenue ratio. Also as a means of minimising 
taxpayer compliance costs, KRA plans to streamline refund payment 
procedures, which are to be monitored by measuring the percentage of 
refunds outstanding for more than 60 days.  
Table 8.1 shows that about half of the priority KPIs identified by ARA 
executives surveyed in Chapter 5, are incorporated in KRA’s fourth corporate 
plan. Actual against forecast revenue is a key performance measure. 
However, there are two major KPIs that are absent in the plan. First, whilst 
there does not appear to be a direct measure of voluntary compliance, KRA 
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does keep tabs on the ‘number of new taxpayers recruited’ and the ‘number 
of electronic tax register compliant taxpayers as a ratio of active taxpayers’. 
Also, KRA measures the percentage increase in Authorised Economic 
Operators (AEOs), who generally constitute compliant importers and their 
agents. Second, there is reference to taxpayer satisfaction in the plan, but no 
specific KPI, yet since 2009, KRA has commissioned an independent market 
research firm to survey various categories of taxpayers. Still one of the 
outputs from the research is a customer satisfaction index. Furthermore, 
according to informants at KRA, the organisation uses the results of surveys 
to enhance taxpayer services. 
Table 8.1: Application of the 12 priority KPIs in KRA’s fourth corporate plan  
KPI Included in plan? 
1. Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue 9  
2. Voluntary compliance rate  8  
3. Percentage of taxpayers satisfied with services/information and tools 
provided by the ARA 
8  
4. Percentage uptake in electronic filing 9  
5. Average processing turnaround time for tax returns and refunds 9  
6. Reduction in taxpayer/trader compliance burden 9  
7. Amount spent for every dollar collected 9  
8. Percentage increase in accuracy of processing 8  
9. Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes 8  
10. Global ease of paying taxes ranking 8  
11. Percentage uptake in electronic filing 9  
12. Number of cases successfully prosecuted15 8  
Source: KRA 2009b  
It is noteworthy that in addition to a few of the measures listed in the table 
above, KRA’s performance contract of 2010/11, lists the following priority 
KPIs: voluntary compliance rate; percentage of customers satisfied; and tax 
evasion cases prosecuted. The contract specifically defines voluntary 
compliance as “declarations made as a ratio of total revenue” (Government 
of Kenya, 2011: 22). On the other hand, ‘tax evasion cases prosecuted’ 
                                                     
15 KRA’s corporate plan contains a KPI ‘number of offenders prosecuted’ but not 
‘successfully prosecuted’. 
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cannot be used to enumerate the number of cases that were successfully 
prosecuted. The operations component of KRA’s performance contract of 
2010/11 also gives prominence to audits and debt management by setting 
targets for audit coverage and debt collections respectively.  
8.4 Service request KPIs in charter 
KRA introduced its first taxpayers’ charter in 2000. The charter was hailed by 
external stakeholders as a useful tool for providing “true transparency and 
accountability in the public service…[and] a significant step in the quest for 
efficient and customer- friendly public service” (Daily Nation on the Web, 
2000). In addition, “66% of taxpayers interviewed indicated that the 
Taxpayers Charter was useful in dealing with” the authority (KRA, 2003: 14) . 
One service standard, ‘tax inspections and audits be completed within 10 
days’, was considered efficient and helpful in terms of minimising taxpayer 
harassment (Daily Nation on the Web, 2000). However, it appears that the 
first charter was never fully implemented (Taliercio, 2004b). KRA’s 
explanations for implementation failure were: that too much time was spent 
revising the charter; and the charter was not mainstreamed into day-to-day 
operations (KRA, 2003). 
In September 2006, the Customs Services Department issued its own 
charter with standards for functions such as: post clearance audits; 
objections; appeals; processing of returns, entries, exemptions and bonds; 
processing of refunds, duty drawbacks and cancellation of bonds etc. (KRA, 
2006b). Several of the customs service standards were incorporated in 
KRA’s second taxpayers’ charter which was revised in 2006/07 to reflect 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  146 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
lessons of experience and changes to services. The revised charter contains 
around 40 service request KPIs which are focussed on KRA’s core 
operations (see Table 8.2).  
Table 8.2: KRA’s revised service standards 
Service KPIs when a taxpayer… 
Submits returns or entries – we will process: 
• Income tax returns within 180 days after the due date if it is for the immediate past year of income 
• Income tax within 30 days of receipt of the return if it is for the years of income other than the immediate 
past year of income 
• VAT returns within 30 days 
• Customs entries/ other customs returns within two days if correctly declared 
• Exemption letters from Treasury in respect of Customs duty etc will be processed and dispatched to the 
respective regions within two days. 
Objects – we aim to: 
• Acknowledge the objection within 7 days and endeavour to resolve the objection within 30 days. Complex 
cases may take more than 30 days to resolve 
• List your case for hearing by the Local Committee or Tribunal within a period of 2 calendar months from 
the date you lodge your Income Tax or VAT appeal, if you will have complied with the Income Tax and 
VAT appeal procedures 
Is audited – we will endeavour to complete the audit within: 
• 10 days, 20 days, 20 days and 30 days from the date of commencement of single issue audits, post 
payment audits, post clearance audits and comprehensive audits respectively 
• One day for a general inspection of an excise factory and 10 days for any other tax administered by the 
authority 
• 60 days from commencement of comprehensive audits for Large Taxpayers 
• 180 days from commencement of comprehensive audits for cases under investigation 
Applies for a refund or bond cancellation – we will: 
• Process income tax refunds within 120 days from the date of processing the return if it is for the 
immediate past year of income and the amount is less than KShs 30,000 or within 150 days for amounts 
greater than KShs 30,000 
• Process income tax refunds within 60 days from the date of processing the return if the return is for a 
year of income other than the immediate past year of income provided your return is accompanied by 
relevant documents 
• Process VAT/excise refunds within 60 days where the claim is accompanied by an audit certificate 
together with the relevant supporting documents  
• Process VAT/excise refunds within 90 days for claims that will require verification 
• Process customs refunds within 30 days of lodgement of the claim for duty overpaid or paid in error and 
which is received within 12 months from the date of payment provided the claim is valid and that all 
relevant supporting 
Applies for security bonds/remissions – we will: 
• Process applications for bonds for export/ remissions/ all types of security bonds within two days 
Requests to register or licence a motor vehicle (MV) – we will: 
• Register it within two days 
• Process and despatch new and duplicate log books within five and seven days respectively 
• Transfer ownership and despatch log books within three days 
• Process replacement number plates within four days and provide copies of MV records on the spot 
• Issue a certificate of ownership within one day 
• Issue foreign vehicle permits on the spot 
• Issue provisional/interim driving licence on the spot  
• Process and despatch new and duplicate driving licences within seven and five days respectively 
• Renew driving licences on the spot 
• Endorse additional classes of driving licences in Nairobi and upcountry on the spot and within five days 
respectively 
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Service KPIs when a taxpayer… 
• Process passenger service vehicle driving licences within one day 
• Issue Kenya Garage driving licences within one day 
• Issue a caveat on motor vehicles and driving licences within one day 
Source: KRA, 2007  
There are no standards around responses to telephone and written enquires, 
or walk-ins. Such standards would be useful for monitoring, for example, the 
effectiveness of KRA’s call centre launched in 2009. What is more, some of 
the standards may be misleading, particularly those that offer to provide a 
service ‘on the spot’, as a client may have to queue for a period of time 
before being served. It is also striking that about 40% of the standards have 
to do with the motor vehicle and driver registration and licensing, yet in 
2009/10 the roads transport function only contributed 0.5% of total revenues 
collected by the authority16 (KRA, 2010a). Besides, a separate “Citizens 
Service Delivery Charter for road transport services was developed and 
launched in 2008” (KRA, 2009b: 16). 
The fourth corporate plan does not specify quantifiable measures for 
monitoring implementation of the taxpayer charter. Rather the plan only goes 
as far as to state that there will be “strict adherence to taxpayers’ charter 
timelines” (KRA, 2009b: 89). Furthermore, a review of a sample of the 
authority’s quarterly and annual reports, suggests that progress in 
implementing the charter is not reported to the public. Interviews with key 
informants from KRA revealed that KRA is not effectively monitoring its 
service KPIs. 
                                                     
16 According to KRA executives over 60% of walk-in taxpayers at its headquarters seek 
motor vehicle related services. Therefore deliberate efforts are made to monitor the 
efficiency of those services. 
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8.5 Performance measurement process and routines 
The preparation of KRA’s corporate plan is informed by a self-assessment of 
achievements, challenges and lessons learned in the previous plan period, 
feedback solicited from stakeholders, annual taxpayer surveys, complaints 
received from the Complaints Office etc. KRA’s Performance Management 
Committee coordinates this feedback. The outcomes, KPIs and targets in 
KRA’s corporate plan are incorporated into its performance contract. KRA’s 
Board negotiates and eventually signs each annual performance contract 
(running from 1 July to 30 June) with the Ministry of Finance. The Board’s 
performance contract mirrors KRA’s performance contract. 
KPIs and targets in the corporate plan, RARMP and national budget are 
cascaded down into individual annual performance contracts. The 
Commissioner General negotiates his contract with KRA’s Board. Staff in 
senior management cadres negotiate and have their contracts signed off by 
the Commissioner General. Targets in performance contracts are weighted. 
For staff in revenue departments, 50% of the weighting in performance 
contracts is allocated to meeting revenue collection targets where as people, 
internal processes and taxpayer perspective have weights of 15%, 20% and 
15% respectively. 
Each department collects performance measurement data and reports 
progress to “enable the management to determine whether or not 
departments are on course to achieve the annual performance targets” 
(Waweru, 2007: 11). The performance management system is not 
automated for corporate and individual level measures. Therefore, at the 
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moment, the Research and Corporate Planning function within the authority 
coordinates this process by summarising achievements against various 
strategies. However, KRA plans to install a data warehouse which will enable 
users to access and analyse data.  
The PMBO maintains a database of performance indicators which it uses to 
report RARMP progress in presentations to external stakeholders and top 
management, and through an annual report. The PMBO annual report is in 
matrix format and contains the following fields: (1) project name and reform 
description; (2) planned activities for the year; (3) implementation status; (4) 
remarks; and (5) source of funding. 
KRA’s Board reports to the Ministry of Finance and Performance Contracting 
Department (PCD) in the Office of the Prime Minister and the Inspector 
General State Corporations on a quarterly and annual basis. Quarterly 
performance reports must be prepared using a format prescribed by PCD, 
which essentially requires KRA to provide an analysis of, and supporting 
narratives for, actual against target results for KPIs for the current and 
previous year. The Inspector General State Corporations is required to 
review the report and feedback comments to KRA within two weeks of 
receiving the quarterly report (Office of the Prime Minister, 2010a). The 
annual performance report has a similar format to the quarterly one, except it 
presents cumulative progress. 
After each year end, an Ad-Hoc Evaluation Task Force consisting primarily of 
external experts evaluates corporate level performance contracts. The 
evaluation entails assessing whether targets have been met, and assigning 
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raw, weighted and composite scores. Every public sector organisation is then 
assigned a grade ranging from excellent to poor (see Table 8.3). In this 
regard, the latest performance evaluation report grades KRA as very good, 
and ranks it in 40th position out of 162 state corporations.  
Table 8.3: Scores used in ranking PSOs in Kenya 
Grade Composite score (upper to lower ranges) 
Excellent 1.00-1.49 




Source: Office of the Prime Minister, 2011: 5 
In addition to the reports above, the Commissioner General issues a revenue 
performance report at a Press Conference within one month of the end of 
every quarter. The report typically covers an analysis of the operating 
environment (including the economy, inflation, interest and exchange rates), 
revenue performance for the quarter and any effects of the operating 
environment, progress in implementing administrative measures and 
cumulative revenue performance ((KRA, 2009c); (KRA, 2011b); (KRA, 
2012)). Also, Section 18 (1) of the KRA Act of 1995, requires the 
Commissioner General to submit an annual report to the Minister of Finance 
within three months after the year end which contains: financial statements; 
“performance indicators and any other related information; a report on the 
operations of the Authority; and such other information as the Board may 
deem fit” (Government of Kenya, 1995: 6). Annual reports are audited by the 
Controller and Auditor General (CAG). The CAG does undertake 
performance audits. 
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KRA’s annual reports do not contain extensive information on non-financial 
performance. Table 8.4 presents the quantitative performance measures 
reported in two KRA annual reports. One KRA executive suggested that this 
may be attributable to GoK’s reporting culture which is minimalist – as a 
result of historically tense relations with international donors; and to avoid 
audit queries. This state of affairs is likely to change once the Freedom of 
Information legislation is enacted. 
Table 8.4: Quantitative performance measures reported in two KRA annual reports 
Annual report 2009 Annual report 2010 
• Actual against forecast revenue 
• Annual revenue growth in percentage terms 
• Total number of taxpayers using online services 
• Size of total staff force and their allocation by 
department 
• Number of staff trained as HIV/AIDS peer 
educators 
• Number of staff trained in as counselors 
• Actual against forecast revenue 
• Annual revenue growth in percentage terms 
• Employee satisfaction rate  
• Size of total staff force and their allocation by 
department 
• Number of staff trained as HIV/AIDS peer 
educators 
 
Sources: KRA, 2009a; KRA, 2010a  
KRA’s produces about 1,000 copies of the annual report which the Minister 
of Finance presents to Parliament. KRA also distributes the report to the 
Central Bank of Kenya, National Bank of Kenya, National Archives, Staff, 
External Auditors, and the World Bank. KRA’s financial must be published in 
the Kenya Gazette – two months after the audit. From 2011/12, KRA began 
to post its annual report at its website. 
8.6 Lessons learnt, challenges and areas for further 
consideration 
There are two key lessons that can be garnered from Kenya. First, 
performance contracting has taken off relatively well, and is embraced by 
most institutions including KRA. In fact, in 2007 Kenya received the 
prestigious United Nations award for its performance contracting system as a 
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means for enhancing transparency, accountability and responsiveness in 
government. According to the UN: 
“The uniqueness of the Kenyan concept lies in the introduction of a 
methodology that allows all public agencies to be ranked on a scale of 
1 – 5. The absence of such a measurable scale explains the failure of 
previous attempts” (United Nations, 2007: 4). 
The performance contracting process has been fine-tuned over the years. 
However, according to a recent review of the initiative there is need for: a 
clear linkage between performance contracting and Vision 2030 and the 
medium-term expenditure framework; to simplify the scoring system; building 
human resource capacity in performance improvement; greater citizen 
engagement; and a system of rewards and sanctions for good and poor 
performers (Office of the Prime Minister, 2011). There is an ongoing exercise 
to implement the review recommendations. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the PCD has developed sector performance standards that are linked to 
Vision 2030. So for example, in the context of KRA, by 2030, in addition to 
an increase in revenue as a percentage of GDP, Kenya should have 
improved its World Bank “global ranking on the ease and simplicity in the 
process of paying taxes” by moving from 158th position to the top 20 (Office 
of the Prime Minister, 2010b: 137). However, at the time of undertaking this 
research it was observed that KRA had not taken account of sector 
standards.  
Second, KRA produces performance reports for public consumption on a 
more frequent basis than SARS and TRA, which is a good indicator of the 
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organisation’s commitment to accountability and transparency. Its quarterly 
reports capture the attention of media houses which analyse and 
disseminate key points to their readership (see Box 8.1). Nevertheless, 
reports would be more comprehensive if they contained more quantitative 
non-financial performance data on the KPIs contained in the corporate plan. 
For example, the results of perception surveys as and when they are 
released. In this regard, the fourth corporate plan makes several references 
to the need to combat corruption, and lists ‘exiting TI’s East Africa Bribery 
Index’ as a KPI to be achieved in 2011/12. Reporting the results of the 
survey when released would be a good indicator of whether progress is 
being made. 
Box 8.1: Excerpt from the media on KRA’s second quarter report (2011/12)  
“Tax revenues for the second quarter of the financial year were off target by a massive Sh45 billion, 
setting the Treasury up for a season of belt-tightening that is expected to put a number of 
development projects on ice… Official statistics show that the government got only Sh345 billion in 
revenues from taxes, grants and domestic borrowing against a target of Sh390 billion for the period 
under review that began in July. 
 
A fragile economy, the recent increase in excise duty and challenges in the administration of value 
added tax are expected to continue depressing revenue growth in the medium term…Last month, 
the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) said in a statement that the unfavourable macroeconomic 
environment was to blame for the less than expected outcome of revenue collections at the end of 
last year…‘The operating environment leading into and during the second quarter 2011/12 was not 
promising having been characterised by high inflation, rising interest rates, fluctuation of the 
exchange rate and high oil prices,’ said Michael Waweru, the outgoing commissioner-general. Mr 
Waweru said the unfavourable economic conditions were “likely to continue in the third quarter of 
financial year that ends in March.” 
Source: Irungu, 2012 
In terms of challenges, there are three apparent issues around performance 
measurement to do with: (1) capacity and coordination; (2) data quality; and 
(3) the utility of performance measures. There is no one dedicated to 
managing KRA’s corporate BSC. According to a key informant, performance 
reports need more thorough checking than is currently the case, but there 
are not enough bodies available to discharge this responsibility. What is 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  154 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
more, although RARMP was designed to reinforce administrative reforms in 
KRA by forging linkages and enhancing coordination, it is not absolutely 
clear how the programme’s components (projects) align with the outcomes in 
the authority’s corporate plan. Moreover, there appear to be differences in 
the types of KPIs used. Going forward, there is probably need to identify and 
create stronger synergies in order to promote efficiency in the deployment of 
the already limited capacity. 
With respect to data quality, financial metrics maintained on the RARMP KPI 
database are generally good. Still, there are concerns with respect to the 
data quality of non-financial performance metrics. Over 50% of KRA’s 
performance data is extracted from manual records (e.g. registers and logs), 
making it cumbersome to ascertain accuracy and completeness, and 
therefore increasing the risk of data inaccuracies through human error and 
deliberate manipulation. For this reason data capture and analysis processes 
could benefit from automation. 
Finally, the performance measurement system as it stands, is considered by 
a few KRA managers and stakeholders to be biased towards outputs. As a 
consequence, it drives managers to produce and report on quantities 
delivered. At the moment there are few measures to demonstrate value for 
money or quality. One senior executive suggested that in addition to 
incorporating more efficiency and effectiveness KPIs, KRA could also benefit 
from adopting measures which: (1) can be benchmarked with other 
countries; and (2) analyse equity and compliance by presenting the 
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distribution of taxpayers by bracket and/or those outside the tax loop who 
have began to comply. 
Furthermore the PMO requires KRA to incorporate indicators and targets for 
various Vision 2030 projects, and report to institutions such as the Gender 
Commission and the Discrimination Commission which is considered to be 
cumbersome. One executive remarked that these requirements fail to 
acknowledge that KRA’s core function is to deliver revenue. However, as 
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9 Factors that may shape the adoption 
of performance measurement in 
ARAs 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to discern from both theory and the three country cases, 
the factors that may shape the adoption of performance measurement in 
ARAs. Specifically, the chapter draws on the literature (see Chapters 3 and 
4, Sections 3.4, 3.8 (Table 3.8) and 4.2), to pinpoint the factors that have 
been considered and/or identified elsewhere, as a footing for advancing 
causal conditions (independent variables) for the efficient and effective use 
of performance measures – full adoption. The seven prominent factors are: 
(1) political economy; (2) strategic considerations; (3) policy and legislative 
requirements; (4) structure of the revenue base; (5) organisational culture; 
(6) utility of performance data to external stakeholders; and (7) data 
collection cost and quality considerations.  
In addition, on the foundation of theory, the chapter coins conditions for the 
adoption of performance measurement. Each ARA is assessed and given a 
degree of membership to every condition. The method of assessment is 
guided by the work of Ragan (2000) on fuzzy sets. For each major causal 
condition identified, an ARA’s membership is categorised as: (1) fully in= 1; 
(2) more in than out= 0.75; (3) neither in nor out= 0.5; (4) more out than in= 
0.25; and (5) fully out= 0 (Ragin, 2000: 156).  
At this juncture, given the available evidence, membership of the outcome 
(the dependent variable - Y) “the degree of adoption of performance 
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measurement in ARAs”, is defined on the basis of the extent to which, over 
the years, the 12 priority KPIs evaluated by ARA executives as, important 
and very important, have been used in practice. The assessment criteria for 
gauging the extent of adoption are as follows: (1) nine or more KPIs adopted 
= 1 - full membership of the set; (2) more than six but less than nine KPIs 
adopted = 0.75 - more in than out of the set; (3) three up to six KPIs adopted 
= 0.5 - in between; (4) one or more but less than three KPIs adopted = 0.25 - 
less out than in of the set; and (5) no KPIs adopted = 0 - not a member of the 
set.  
The information presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8 (see Sections 6.2, 7.3 and 
8.3 – Tables 6.1, 7.2 and 8.1) indicates that in practice SARS, TRA and KRA 
apply/have applied 10, 7 and 6 of the priority KPIs respectively. It is against 
this rationale that the fuzzy-set membership of the outcome shown in Table 
9.1 has been derived. It is of note that even though they were all established 
at around the same time, the three case studies covering the ARAs in Kenya, 
South Africa and Tanzania confirm that performance measurement in the 
three organisations has taken off in varying shapes and forms. This matter is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 10. 
Table 9.1: Membership of the set “adoption of performance measurement in ARAs” 





Key: 1= nine or more KPIs adopted; 0.75 = more than six but less than nine KPIs adopted; 0.5 = six KPIs adopted; 
0.25 = three but less than six KPIs adopted; 0 = no KPIS adopted 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
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9.2 Political economy environment 
Bovaird (2008: 186-187) suggests that the choice of KPIs can be drawn from 
a variety of disciplines including engineering, statistics, 
management/systems approach, management accounting and consumer 
marketing. The same author also contends that performance measurement 
is influenced by the school of political economy prevailing in a particular 
public sector environment. In this regard, he defines six such political 
economy schools: (1) welfare economics; (2) public choice theory; (3) 
principal-agent theory; (4) Austrian economics; (5) new institutional 
economics; and (6) classical and neo-Marxism (see Table 9.2). 
Table 9.2: Different schools of political economy 
School Key features 
Welfare economics Government pursuit of “economic efficiency and equity”. Seeks to correct market failures 
Public choice theory 
Measures: the elimination of government failures (e.g. inefficiency, budget  
maximisation, rent seeking); cost differences between publically and privately 
provided services; and the constitutional and pressure group constraints on 
budget-maximising bureaucrats 
Principal-agent theory 
The principal is the regulatory authority (e.g. ministry) and agent the regulated 
organisation (in this case ARA). Performance agreements may be in place. 
Agents may be subject to monitoring by the principal 
Austrian economics 
There is “no rationale for the public provision of goods and services through 
planned economies and no need for performance assessment”. Advocate 
policies such as deregulation, privatization, reduced taxation etc. 
New institutional economics Requires certain rules with respect to regulation. Adopts the use of pragmatic KPIs (e.g. reduced transaction costs) 
Classical and neo-Marxism 
KPIs “should heavily emphasize the leverage of public monies into public 
projects and the achievement of commercial or quasi-commercial rates of 
return of investment”. Neo-Marxism concerned with the impact of regulation on 
the business environment 
Source: Bovaird, 1996 
As discussed in Chapter 4 (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3) and confirmed by the 
three case studies, ARAs deploy the “systems approach which sets 
objectives” as well as KPIs for their attainment (Bovaird, 2008: 186). 
However, the KPIs applied at a corporate level are also incorporated from 
other disciplines. So for instance, expansion/contraction of the tax base, 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  159 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
processing turnaround times, taxpayer satisfaction and cost of collection 
measures are likely to be associated with statistical, engineering, consumer 
marketing and management accounting approaches respectively. 
One can not discern with certainty from the case studies presented in 
Chapters 6 to 8 of this thesis, which schools of political economy prevail in 
the three ARAs. On the one hand, in all three cases features of the principal-
agent theory appear to be in place, in that ARAs (the agents) are 
accountable to their Ministers of Finance (principals) largely for delivering 
revenue targets. In the case of South Africa, the Commissioner is required to 
present the ARA’s strategic plan and annual reports to Parliament. 
Furthermore, KRA is subject to annual performance contracts. However, 
KPIs contained in KRA’s performance contracts draw heavily on those 
contained in its strategic plan. 
On the other hand, all three ARAs have dabbled with the consumer 
marketing approach through attempts to measure taxpayer satisfaction and 
set service standards. According to the literature, the consumer marketing 
approach is the only discipline with links to specific schools of political 
economy – in particular its “obvious parallels to welfare economics and 
public choice theory” (Bovaird, 1996: 149). The theory also suggests a 
partiality towards welfare economics in that a “tax administration may play a 
powerful role in influencing the efficiency of the economy and equity of the 
tax system” (Mansfield, 1987: 1). In this regard, ARAs are expected to 
implement tax policies and laws to the letter. This requirement might be used 
to explain why both internal and external stakeholders in the three ARA 
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cases place great emphasis on the KPI - actual against forecast revenue. 
Still, it is significant that a focus on this particular KPI may be driven by an 
ARA’s raison d'être. Moreover, equity indicators demanded by external 
stakeholders that analyse progressivity and the degree to which the tax 
system is pro-poor are not defined in the three case study corporate plans, 
nor are they reported in ARA annual reports. 
On the basis of the points discussed above, only a few of the KPIs covered 
in this thesis can be connected to any of the political economy paradigms. 
Therefore, it may be the case that “actors are motivated more by pragmatic 
than philosophical considerations” (Bovaird, 1996: 163). This tendency 
towards a pragmatic orientation is supported by the work of: Denhardt and 
White (1986: 316) who assert that beyond technique, sound public 
administration demands “judgement and a good sense of future possibilities”; 
Hummel (1991: 35) who contends that seasoned and well educated public 
managers “explicitly rely on sources of knowledge other than mere scientific”; 
and Shields (1996) who posits that public administrators learn by solving 
problems in turbulent political environments. What is more, the key features 
of a pragmatic approach to performance measurement are the prominence it 
gives to quantification, with limited accent to theory (Talbot, 2010). 
Table 9.3 presents this researcher’s characterisation of the extent to which 
each organisation displays pragmatism in setting performance measures in 
its most recent strategic plan. It is noteworthy that in all three case studies, 
measures tend to be quantified. In addition, the ARAs have refined KPIs over 
time to reflect changed objectives and lessons learned. What is more data 
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availability is a major factor in the choice of KPIs. In addition, TRA’s focus is 
on KPIs identified for its main functional areas (see Chapter 7, Section 7.3). 
It also relies upon the feedback from real life experiences (e.g. the time 
release study) to fine-tune its KPIs. Yet there are points of departure. At 
KRA, given its principal-agent arrangements (see Chapter 8, Section 8.2), 
some KPIs are determined externally (at the centre) on the basis of national 
and sector priorities; the remaining indicators are developed internally using 
the balanced scorecard approach. In the case of SARS the choice of KPIs 
appears to be dependent on criteria such as accuracy; consistency; and the 
ability to explain trends. Also, due to other factors elaborated in this chapter 
such as culture, SARS seems to be shifting towards adopting a more 
positivist approach in the development of performance measures and 
predicting results. In any case, given the strong influence exercised by its 
Minister of Finance and Treasury (see Chapter 6, Section 6.5), SARS can 
only practice pragmatism within limits.  
Table 9.3: Membership of the set A 
ARA Set A – Pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in 




Key: 1= Plainly pragmatic; 0.75=More or less pragmatic; 0.5=In between; 0.25=More or less not pragmatic; and 
0=Plainly not pragmatic 
Criteria:  Plainly pragmatic = KPIs refined over time based on experience with no involvement by the principal in 
setting them; More or less pragmatic = KPIs refined over time based on experience with some involvement by the 
principal in setting them; In between = KPIs refined over time based on experience with significant involvement by 
the principal in setting them; More or less not pragmatic = KPIs refined over time based on experience with 
extensive involvement by the principal in setting them; Plainly not pragmatic = KPIs set by the principal with no 
consideration given to practice 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
9.3 Strategic considerations 
There is extensive discourse in the literature about the strategic 
considerations that an organisation needs to reflect on in the selection and 
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use of performance measures. The literature review in Chapters 3 and 4 (see 
Sections 3.2, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) suggests that managing for results is a key 
driver. In this regard, there is an argument that at the organisation level 
performance measures should be linked to strategic plans. Where this 
linkage is absent: 
 “The potential for goal conflict, confusion and inaccurate measurement 
arises…[Furthermore] performance measurement without broader 
strategic guidance fosters measurement without a sense of overall 
purpose; a technical exercise undertaken out of habit or administrative 
compliance, with little practical relevance for decision makers” 
(Moynihan, 2008: 7-8).  
Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3) specifies some general good practices for 
selecting KPIs at the outcome, output, process and input levels. Five 
additional criteria that should guide the development of outcome KPIs are: 
(1) relevance to the intended result; (2) “importance to the outcome”; (3) 
‘uniqueness’, thereby avoiding overlaps and duplications; (4) scope for 
manipulation; and (5) comprehensiveness (Hatry, 2006: 62).It is also the 
case that some outcomes are difficult to measure, so there may be need to 
identify appropriate proxy measures. Still, when an outcome consists of more 
than one dimension, organisations tend to measure a sub-set which should 
not be construed to “capture the entire truth in an objective and 
comprehensive way” (Marr, 2009: 140).  
The three ARAs covered in the case studies have accommodated the good 
practices around the choice of KPIs to varying degrees (see Table 9.4). To 
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begin with SARS’s current strategic plan contains at least one unique KPI 
that clearly relates to a corresponding outcome. Indices are being developed 
to measure levels of compliance in tax and customs. In addition, the current 
strategic plan draws on tried and tested KPIs such as, percentage uptake in 
electronic filing and average processing turnaround times, as additional 
proxy measures for outcomes. At the outcome level, the strategic plan 
minimises the use of output KPIs.  
Table 9.4: Membership of the set B 
ARA Set B – Good practices influence the choice of outcome KPIs
SARS (meets all criteria) 1 
TRA (meets criteria 1 and 2) 0.25 
KRA (meets criteria 1 and 2) 0.25 
Key: 1= Good practices clearly influence the choice of outcome KPIs (5 or more criteria met); 0.75= Good practices 
more or less influence the choice of outcome KPIs (at least 4 criteria met); 0.5= In between (at least 3 criteria met) ; 
0.25= Good practices have limited influence on the choice of outcome KPIs (at least 2 criteria met) ; and 0= The 
choice of outcome KPIs is clearly not influenced by good practices (no criteria met) 
Criteria: 1- KPIs are linked to the strategic plan; 2 – KPIs are tried and tested; 3 – KPIs are comprehensive; 4 – KPIs 
are valid, reliable and understandable; 5 – The ARA makes minimal use of output KPIs to measure the achievement 
of outcomes; and 6 – There is a unique KPI for every outcome 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
TRA’s third corporate plan contains many output KPIs. It does not assign 
KPIs to specific outcomes. Hence there is room to develop a comprehensive 
set of KPIs at the outcome level. However, three KPIs allocated to 
departments seem relevant and important to outcomes: (1) ‘revenue 
collection performance as a percentage’ (outcome – increase revenue 
collection in a cost effective way); (2) ‘percentage of VAT refunds made 
within a month’ (outcome – provide high quality and responsive customer 
services); and (3) ‘corruption perception index’ (outcome – provide high 
quality and responsive customer services). It is also noteworthy that one KPI, 
‘total revenue realised from audits as a percentage of revenue collected’ is 
not only susceptible to manipulation by focussing on easy targets, but could 
also encourage taxpayer harassment. 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  164 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
In the case of KRA: (1) the relevance of some of the outcome KPIs is 
questionable, for instance, the ‘number of visitors to KRA’s website’ and 
‘number and portfolio of publications available on website’, are not robust 
indicators of ‘improved voluntary compliance’; (2) most KPIs have an output 
orientation (e.g. ‘integrated audit function’, ‘refurbished and equipped 
offices’) and therefore are unlikely to give a feel for attributes such as 
improved timeliness, quality, effectiveness; (3) the menu of KPIs is not 
comprehensive – obvious gaps are around unique indicators for the level of 
voluntary compliance and taxpayer satisfaction. 
Other strategic considerations include, for example, the optimal number of 
KPIs and targets, whether there is a bias towards easy to measure KPIs, 
what impact performance measurement has on equity, and whether target 
setting adversely or favourably affects organisational performance. However, 
according to Boyne (2010c) debates on these issues tend to be conceptual, 
and are generally not supported by rigorous study. Still, according to the 
same author, a consistent finding from empirical studies is that “targets have 
a positive effect” on the performance of earmarked KPIs (Boyne, 2010c: 
222). Marr (2009: 188) concurs with this view, and recommends that targets 
set need to be: “(1) specific and time bound, (2) stretching and aspirational 
but achievable and (3) based on good information”. Nevertheless, as 
elaborated in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.7), there is need to have mechanisms 
in place to avoid the negative consequences of performance measurement 
design and target setting such as measure fixation and gaming.  
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Table 9.5 rates how each case covered by the research meets the criteria for 
the fuzzy set ‘target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement’. 
The three ARAs covered in Chapters 6 to 8 of this thesis all practice target 
setting. In general targets are stretched. In its current strategic plan, KRA 
has set three year targets primarily for output KPIs (KRA, 2009b: 68-71) – 
with a baseline year of 2008/09. TRA’s target setting centres on the 34 KPIs 
assigned to departments in its current corporate plan, which are mostly 
output focussed (TRA, 2010c: 44-45). TRA’s third corporate plan presents 
targets for five years (2008/9 – 2012/13). The baseline year is 2007/08. 17 
(or half) of the KPIs have baseline data. SARS sets targets for both outputs 
and outcomes based on baseline data (where available) at the strategic 
planning stage. In its current strategic plan, SARS has specified three-year 
targets (for the period 2011/12 to 2013/14) for 15 outcome KPIs against 
baseline data for 2010/11 (SARS, 2011b: 44-45). 
Table 9.5: Membership of set C 
ARA Set C – Target setting is a chief feature of performance 
measurement 
SARS (meets all criteria) 1 
TRA (meets all criteria) 1 
KRA (meets all criteria) 1 
Key: 1= Target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement (4 criteria met); 0.75= Target setting is more 
or less a feature of performance measurement (3 criteria met); 0.5= In between (2 criteria met) ; 0.25= Target setting 
is a rare feature of performance measurement (1 criterion met) ; and 0= Target setting is not a feature of 
performance measurement (no criteria met) 
Criteria: 1- Targets are set; 2 – Targets are specific and time bound; 3 – Targets are stretched; 4 – Targets have 
baselines 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
9.4 Policy and legislative requirements 
Some ARAs are also bound by national laws and policies to maintain and 
report on non-financial performance information. For example, the USA’s 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 seeks to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of agency programmes at the Federal level 
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by requiring the preparation of strategic and annual plans, and making it 
mandatory to monitor and report on performance measurement (Government 
of the United States of America, 1993). The GPRA gives Congressional 
Committees the power to approve performance reports and plans. 
KRA, SARS and TRA have to comply with government wide legislative/policy 
instruments for performance measurement. In particular: Kenya’s 
Performance Contracting Policy; South Africa’s Treasury Regulations of 
2007 and 2009 Policy on Improving Government Performance; and 
Tanzania’s MKUKUTA. Lessons of experience suggest that such frameworks 
can be problematic. Specifically, they can create conflicting perspectives 
between the legislature and executive. In the USA, differing views are said to 
have contributed to cynicism, with some executives commenting that “they 
were ‘doing GPRA’ simply because it is required by congress” (Brown, 2006: 
126). Moreover, there is the argument that one size does not fit all agencies 
(Wilson, 2006). This latter predicament was identified during the research at 
KRA – where some performance measures are determined at a ministerial 
level (see Chapter 8 – Section 8.6).  
In addition, ARAs’ enabling legislation typically specifies accountability 
arrangements with respect to performance. Typically, an ARA’s management 
and/or Board are required to report to the Minister of Finance on the 
organisation’s activities and financial statements. The KRA and TRA Acts 
stipulate that both authorities should include “performance indicators and any 
other related information” in their annual reports ((Government of Kenya, 
1995: 6) ;(United Republic of Tanzania, 1995: 13)). However, in the case of 
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South Africa, the SARS Act is not explicit about reporting on non-financial 
performance measures.  
On the basis of the above, it would appear that policy and legislative 
requirements influence performance measurement regimes to varying 
extents (see Table 9.6). From its establishment, in spite of the absence of 
explicit legislative and policy requirements on performance measurement, 
SARS appears to be the most rigorous of the three country cases in 
monitoring and reporting KPIs. Subsequent policies and regulations issued 
by the government have provided a basis for fine-tuning the existing 
performance measurement regime. In the case of Tanzania, the 
requirements of the TRA Act have ensured that the authority incorporates 
some KPI data in its annual reports, as legislation does not prescribe specific 
measures to be reported. KRA seems to be more driven by the demand to 
report KPI data in line with the national performance contracting policy than 
its enabling Act. 
Table 9.6: Membership of set D 
ARA Set D – Policy and legislative requirements make a significant 
difference to the performance measurement regime 
SARS (meets criteria 1, 2 and 5) 0.5 
TRA (meets criteria 1, 2, 3 and 4) 0.75 
KRA (meets criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6) 1 
Key: 1= Requirements make a significant difference (5 or more criteria met); 0.75= Requirements more or less 
influence the performance measurement regime (4 criteria met) ; 0.5= In between (3 criteria met) ; 0.25= 
Requirements rarely make a difference (2 criteria met) ; and 0= Requirements do not make any difference (1 or less 
met) 
Criteria: 1 – There is a government-wide legislative/policy instrument on performance measurement; 2 – The ARA’s 
Act specifies lines of accountability; 3 – The ARA’s Act contains explicit requirements on performance measurement; 
4 – Performance measurement is driven by criterion 1 or 2; 5 – There is evidence of the use of performance 
measures in spite of legislation; 6 – There are additional reporting requirements resulting from criterion 1 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
9.5 Structure of the revenue base 
All three country cases administer four main types of taxes: income taxes; 
VAT; excise taxes; and trade taxes. Following trade liberalisation and the 
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formation of regional trading blocks (such as the South African Development 
Cooperation and East African Community), the potential to raise revenues 
from international trade taxes is limited. Therefore the focus of ARAs is on 
improving trade facilitation and protecting borders which provides context to 
KPIs such as: reduction in trader compliance burden (see Table 4.3); 
percentage of declarations subject to errors committed by CFAs (see Section 
7.3); and percentage decrease in the size of the illicit economy (see Section 
6.3). 
In contrast, both income taxes and VAT offer revenue raising potential. 
According to the IMF (2011: 18) the key areas of reform that an ARA should 
address as a means of widening the tax base in the medium-term include: 
improving compliance especially with respect to VAT; “removing 
opportunities for avoidance and strengthening detection and enforcement”; 
and regularly compute and analyse revenues lost through tax exemptions. 
These key reform areas might explain why stakeholders covered by this 
research ranked certain KPIs as important – for instance the: voluntary 
compliance rate; expansion/contraction of the tax base; time taken to 
prepare, file and pay various taxes; and tax expenditure (see Table 5.5). 
The shadow economy, defined as “all market-based legal production of 
goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities”, 
is another potential source of tax revenue (Schneider et al., 2010: 4). 
Specifically, in the longer-term, ARAs can raise revenues from those outside 
the tax net (and largely in the informal sector) by “establishing streamlined 
tax regimes for small businesses, and extending to them the methods of 
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taxpayer segmentation” (IMF, 2011: 18). Such measures are relevant to all 
three case countries which have fairly substantial shadow economies as a 
percentage of GDP – Kenya (39.4%), South Africa (31.7%) and Tanzania 
(63%) (Schneider et al., 2010). 
A review of the case studies and KPIs in each country’s public service 
building blocks (see Annex C), suggest that one or more aspects of the 
revenue structure influences the choice of each ARAs KPIs (see Table 9.7). 
SARS appears to fully meet the requirements of this fuzzy set. Its current 
strategic plan measures: compliance by type of taxes; reduction in the 
compliance burden; detection through audits; the effectiveness of border 
controls; and the success of its efforts to reduce the size of its shadow 
economy. Specifically, the measurement framework also recognises the 
need to keep tabs on SARS’s small business segment by measuring the 
‘percentage increase in the small business register’. 
Table 9.7: Membership of set E 
ARA Set E – The structure of the revenue base influences the choice 
of KPIs  
SARS  (meets criteria 1, 2 , 3, 5 and 6) 1 
TRA (meets criteria 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6) 1 
KRA (meets criteria 1, 2 and 6) 0.50 
Key: 1= Structure influences choice of KPIs (5 or more criteria met); 0.75= Structure more or less influences the 
choice of KPIs (4 criteria met); 0.5= In between (3 criteria met) ; 0.25= Structure rarely makes a difference (2 criteria 
met); and 0= Structure does not make any difference (1 or less met) 
Criteria: 1 – KPIs cover the various types of taxes; 2 – The ARA measures the compliance burden; 3 – KPIs cover 
trade facilitation and/or the protection of borders; 4 - The ARA measures tax expenditure; 5 – KPIs cover small 
businesses; and 6 – KPIs cover issues to do with detection and/or risk  
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
TRA’s KPIs are disaggregated by type of tax, and centre on detection (e.g. 
time taken to identify stop-filers), enforcement (e.g. amounts realised from 
audits) and trade facilitation in customs (e.g. average time taken to 
accomplish customs clearance). Furthermore, the authority keeps tabs on 
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tax expenditure and the number of new small taxpayers registered through 
the presumptive tax system (TRA, 2011a). Therefore it can be induced that 
the structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs. 
The KPIs in KRA’s current corporate plan intimate that the choice of 
performance measures is not especially influenced by the structure of the 
revenue base. In this regard, the plan only specifies four relevant outcome 
measures: (1) increase in level of compliance among taxpayers; (2) reduced 
time taken to file tax returns; (3) integrated risk function in place; and (4) 
integrated audit function in place (KRA, 2009b). Still in determining 
membership in the set, this researcher recognised that KRA’s service 
standards in Table 8.2 are disaggregated by major types of revenue. 
9.6 Organisation culture – does it matter? 
According to Marr (2009: 8), a ‘command-and-control’ model of management 
undermines performance measurement. Such a model is characterised by 
an environment in which a focus on attaining targets is prevalent, and where 
an organisation’s staff are concerned that if the targets are missed “they will 
be blamed or even sacked”, and as a result they may be tempted to “game 
the process, lie about results or cheat by misreporting output” (Radnor, 2011: 
104). Instead a ‘performance-driven culture’ which promotes “learning and 
improvement” is preferred (see Box 9.1) (Marr, 2009: 8). In this regard, an 
empirical study by Moynihan and Pandy (2010: 13) found that organisational 
culture attributes such as openness, innovation and risk taking contribute to 
“higher reported information use”. 
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Box 9.1: Key characteristics of a performance driven culture 
“At the center of a performance-driven culture is organizational learning and improvement…[In] an 
enabled learning environment…all employees are actively seeking new strategic insights, which are 
based on their understanding of strategy, key performance questions and the performance 
indicators collected, to allow them to challenge strategic assumptions, to refine strategic thinking, to 
learn and to make better decisions to improve future performance”. In understanding the 
improvement process, one can draw parallels with formative assessment used in education. In 
particular, feedback systems enable an organisation’s staff to “learn and fine-tune or modify what 
they have been doing”. In other words, reflect and improve. Planned performance review meetings 
also assist teams to “focus on problem solving, decision making and formulating actions”.  
Source: Marr, 2009 
However, “achieving a supportive culture…is one of the most difficult and 
most important institutional challenges to be met” (Thomas, 2008: 180). 
Research by Micheli and Pavlov (2008), which the authors opine is 
applicable to PSOs in general, pinpoints four facets that need to be in place 
to promote what they term as a ‘performance culture’. First, there should be 
a shared appreciation across the organisation of a performance 
management framework’s objectives and methods. Second, frontline staff 
need to understand how performance data collected is interpreted and used. 
Third, effective structures and systems to support performance management 
need to be in place. Fourth, there should be linkages between objectives and 
associated KPIs at corporate, departmental and individual levels using 
cascading processes and/or through reward systems. 
Table 9.8 sets-out the degree to which each ARA qualifies for membership of 
the set ‘a performance culture has a bearing on the selection of KPIs’. The 
case studies suggest that the selection of KPIs is an iterative process. 
Furthermore, the country cases offer evidence that objectives and KPIs are 
cascaded down to individuals in the organisation – at least to management 
level.  
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Table 9.8: Membership of set F 
ARA Set F - A performance culture has a bearing on the selection of 
KPIs  
SARS  (meets all criteria) 1 
TRA (meets criteria 1, 3, 4 and 5) 0.75 
KRA (meets criteria 1, 4, and 5) 0.5 
Key: 1= A performance culture has a bearing on the selection of KPIs (5 criteria met); 0.75= A performance culture 
more or less has a bearing on the selection of KPIs (4 criteria met); 0.5= In between (3 criteria met ; 0.25= A 
performance culture rarely has a bearing on the selection of KPIs ( 2 criteria met); and 0= A performance culture has 
no bearing on the selection of KPIs (1 or less met) 
Criteria: 1 – There is a shared appreciation across the organization of the performance management framework; 2 – 
Staff understand how performance data collected is interpreted and used; 3 – There are structures and systems in 
place to support performance management; 4 – KPIs are cascaded from corporate to individual level; 5 – There is 
evidence of year-on-year improvements 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
The degree to which systems and structure have been developed to support 
a performance culture varies. SARS has invested substantial resources in 
implementing its Enterprise Performance Management Framework, by way 
of its leadership involvement, knowledge base, skills and systems (see 
Section 6.5). TRA’s Monitoring and Evaluation Database is accessible to its 
managers (see Section 7.5). In comparison, KRA’s structures and systems 
seem less well developed (see Section 8.5). 
The initiative at SARS to promote a common understanding of KPIs and 
performance data through the collaborative development of the ‘Reference 
Guide to Measures in the Strategic Plan’ implies that it is eligible for full 
membership of the set F. Whilst the TRA case does not offer any evidence of 
a similar initiative, it meets the remaining criteria offered by Micheli and 
Pavlov (2008). In sum, TRA’s performance culture more or less has a 
bearing on the selection of KPIs. Finally, it can be inferred from the case in 
Chapter 8 that systems and structures are not as effective as they could be, 
and more learning and understanding of the KPIs used is needed. Therefore, 
KRA’s performance culture is neither a strong nor a weak factor in the 
selection of KPIs. 
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9.7 Utility of performance data to external stakeholders 
The literature review in Chapters 3 and 4 dedicate Sections 3.4 and 4.5 to 
performance information use including reporting. The former section 
indicates that the use of performance information not only requires resources 
and a performance culture, but there also needs to be demand for it. The 
latter section confirms that performance reporting to ARAs’ external 
stakeholders is the norm. 
Whilst external stakeholders have limited options around terminating their 
dealings with ARAs (‘exit’), performance reporting is an important vehicle by 
which they can put pressure on them to enhance services delivery and meet 
their mandates through ‘voice’ ((Hirschman, 1970); (Van de Walle and 
Roberts, 2011)). Yet there is a school of thought that “when it comes to the 
actual use of performance reports, less enthusiasm is observed” (Van 
Dooren et al., 2010: 124). This lack of enthusiasm is attributed to 
“information overload” and external stakeholders “not knowing what 
credibility to attach to ‘official’ documents” as there is a perception that PSOs 
are partial to offering “flattering interpretations of their” performance 
(Thomas, 2008: 170). Moreover, performance reporting is sometimes 
perceived to be just a “public relations gimmick” (Ho, 2011: 200).  
To counter the challenges above, PSOs have sought to engage stakeholders 
through mechanisms such as the ‘co-production’ model in which they are 
involved in aspects of performance management (Van Dooren et al., 2010). 
Ho (2011) illustrates the practical use of this model in setting performance 
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measures and reviewing related reports in Iowa. One of the lessons distilled 
from this initiative is that external stakeholders: 
“Often have a different perspective on performance measurement than 
managers do. Generally, they are less interested in input and output 
measures, and more interested in outcomes and in citizen perception of 
service quality, responsiveness, customer services, intra-jurisdictional 
equity, transparency and effectiveness in public communication” (Ho, 
2011: 212). 
External stakeholders interviewed during this research pinpointed 12 priority 
KPIs that should feature in ARA reports (see Table 5.5 in Chapter 5, Section 
5.7). It is striking that many of the KPIs fall within the broad categories 
identified by Ho (2011). KPIs and targets to do with responsiveness are 
generally incorporated in service charters (see Chapters, 6, 7 and 8, 
Sections 6.4, 7.4 and 8.4). In addition, a review of the annual reports of the 
three ARAs found that SARS, TRA and KRA provide performance data on 9, 
7 and 3 of the 12 priority KPIs preferred by external stakeholders 
respectively. Data for three KPIs that are absent in the three ARAs’ annual 
reports evolve around the tax gap and equity and corruption. However, it is 
noteworthy that SARS does report on other governance measures, and that 
the government only grants tax exemptions “on an extremely exceptional 
basis” (African Development Bank Group, 2010b: 35). On the basis of the 
available evidence, Table 9.9 presents membership of the fuzzy-set ‘priority 
information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of 
performance measures’. 
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Table 9.9: Membership of set G 
ARA Set G – Priority information demanded by external stakeholders 




Key: Key: 1= nine or more KPIs adopted; 0.75 = more than six but less than nine KPIs adopted; 0.5 = six KPIs 
adopted; 0.25 = up to three but less than six KPIs adopted; 0 = no KPIS adopted 
Criteria: These are the number of KPIs demanded by external stakeholders which have been adopted (see Table 
5.5) 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
9.8 Data collection cost and quality considerations 
The cost of collecting data for selected KPIs is often an important 
consideration. The least expensive data are typically mined from an 
organisation’s administration systems and records. However, an 
organisation’s own sources have drawbacks in that they tend not to maintain 
outcome and service quality data ((Hatry, 2006); (Van Dooren et al., 2010)). 
Therefore the next best option may be to survey clients which: is an 
expensive undertaking in that it often demands external expertise; is time 
consuming; and may result in low response rates. Moreover, “respondent’s 
perceptions and memory may be less convincing than data obtained from 
agency records” (Hatry, 2006: 86).  
Van Dooren et al. (2010) offer additional data sources, one of which is self 
assessment whose greatest drawback has to do with the risks it presents in 
terms of gaming and cheating. Another source relevant to ARAs is data 
generated by ‘international statistical institutions’ such as the World Bank. 
Section 4.6 of Chapter 4 covers universal KPIs for ARAs. It is noteworthy 
that there are reservations about the use of global indicators and associated 
data. Whilst such indicators offer unique and comprehensive data sets, they 
may have limitations around context, assumptions made and data quality 
((Høyland et al., 2008); (Van de Walle, 2006)). 
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In addition to cost considerations, there is also the issue of data quality. In 
this regard it is important to ensure accuracy and reliability. The UK’s 
National Audit Office (NAO) recommends the institutionalisation of a control 
framework encompassing the following components: “clear definitions, good 
documentation and management review of data reliability”; as well as 
disclosure in reports where there are limitations in data quality (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2005: 13). In addition, the risks are mitigated as 
systems mature and human capacity is built. The NAO also offers feedback 
in its reports to Parliament and the Public on the quality of performance 
measurement data and systems. It rates each system using one of the 
following categories: “fit for purpose; broadly appropriate but in need of 
strengthening; and not fit for purpose” (Comptroller and Auditor General, 
2009: 1). 
Table 9.10 indicates the extent to which ‘data collection cost and quality are 
taken into account in selecting KPIs’ in the three ARAs. The three ARAs all 
use administrative systems and records as well as stakeholder surveys as 
data sources. None of the three cases make use of universally available 
performance measures and data – especially the ‘time taken to prepare, file 
and pay various taxes’ and ‘global ease of paying taxes ranking’, which ARA 
executives identified as important indicators. At the time of undertaking this 
research, SARS was in the process of assessing the viability of these 
measures. KRA expressed some reservations around the methodology used 
to collect data – especially since executives were of the view that they do not 
participate in the process. TRA executives did not indicate the reasons 
behind the non-use of these indicators. 
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Table 9.10: Membership of set H 
ARA Set H – Data collection cost and quality are taken into account 
in selecting KPIs 
SARS (meets criteria 2 to 6) 1 
TRA (meets criteria 2, 3, 5 and 6) 0.75 
KRA (meets criteria 2, 3 and 5) 0.5 
Key: 1= Data collection cost and quality are taken into account in selecting KPIs (5 or more criteria met); 0.75= Data 
collection cost and quality are more or less taken into account in selecting KPIs (4 criteria met); 0.5= In between (3 
criteria met); 0.25= Data collection cost and quality are rarely taken into account in selecting KPIs (2 criteria met); 
and 0= Data collection cost and quality are not taken into account in selecting KPIs (1 or less met) 
Criteria: 1 – The ARA uses data generated by international statistical institutions; 2 – Data quality is an area of 
concern; 3 – Management assesses the reasonableness of the data; 4 – Data quality is independently verified; 5 – 
The ARA uses a combination of data sources (i.e. from routine systems and surveys); 6 – The ARA is automated 
with the aim of enhancing data integrity 
Source: This researcher’s assessment 
Executives in the three ARAs identified data quality to be an area of concern. 
In the case of SARS considerable effort has gone and continues to go into 
improving data quality – in this regard automation has been an enabler and 
so are reviews to establish whether the performance data generated is fit for 
purpose (see Chapter 6, Section 6.6). Furthermore, KPI data are subject to 
audit by the AGSA (see Chapter 6, Section 6.5). TRA has benefited from an 
automated data collection system. Its management undertakes reviews to 
ascertain the reasonableness of data quality. However, non-financial data is 
not subject to external audit (see Chapter 7, Section 7.5). Finally, KRA 
extracts most of its non-financial data from manual records – there is 
concern about its accuracy, especially since it is not subject to audit (see 
Chapter 8, Section 8.6). 
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10 Towards convergence of 
performance measurement practices 
in ARAs 
10.1 Introduction 
On the basis of the assessment in Chapter 9, this chapter seeks to make 
generalisations about the conditions needed by an ARA to adopt robust 
performance measurement practices. The analysis applies the Qualitative 
Comparative (QCA) technique and fsQCA software developed by Ragin 
(2008) and Ragin et al. (2008). 
10.2 Overall minimum and maximum membership 
The fuzzy-set memberships presented in Table 10.1, suggest that each 
ARA’s performance measurement regime is influenced by different 
configurations of the conditions or ‘recipes’ reviewed in Chapter 9. The tenth 
column in the table indicates the minimum degree of membership of the 
three cases in the recipe that combines all eight conditions. In this regard, 
the cases which least conform with the eight conditions (measured as: 
ܴ௜ ൌ min ሺܣ௜, ܤ௜, ܥ௜, ܦ௜, ܧ௜, ܨ௜, ܩ௜, ܪ௜ሻ) are: (1) TRA and KRA for factor B; (2) and 
KRA for factor G. In contrast, the eleventh column in the table sets out the 
maximum degree of membership for each case using the same eight causal 
conditions. Cases with full membership (measured as: 
ܴ௜ ൌ max ሺܣ௜, ܤ௜, ܥ௜, ܦ௜, ܧ௜, ܨ௜, ܩ௜, ܪ௜ሻ) are: (1) TRA for condition A; (2) SARS for 
condition B; (3) All three ARAs for condition C; (4) KRA for condition D; (5) 
SARS and TRA for condition E; and (6) SARS for condition F and H. In sum, 
SARS, TRA and KRA are full members in 5, 3 and 2 fuzzy-sets respectively. 
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Table 10.1: The eight conditions shaping performance measurement in ARAs  
ARA A B C D E F G H Cralln Crallu Y
SARS 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 
TRA 1 0.25 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 1 0.75 
KRA 0.75 0.25 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 1 0.5 
Key: A= Pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in setting performance measures; B= Good practices 
influence the choice of outcome KPIs ; C=Target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement; D= Policy 
and legislative requirements make a significant difference to the performance measurement regime; E= The 
structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs; F= A performance culture has a bearing on the 
selection of KPIs; G=Priority information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of performance 
measures; H= Data collection cost and quality are taken into account in selecting KPIs; Cralln = Minimum score (A 
∩ B ∩ C ∩ D ∩ E ∩ F ∩ G ∩ H); Crallu = Maximum score (A U B U C U D U E U F U G U H); Y= Degree of 
adoption of performance measures 
Source: This researcher’s assessment (see Tables 9.1-9.9)  
10.3 Select review of linkages between conditions 
Factor C (target setting) appears to be the most dominant condition in that all 
three cases have full membership. The analysis of C’s theoretic-set 
consistency vis-à-vis the other factors (X = A, B, and D to H) expressed as 
ሺ ௜ܺ ൑ ܥ௜ሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ܥ௜ሻሿ/∑ሺ ௜ܺሻ and coverage (ሺ ௜ܺ ൑ ܥ௜ሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ܥ௜ሻሿ/
∑ሺܥ௜) are set out in Table 10.2. The data shown confirms that all seven 
conditions are a perfect subset of C. For that reason C demonstrates 
theoretic consistency as an outcome. In other words all other conditions have 
an impact on the target setting condition C and must be met first – being 
pragmatic (A) but at the same time applying good practices in developing 
KPIs (B), meeting policy and legislative requirements (D), taking the structure 
of the revenue base into account (E), nurturing a performance culture (F), 
catering for external stakeholder demands (G) and keeping a check on data 
quality and collection costs (H). In practice, the criteria required for C to be 
attained make sense. 
The analysis of coverage of C shows that condition E has the highest raw 
coverage, or empirical importance, as it accounts for the largest chunk of 
instance of C. Given a benchmark score for coverage of 0.75, factors A, D, F 
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and H take second place. Factor B is the least important. This finding makes 
sense in the day to day functioning of an organisation where targets are set 
for outputs, activities and inputs. 
Table 10.2: Set membership in outcome C (target setting)  
 A B D E F G H
Consistency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Raw coverage 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.75 
Key: A= Pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in setting performance measures; B= Good practices 
influence the choice of outcome KPIs ; C=Target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement; D= Policy 
and legislative requirements make a significant difference to the performance measurement regime; E= The 
structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs; F= A performance culture has a bearing on the 
selection of KPIs; G=Priority information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of performance 
measures; H= Data collection cost and quality are taken into account in selecting KPIs 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
In terms of causal necessity, Table 10.3 shows the extent to which several 
combinations of conditions must be present for outcome C to occur 
(expressed as causal necessity by the equation ሺܥ௜ ൑ ௜ܺሻ ൌ  ∑ሾminሺ ௜ܺ, ܥ௜ሻሿ/
∑ሺܥ௜ሻ). Again the results suggest that the subset relationship for a necessary 
condition to a large extent holds true. It is striking that the combination of 
conditions ‘A, B, D and E’ and ‘H, A, B and D’ are absolutely necessary for a 
C outcome. This necessity holds true in spite of the fact the B has the lowest 
coverage from a theoretical consistency perspective in Table 10.2. 
Table 10.3: Consistency and coverage in outcome C (target setting) 
Condition Consistency Coverage
A +B + D + E 1 1 
E + F + G + H 0.83 1 
F + G + H + A 0.92 1 
G + H + A + B 0.92 1 
H + A + B + D 1 1 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
Condition E (taking the structure of the revenue base into account) is less 
dominant as an outcome than C. Specifically only four conditions B (use of 
good practices in setting outcome KPIs), F (performance culture), G (priority 
information demanded by external stakeholders) and H (data cost and 
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quality) are perfect subsets of E. It is also worth observing that in practice it 
is entirely feasible that they could be subsets of E (see Table 10.4). In 
addition, the raw coverage for conditions C, F, G and H is significant, but low 
for B. Moreover, analysis to establish whether C, F, G and H are necessary 
conditions produces 1 and 0.83 for consistency and coverage respectively, 
and they are therefore empirically important.  
Table 10.4: Set membership in outcome E (taking the structure of the revenue base 
into account) 
 A B C D F G H
Consistency 0.89 1 0.83 0.78 1 1 1 
Raw coverage 0.8 0.6 1 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Key: A= Pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in setting performance measures; B= Good practices 
influence the choice of outcome KPIs ; C=Target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement; D= Policy 
and legislative requirements make a significant difference to the performance measurement regime; E= The 
structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs; F= A performance culture has a bearing on the 
selection of KPIs; G=Priority information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of performance 
measures; H= Data collection cost and quality are taken into account in selecting KPIs 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
Conditions A, D, F and H display similar combinations of membership scores 
but not in the same order. There is therefore merit in at least further 
analysing them. In particular, a more in depth review of condition H (see 
Table 10.5), shows that conditions B, F and G are perfect subsets in terms of 
theoretic set consistency. But condition B’s consistency coverage is 
somewhat low when compared to E. From a necessity perspective conditions 
E (taking the structure of the revenue base into account), F (performance 
culture) and G (priority information demanded by external stakeholders) 
generate consistency and coverage scores of 1 and 0.9 respectively. The 
coverage result suggests that these three conditions are almost sufficient to 
achieve outcome H (data quality and cost). 
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Table 10.5: Set membership in outcome H (data collection costs and quality 
considerations) 
 A B C D E F G
Consistency 0.78 1 0.75 0.78 0.9 1 1 
Raw coverage 0.78 0.67 1 0.78 1 1 0.89 
Key: A= Pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in setting performance measures; B= Good practices 
influence the choice of outcome KPIs ; C=Target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement; D= Policy 
and legislative requirements make a significant difference to the performance measurement regime; E= The 
structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs; F= A performance culture has a bearing on the 
selection of KPIs; G=Priority information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of performance 
measures; H= Data collection cost and quality are taken into account in selecting KPIs 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
Conditions B, G and H are perfect subsets of F in terms of theoretic set 
consistency, with coverage of 0.67, 0.89 and 1 respectively. Condition E has 
a consistency and coverage of 0.9 and 1. As condition B’s coverage is below 
the benchmark, it has not been used to assess sufficiency. Instead a check 
to establish necessity of conditions E, G and H generates consistency and 
coverage scores of 1 and 0.9 respectively – indicating that these three 
conditions are necessary for the outcome F. 
From a theoretic set consistency perspective, condition G only has one 
perfect sub-set B, with a coverage of 0.75. Whilst conditions C, E, F and H 
are not perfect subsets, their theoretic set coverage is 1. It is also worth 
pointing out that conditions D (meeting policy and legislative requirements), 
A (being pragmatic) and B (use of good practices in setting outcome KPIs) 
do not have any perfect subsets. 
Condition B (use of good practices in setting outcome KPIs), features as a 
perfect subset of conditions C, E, F, G and H. As condition B does not 
posses a single perfect subset, and condition G has the highest theoretic set 
consistency of 0.75 (albeit with a coverage of 1), on the basis of Ragin’s 
rules there is no case for testing its necessity as an outcome (see Table 
10.6). However, on the basis of the literature on ARAs and the three case 
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studies, it is worth noting that the use of outcome KPIs is at an infancy stage. 
Furthermore as G (priority information demanded by external stakeholders) 
is an outcome of B, it can be understood why it does not feature more 
prominently as a causal condition. 
Table 10.6: Set membership in outcome B (use of good practices in setting outcome 
KPIs) 
 A C D E F G H
Consistency 0.44 0.5 0.44 0.6 0.67 0.75 0.67 
Raw coverage 0.67 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 
Key: A= Pragmatism is a dominant political economy driver in setting performance measures; B= Good practices 
influence the choice of outcome KPIs ; C=Target setting is a chief feature of performance measurement; D= Policy 
and legislative requirements make a significant difference to the performance measurement regime; E= The 
structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs; F= A performance culture has a bearing on the 
selection of KPIs; G=Priority information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of performance 
measures; H= Data collection cost and quality are taken into account in selecting KPIs 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
10.4 Effects of different causal configurations 
The scrutiny in the previous section provided some useful insights. However, 
more complex configurations are needed to be able to make generalisations 
about which combinations of conditions or recipes that have the greatest 
influence on the outcome - adoption of performance measurement in ARAs 
(Y). To this end, Table 10.7 presents each ARA’s minimum membership 
when the causal conditions are combined into six configurations. The 
configurations are drawn from the original recipe as well as the five sets in 
Table 10.1 with the highest degrees of membership, and computed using 
fsQCA. The results show that a logical AND (ת) of the top two sets C and E 
generates ‘Crtop2’, the highest level of membership among the five 
configurations. ‘Kratop2’, ‘Comb3’ and ‘Crtop4’ have the next highest levels 
of membership. 
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Table 10.7: Set membership in the top five configurations, plus one recipe with eight 
conditions  
ARA Top five configurations Cralln 
Crtop2 Kratop2 Tratop3 Comb3 Crtop4 
SARS 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 
TRA 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.25 
KRA 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 
Key: Crtop2=Minimum score (C ∩ E); Kratop2= Minimum score (C ∩ D); Tratop3= Minimum score 
(A ∩ C ∩ E); Comb3= Minimum score (E ∩ F ∩ H); Crtop4= Minimum score (C ∩ E ∩ F ∩ H); Cralln 
= Minimum score (A ∩ B ∩ C ∩ D ∩ E ∩ F ∩ G ∩ H) 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
Table 10.8 sets out the theoretic set consistency and coverage of the six 
recipes for the outcome Y. The results show that four configurations ‘Crtop2’, 
‘Comb3’, ‘Crtop4’ and ‘Cralln’ each with two, three, four and eight conditions 
respectively have the highest consistency. The last three configurations are 
perfect subsets of the outcome Y. In addition, ‘Crtop2’, ‘Comb3’ and ‘Crtop4’ 
all have a coverage of 1 indicating that these configurations account for the 
entire “sum of memberships” in Y (Ragin, 2008: 117). In contrast Cralln 
accounts for less than half of the sum of memberships in Y.  
Table 10.8: Consistency and coverage of the six recipes for the outcome Y 
ARA Top five configurations Cralln 
Crtop2 Kratop2 Tratop3 Comb3 Crtop4 
Consistency 0.9 0.78 0.88 1 1 1 
Coverage 1 0.78 0.78 1 1 0.44 
Key: Crtop2=Minimum score (C ∩ E); Kratop2= Minimum score (C ∩ D); Tratop3= Minimum score 
(A ∩ C ∩ E); Comb3= Minimum score (E ∩ F ∩ H); Crtop4= Minimum score (C ∩ E ∩ F ∩ H); Cralln 
= Minimum score (A ∩ B ∩ C ∩ D ∩ E ∩ F ∩ G ∩ H) 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
Furthermore, a test to establish the necessity of the configurations in Table 
10.8 (i.e. ‘Crtop2’, ‘Kratop2’, ‘Tratop3’, ‘Comb3’ and ‘Crtop4’), which have a 
consistency and coverage of at least 0.75 indicates that they are all sufficient 
in terms of consistency. In addition, ‘Comb3’ has the highest coverage of 0.9. 
The other configurations have the same coverage of 0.75 indicating that 0.25 
of the coverage necessary to achieve sufficiency is attributable to other 
configurations. 
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Table 10.9: Results of test to establish necessity 
ARA Crtop2 Kratop2 Tratop3 Comb3 Crtop4
Consistency 1 1 1 1 1 
Coverage 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.9 0.75 
Key: Crtop2=Minimum score (C ∩ E); Kratop2= Minimum score (C ∩ D); Tratop3= Minimum score 
(A ∩ C ∩ E); Comb3= Minimum score (E ∩ F ∩ H); Crtop4= Minimum score (C ∩ E ∩ F ∩ H) 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
The configurations in Table 10.9 if combined provide “direct evidence of their 
relative empirical importance” as one can establish partitioning coverage – 
that is the elements of coverage that are common (raw) and unique (Ragin, 
2008: 63). Given that various configurations can deliver the same outcome, 
partitioning coverage helps in identifying the combinations with the greatest 
coverage. In this regard, on the basis that ‘Comb3’ appears to be the 
superior configuration, it is compared with each of the other four 
combinations. A two step process has been followed. First, the maximum 
membership scores are computed using the Boolean algebra function ‘or’ 
(׫). The results are presented in Table 10.10. 
Table 10.10: Membership in the combined configurations 
ARA Join 1 Join 2 Join 3 Join 4 
SARS 1 1 1 1 
TRA 1 0.75 1 0.75 
KRA 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 
Key: Join 1= Maximum score (Comb3 U Crtop2); Join 2= Maximum score (Comb3 U Kratop2); Join 
3= Maximum score (Comb3 U Tratop3); Join 4= Maximum score (Comb3 U Crtop4) 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
Table 10.11 presents the partition coverage for the four combined 
configurations. The solution coverage (SC) is computed using the formula 
ሺ∑ܥ஼௢௡௜ା஼௢௡௝ ∑ܻ⁄ ሻ, where: ‘Coni’ and ‘Conj’ are the two configurations that 
are combined to create a solution (C); and ‘Y’ is the outcome. The raw 
coverage (RC) for each solution is set out in Table 10.9 (ሺ∑ܥ஼௢௡௜ ∑ܻ⁄ ሻ). The 
unique coverage (UC) is calculated by subtracting the overlap that arising by 
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combining configurations – as an equation the UC for Coni is expressed as 
ܷܥ௖௢௡௜ ൌ ܵܥ െ ܴܥ௖௢௡௝ . 
The results indicate 100% solution coverage for all combined configurations. 
However, most (65%) of the solution coverage in each solution set is 
overlapping. ‘Comb3’ has the highest unique coverage in all four solution 
sets. In particular, ‘Comb3’, made of conditions to do with the revenue base 
(E), performance culture (F) and data cost and quality (H), ‘embraces’ 25% 
of the instances of Y. In contrast the other four configurations (‘Crtop2’, 
‘Kratop2’, ‘Tratop3’ and ‘Crtop4’) only embrace 10% of the instances of Y.  
Table 10.11: Partitioning of combined configurations (first four solutions) 
ARA Join 1 Join 2 Join 3 Join 4 
Solution coverage 1 1 1 1 
  Comb3 Crtop2 Comb3 Kratop2 Comb3 Tratop3 Comb3 Crtop4 
Raw coverage 0.9 0.75 0.9 0.75 0.9 0.75 0.9 0.75 
Unique coverage 0.25 0.1 0.25 0.1 0.25 0.1 0.25 0.1 
Solution consistency 0.9 0.82 0.9 1 
 Comb3 Crtop2 Comb3 Kratop2 Comb3 Tratop3 Comb3 Crtop4 
Consistency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Key: Join 1= Maximum score (Comb3 U Crtop2); Join 2= Maximum score (Comb3 U Kratop2); Join 
3= Maximum score (Comb3 U Tratop3); Join 4= Maximum score (Comb3 U Crtop4) 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
A review of four alternative solution sets (see Table 10.12) indicates that 
‘Join8’ has both the lowest membership and coverage in outcome Y. 
Furthermore, the configurations that make up ‘Join8’, namely ‘Kratop2’ and 
‘Tratop3’, each account for only 3% of the instances of Y. Also ‘Join 6’ and 
‘Join7’ throw up similar results, in particular: solution consistency and 
coverage of 0.9 and 1 respectively; and 25% unique coverage by the sets 
‘Crtop2’ (target setting (C) and revenue base (E)), ‘Tratop3’ (pragmatism (A), 
target setting (C) and revenue base (E)) and ‘Crtop4’ (target setting (C), 
revenue base (E), performance culture (F) and data cost and quality (H)). It 
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is noteworthy that the condition centring on the revenue base (E) is present 
in all three sets. 
Table 10.12: Partitioning of combined configurations (next four solutions) 
ARA Join 5 Join 6 Join 7 Join 8 
Solution coverage 1 1 1 0.78 
 Crtop2 Kratop2 Crtop2 Tratop3 Crtop2 Crtop4 Kratop2 Tratop3 
Raw coverage 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Unique coverage 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.03 0.03 
Solution consistency 0.75 0.90 0.90 0.70 
 Crtop2 Kratop2 Crtop2 Tratop3 Crtop2 Crtop4 Kratop2 Tratop3 
Consistency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Key: Join 5= Maximum score (Crtop2 U Kratop2); Join 6= Maximum score (Crtop2 U Tratop3); Join 
7= Maximum score (Crtop2 U Crtop4); Join 8= Maximum score (Kratop2 U Tratop3) 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software 
10.5 Paths charted by truth tables 
According to Ragin (2008) truth tables which also use Boolean logic offer a 
much more scrupulous approach to understanding causal links than the 
techniques above. Essentially a truth table generates logical configurations 
of causal conditions exponentially. The total number of configurations 
depends on the number of conditions (k), and is expressed as 2௞. A truth 
table takes into account both the inclusion and exclusion of a condition in 
recognition of its relevance or irrelevance. Put succinctly, “the goal of truth 
table construction is to identify explicit connections between combinations of 
causal conditions and outcomes” (Ragin, 2008: 125). 
This piece of research assessed the effects of eight causal conditions, which 
meant that a truth table produced 2଼ (or 256) configurations. However, given 
that the number of cases are very small (N=3), there is limited diversity and 
as a result most rows in the truth table did not have cases (referred to as 
remainders). Specifically, for the eight causal conditions, the truth table only 
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generates one complex solution (without any remainders which are labelled 
as false), excludes causal condition B or in Boolean algebra ~ ܤ, and has 
very low raw, unique and solution coverage (see Table 10.13). The truth 
table for some of the configurations in Section 10.4 again only generate one 
complex solution, however, their raw coverage is higher, and there are two 
empirical instances where this solution holds true.  






ܣ ת ~ܤ ת ܥ ת ܦ ת ܧ ת ܨ ת ܩ ת ܪ 0.44 0.44 1 
ܥ ת ܧ ת ܨ ת ܪ 1 1 1 
 ܧ ת ܨ ת ܪ 1 1 1 
ܥݎݐ݋݌2 ת ܶݎܽݐ݋݌3 ת ܭݎܽݐ݋݌2 ת ܥ݋ܾ݉3 ת ܥݎݐ݋݌4 0.78 0.78 1 
Join 1 ሺܥ݋ܾ݉3 ׫ ܥݎݐ݋݌2ሻ 1 1 0.9 
Source: Computed using fsQCA software  
According to Ragin and Sonnett (2004: 11) “limited diversity (i.e., an 
abundance of remainders) is the rule, not the exception, in the study of 
naturally occurring social phenomena”. Therefore, even when there are 
many cases (large N), a researcher will not necessarily obtain sufficient 
levels of diversity. It is therefore recommended that researchers should 
attempt ‘thought experiments’ to establish the counterfactual, based both on 
their knowledge and the available theory (Ragin et al., 2008). The 
counterfactual can be either: easy or difficult when a parsimonious solution is 
identified; or easy when an intermediate solution is found. The software 
fsQCA enables users to establish both solutions by including remainders.  
A test to establish the counterfactuals for the solutions in Table 10.13 was 
not particularly fruitful. The only alternative solution that could be discerned is 
a parsimonious and intermediate solution for ܥ ת ܧ ת ܨ ת ܪ, which excludes 
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C. Apparently, QCA has limited utility when N is less than 12 (Fiss and 
Ragin, No date). 
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11 Overall findings, recommendations 
and concluding remarks 
11.1 Overview 
This final chapter recapitulates the research findings in the context of the 
objectives specified in the introductory chapter of this thesis. In addition, the 
chapter delineates which findings constitute a contribution to knowledge 
and/or practice, and offers recommendations on the way forward. The 
chapter also: points out the limitations of the research; suggests areas 
worthy further investigation; and ends with some concluding remarks. 
11.2 Research findings, contribution and recommendations 
The key research findings, contributions and recommendations presented in 
this section respond to: the question ‘How can performance measures in 
African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective?’; and in particular the six 
areas where this researcher anticipated that she could make a contribution 
(see Section 1.3). The section is set out under the following sub-headings: 
(1) level of attention accorded to performance measurement; (2) a possible 
menu of performance metrics; (3) the role of performance measurement 
processes; and (4) conditions associated with the adoption of performance 
measurement. 
11.2.1 Level of attention accorded to performance measurement 
Before undertaking this research, this author’s was of the view that 
performance measurement has not received as much attention in ARAs. 
However, the review of the features of performance measurement in tax 
administration in Chapter 4 revealed that at a planning level, the broad 
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outcomes sought are fairly consistent in ten ARAs from around the globe, 
and to some extent there are commonly associated KPIs. Furthermore, the 
three case studies in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate that the level of 
sophistication in the use of KPIs has been incremental.  
However, one finding is that, to varying extents, in two of the cases, reporting 
of non-financial metrics to the public is limited, and could give the impression 
that performance measurement is not a priority. Another finding from the 
research is that revenue related KPIs receive more attention than non-
financial metrics such as value for money, quality and responsiveness. It is 
also noteworthy that in the three cases, service charters are either just a 
paper exercise or the standards of service specified in them have been 
surpassed and are therefore no longer aspirational. There is also the issue 
around whether ARAs have too many measures contained in their corporate 
plans and service charters. In this regard, one school of thought suggests 
that “well-developed, usable Balanced Scorecards seem to have 12 to 24 
metrics, with the number being more on the lower side” (Person, 2009: 74). 
11.2.2 A possible menu of performance metrics 
Prior to the outset of this exercise, it was anticipated that that the research 
would identify a menu of reliable and objective KPIs for ARAs to adopt to 
assess their accomplishments, and benchmark performance against other 
tax administrations. To these ends: (1) this researcher reviewed the literature 
to identify appropriated benchmark KPIs; (2) ARA executives in the three 
country cases were asked to rank a combination of around 40 commonly 
used, universal and good practice KPIs; and (3) external stakeholders were 
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given the opportunity to provide their views on their priority performance 
information preferences.  
A possible menu of about 40 performance metrics is presented in Table 11.1 
for 12 broad outcomes based on four main sources. First, Chapter 5 
presents the 12 (out of 39) of the most highly ranked KPIs by ARA 
executives. Second, the same chapter also sets out another six priority 
performance measures demanded by external stakeholders. Third, during 
the research, additional KPIs were identified during interviews and when 
reviewing country case documentation. Fourth, Vázquez-Caro and Bird 
(2011) suggest a number of useful KPIs that can be used for internal 
monitoring and benchmarking purposes (see Table 4.7).  
One broad outcome that is not explicit in the 10 ARAs appraised in Chapter 
4, and in the three case studies (Chapters 6 to 8) evolves around fairness 
and equity of the tax system in terms of policy formulation and its 
administration. Yet, it was apparent from external stakeholders interviewed 
that there is need for ARAs to report on the progressivity of the tax system. 
Therefore, as a contribution to practice, this researcher recommends the 
inclusion of an additional broad outcome, ‘O12 – The tax system is equitable 
and fair’. Table 11.1 proposes a number of KPIs for this broad outcome.  
It is probably worth distinguishing between two equity and fairness KPIs 
presented in the table. The level of horizontal equity is “a principle used to 
judge the fairness of taxes, which holds that taxpayers who have the same 
income should pay the same amount in taxes” (Cordes, 1999: 195). On the 
other hand, vertical equity focuses more on the tax burden of various income 
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groups. Vertical equity has more of an appeal with civil society organisations 
concerned about progressivity in the tax system, and its impact on the poor. 
In addition, it is worth drawing attention to the finding that ARA executives 
consider that the two universal indicators appearing in Table 11.1 which have 
utility to a tax administration are the ‘time taken to prepare, file and pay 
various taxes’ and ‘global ease of paying taxes ranking’. The same group are 
of the view that measures such as CITPROD, PITPROD and VATCGR might 
be better suited to management by fiscal policy departments in their 
ministries of finance. The one universal KPI that most ARA executives 
suggest has limited utility is the ‘tax staff per population’. As a result, three 
alternative measures are included under O9. 
 Table 11.1: Possible menu of KPIs 
Broad outcome  KPI 
O1 – Increased revenue collections 
for development  
• Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue (in aggregate and by tax 
type)^ 
• Tax gap^ 
• Revenue growth projections^ 
• Tax expenditure/ exemptions^ 
O2 – Operations modernised 
through automation  
•  % uptake in eFiling^ 
• Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes^ 
• No (%) of transactions with internet access> 
• No (%) of totally automated interactive transactions> 
O3 – Improved taxpayer services  •  % uptake in eFiling^ 
• Average processing turnaround time for tax returns and refunds^ 
•  % taxpayer satisfaction with services/information & tools provided by 
ARA^ 
• Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes^ 
• Global ease of paying taxes ranking^ 
 O4 – Taxpayers find it easy to pay 
taxes and hence comply  
•  Reduction in taxpayer compliance burden^ 
•  Voluntary compliance rate^ or compliance index* 
• Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes^ 
• % of taxpayers who think it is easier now than in the past to deal with 
the tax system^  
• % increase in small business register* 
• Number of (VAT/TIN) registered taxpayers per annum* 
O5 – Deliberate non-compliance 
effectively addressed through 
enforcement  
•  No of (or %) cases recommended for prosecution/ successfully 
prosecuted^  
• % of exceptions uncovered from the risk engine+  
• No (or %) of non-compliant cases uncovered as a result of audits^ 
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Broad outcome  KPI 
• Average number of days taken to identify stop-filers* 
 O6 – The ARA operates efficiently 
& effectively  
•  Amount spent for every dollar of tax collected or administrative costs 
as a % of revenue collected ^ 
• Percentage increase in accuracy of processing^ 
• % reduction in escalated service queries^+  
O7 – Size of the illicit economy 
minimised 
• % decrease in the size of the illicit economy* 
• Customs compliance index* 
O8 – Legitimate trade enhanced • Reduction in trader compliance burden^ 
• % trade volume coverage by preferential traders* 
• Percentage increase in the number of AEOs* 




• Tax staff as a proportion of registered (or active) taxpayers+ 
• Productivity per employee* 
• Proportion of staff in key managerial, technical and professional 
positions+ 
• Training impact on tax administration performance> 
O10 – An enabling work 
environment in place 
• Employee satisfaction rate or index* 
• Training impact on tax administration performance> 
O11 – An ARA with a strong 
corporate image & which is well 
governed 
• Governance/ corruption indicators (e.g. East Africa Bribery Index* and 
corruption perception index*) 
• Unqualified audit report* 
O12 – The tax system is equitable 
and fair 
• Level of horizontal equity> 
• Level of vertical equity^ 
• Number (%) of administrative general rulings conceived collectively with 
civil society> 
Source: ^=KPI a priority of external/internal stakeholders; * = KPI identified from country cases; += KPI suggested 
during interviews with ARA executives; >=KPI recommended by Vázquez-Caro and Bird (2011) 
Source: Findings from this research 
11.2.3 The role of performance measurement processes 
The research also explored what role processes play in ensuring that 
performance measurement is efficient and effective. Three lessons can be 
discerned as follows. First, to ensure that there is a common understanding 
within the organisation it is helpful to document and disseminate protocols 
which for example define: the performance management cycle; KPIs, their 
baselines and data collection sources; and reporting routines. Second, 
cascading corporate level KPIs to individuals and gauging their performance 
against targets promotes accountability for results, and enables an ARA to 
operationalise strategic plans. Third, it is important to have the requisite 
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capacity in place, in terms of dedicated human resources and systems to 
monitor and report performance, and thereby make performance 
measurement part and parcel of daily operations.  
The SARS case study exemplifies how the issues above have been dealt 
with on a comprehensive basis. A unique practice at SARS, worthy 
consideration in other ARAs, is its use of information displays (dashboards), 
to enable management to easily analyse, absorb and act on results. Typically 
dashboards are displayed graphically, with specific information given to the 
appropriate audiences within the organisation (Harbour, 1997). Such a 
process therefore needs to be carefully designed in collaboration with 
internal stakeholders. In this regard, Eckerson (2006) presents guidelines on 
managing the design process which in brief suggest it is vital to: (1) segment 
users and their requirements; (2) maintain simplicity; (3) optimise each of the 
three main purposes of dashboards (i.e. analyse, absorb and act) by being 
selective, providing actual results, using traffic light colours (i.e. green, amber 
and red) to pinpoint areas of good performance and exceptions, and 
providing information on a timely basis etc. It is worth drawing attention to the 
fact that it may not necessary for an ARA to invest in new software to design 
dashboards. They can even be designed using office automation tools such 
as Microsoft Excel. However, it is imperative to bear in mind that ‘bling’ has 
far much less significance than “informed design” to aid communication 
(Few, 2006: 4). 
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11.2.4 Conditions associated with the adoption of performance measurement 
The literature on performance measurement in PSOs and ARAs suggests 
that the following eight causal conditions (sets) contribute to the adoption of 
performance measurement: (1) pragmatism is a dominant political economy 
driver in setting performance measures (A); (2) good practices influence the 
choice of outcome KPIs (B) ; (3) target setting is a chief feature of 
performance measurement (C); (4) policy and legislative requirements make 
a significant difference to the performance measurement regime (D); (5) the 
structure of the revenue base influences the choice of KPIs (E); (6) a 
performance culture has a bearing on the selection of KPIs (F); (7) priority 
information demanded by external stakeholders impacts the choice of 
performance measures (G); and (8) data collection cost and quality are taken 
into account in selecting KPIs (H). 
The case studies confirm that the three ARAs are members of all eight sets, 
albeit to varying extents. A further investigation of the relationship between 
the eight conditions found that seven of them are a subset of C – in other 
words target setting depends on the presence of the other causal conditions. 
In contrast, the use of good practices in the choice of outcome KPIs (B) has 
no dominance over the other seven causal conditions, and appears to have 
less weight. This finding is not only plausible in the three ARAs, but at the 
time of writing this thesis it is a shared experience across ARAs (OECD, 
2011: 80). 
In addition, when the conditions are combined to form causal configurations, 
this researcher found that the configuration ‘Comb3’ (constituting the 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  197 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
minimum score of (E ∩ F ∩ H)), has the highest consistency and coverage. 
What is more all combinations of configurations with high coverage and 
consistency consist of the condition E. A final test using the truth table 
algorithm again produces the solutions ‘ܥ ת ܧ ת ܨ ת ܪ’ and ‘ܧ ת ܨ ת ܪ’ as the 
complex and parsimonious solutions respectively. These findings offer a 
contribution to theory (knowledge). 
The fuzzy set analysis above is consistent with other empirical research 
which has found that target setting is important. The analysis also suggests 
that in the three case countries the structure of the revenue base, a 
performance culture and data collection cost and quality are the three other 
important factors that influence the adoption of performance measurement. 
This implies that in choosing KPIs the following issues need to be taken into 
account: (1) strategic initiatives by type of tax and/or taxpayer (to cover the 
revenue base angle); (2) the need to promote organisation learning and 
improvement as a means of engendering a performance culture (e.g. staff 
sensitisation, supporting processes and systems, complementarity between 
KPIs at corporate and individual levels); and (3) the use of readily available 
KPI data such as universal indicators to keep data collection costs down, and 
mechanisms such as performance audits to independently verify data quality.  
In addition, on the basis of the pattern of results presented in Chapter 10, 
Table 10.1, this researcher makes the following analytical generalisations. 
First, an ARA with a fully developed performance measurement system 
(such as SARS): (1) draws on good practices to select KPIs which take into 
account the structure of the revenue base, external stakeholders’ needs and 
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issues to do with data collection costs and quality; (2) sets associated 
targets; and (3) engenders a performance culture. Second, when an ARA 
has not fully developed its performance measurement systems, the selection 
of KPIs is more driven by pragmatic needs as opposed to good practices. 
The extent to which the structure of the revenue base, external stakeholder 
preferences and data cost and quality factors influence the choice of KPIs 
varies – they appear to be less important when the performance 
measurement system is least developed. Still such ARAs find it important to 
set targets. 
11.3 Limitations of the research 
The research focussed on the review of performance measures at an 
institutional level, particularly on outcomes and outputs and their associated 
measures. In other words, the research did not drill down in much detail to 
institutional activities, inputs or individual contributions. However, the author 
did endeavour to gain an appreciation of the processes in place for 
performance measurement at all levels. Also, the research did not assess 
the robustness of strategic planning processes in ARAs – for instance, 
whether each ARA’s strategic goals and objectives address the issues in the 
internal and external environment. 
In addition, although the case studies were purposively selected, the sample 
size was relatively small, mainly to facilitate in depth study. However, given 
that eight causal conditions were identified as having a bearing on the 
adoption of performance measurement (Y), potentially there could be 256 
(2଼) configurations generated by the truth table that are associated with 
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outcome Y. Ragin and Sonnett (2004) are of the view that a larger N will not 
necessarily offer more diversity. In any case there are only around 180 
national tax administrations around the world17. Still a larger number of cases 
may have provided further insights. 
Also, the use of QCA is not without its critics. First, concerns have been 
expressed around ‘thought experiments’ using logical remainders to 
generate truth tables in that they can not be verified. De Meur et al. (2009) 
defend the application of logical remainders by arguing that they do not 
compromise or contradict the empirical evidence – they just facilitate the 
researcher in finding parsimony through a reduced configuration. In this 
regard, they contend that “to be qualified as ‘scientific’, research must go 
beyond the mere description of observed phenomena” and make inferences 
(De Meur et al., 2009: 153). On the contrary, Cooper and Glaesser (2011) 
consider that when fsQCA software is used to generate parsimonious and 
intermediate solutions, the process tends to be mechanical. In their opinion 
any decision over which logical remainders to use is contestable, and should 
therefore be supported by theory. As a result, the same authors state that “it 
might be safer to privilege complex solutions” as they “assume that any 
remainder rows do not obtain an outcome” (Cooper and Glaesser, 2011: 11). 
Second, is the challenge around the selection of independent variables 
(causal conditions). Specifically, there is a view (Amenta and Pulson, 1994) 
that fsQCA limits the number of conditions that can be analysed especially 
with small N (De Meur et al., 2009). A large number of independent variables 
                                                     
17 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings  
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford  200 
How can performance measures in African ARAs be strategic, efficient and effective? 
 
  
reduces the level of coverage, but when omitted can throw misinformed 
results. De Meur et al. (2009) counter this argument by stating that this 
problem is not unique to QCA. It is prevalent in most types of empirical 
research. Nevertheless, one benefit of QCA is that it generates any 
contradictory results, which should prompt the researcher to review the 
causal conditions selected. 
Finally, other than the analysis of the political economy environment and 
policy and legislative requirements in Sections 9.2 and 9.4 respectively, the 
research did not explore other aspects of managerial autonomy as causal 
conditions. The OECD (2009:9) lists these other features of autonomy in 
ARAs as: (1) the power to design internal structures; (2) budget expenditure 
discretion; (3) freedom to set staffing levels within predetermined ceilings; 
and (4) leeway to set staff remuneration levels. However, based on their 
enabling legislation, it is probably fair to state that the extent of autonomy in 
KRA, SARS and TRA with respect to these latter features does not vary 
substantially. Still they could be important considerations in other ARAs. 
11.4 Possible areas for future research 
In terms of possible areas for further research, this researcher’s immediate 
recommendation would be to extend this piece of work to cover at least 
another 10 ARAs in both emerging and developed economies. The aims 
would be to more rigorously test the eight causal conditions, with a view to 
identifying other configurations that influence the adoption of performance 
measurement in ARAs, and to understand why certain conditions are more 
prominent than others. From the documents and internet sources reviewed 
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during this research, potential ARAs include: (1) IRD New Zealand and ATO 
which focus on a handful of outcome KPIs; (2) MRA with very many output 
KPIs, but a world class reputation as one of the easiest places to pay taxes 
in the world (ranks 11th); (3) CRA which uses both outcome and output KPIs, 
ranks 5th in terms of ease of paying taxes, and has been fairly transparent 
about issues to do with data quality; (4) a Francophone African country (e.g. 
Cape Verde or Cameroon); (5) a West African economy (e.g. Nigeria – a 
natural resource rich economy with a low tax threshold; or Ghana – which 
was the first country in SSA to set-up an ARA); (6) a country from the horn of 
Africa such as Ethiopia which has a similar history to Anglophone African 
countries in setting up an ARA; and (7) another Southern and East African 
country – possibly Botswana and Rwanda ranked 22nd and 19th in terms of 
ease of paying taxes respectively. 
In the medium term, many other aspects of performance measurement in 
ARAs would benefit from research. For example, with respect to the 
proposed menu of KPIs recommended in Table 11.1, some of Vázquez-Caro 
and Bird’s (2011) benchmark KPIs require further definition. In particular, 
although it is a useful outcome KPI, how does an ARA definitively measure 
‘training impact on tax administrative performance’. Besides the level of 
horizontal equity needs to be circumscribed for specific types of taxes. In this 
regard as Cordes (1999: 196) points out: 
“The standard of horizontal equity will have limited applicability when 
taxes are levied to account for the presence of external costs. For 
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example, smokers and non-smokers will face sharply different tobacco 
tax burdens, even when their incomes are the same.” 
In addition areas cited by Boyne (2010c) (see Table 3.3), that appear 
amenable for future research in ARAs include: the usefulness of outcome 
KPIs as opposed to measures that focus on outputs and activities; the 
relationship between the number of targets and service performance; and the 
relationship between targets and incentives. In addition, there is scope to 
look into rationalising the various benchmarking tools in place with a view to 
ensuring they have utility to ARA managements and their diverse 
stakeholders (see Section 4.6). Furthermore, it would be beneficial to build 
specific theories around the eight causal conditions for tax administrations. 
Such an undertaking would demand more in-depth case studies, and could 
be informed by the research proposed in the paragraph above. 
11.5 Concluding remarks 
This research has contributed to the practice of performance measurement 
through the critical review of global practices in tax administrations in 
general, and assessing their relevance in three specific countries. As a result 
of this exercise, this researcher has contributed to practice by suggesting a 
possible menu of KPIs: clustered around 11 broad outcomes discerned from 
the literature; and a 12th outcome identified from interviews with external 
stakeholders. On the basis of this recommendation, any ARA that decides to 
overhaul its performance measures should plan to do so within its existing 
performance management framework. This means that an ARA may need to 
wait to initiate changes during its next strategic planning cycle. 
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The research also offers insights and recommendations on important 
process issues. Over and above these two contributions, the researcher has 
endeavoured to make sense of the factors that influence the adoption of 
performance measurement – in other words a contribution to knowledge. 
Whilst this researcher does not claim to have devised an exclusive recipe, 
she has identified relationships and configurations that provide a foundation 
for further research.  
There is wide scope for more research in the area of performance 
measurement in ARAs, particularly since public revenues are likely to remain 
a principal source for financing critical development initiatives in developing, 
emerging and developed countries. In this regard, with time, this researcher 
anticipates that ARAs will gradually be able to focus on the aspects of their 
operations that make the greatest difference.  
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For official use only 
 
Serial No     Code      Data Entry  
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
SURVEY ON COMMONLY AND UNCOMMONLY USED KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Elizabeth Kariuki is conducting her doctoral research on performance measurement in African semi-Autonomous 
Revenue Authorities (ARAs).  The aim of the research is to explore how best to address the following question: 
‘How can performance be efficiently and effectively measured in African ARAs?’ 
The aim of this questionnaire is to gather important information for the study, specifically on the 
following areas: 
• The importance if any of key performance indicators that are commonly used by ARAs around the world 
to assess the attainment of organisational outcomes; 
• The importance if any of key performance indicators that are universally used by development 
organisations to benchmark ARAs; 
• The extents to which respondents agree that some select key performance indicators are amenable for 
universal application. 
Any views obtained from you during the research will not be directly attributed to you by name. All records related 
to your involvement in this research will be stored in a locked file cabinet. Only the principal investigator will have 
access to any identifiable information – however, authorised representatives of the University of Bradford may 
review your identifiable research information. 
Your participation in the research is voluntary. Whether or not you provide your consent for participation will have 
no effect on your current or future relationship with the University of Bradford. Furthermore, you may withdraw 
from the research at any time by providing a written and dated notice. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
I recommend you follow the guidelines detailed below in completing this questionnaire: 
• Read each question / statement carefully; 
• Read the response instructions carefully to ensure you are recording your views in the required manner; 
• Record your first and natural answer; 
• If you circle the incorrect response by mistake please make sure you score this out fully and indicate 
your actual response in the normal way 
Example 1 








Please fill in your name and contact details in the relevant boxes at the beginning of the questionnaire.  This is for 
quality control and back check purposes only. 
If you have any queries regarding the questionnaire or the study, please do not hesitate in contacting 
Elizabeth Kariuki by email at ejnkariuki@yahoo.co.uk  or Tel +254-733-838710. Thank you. 
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Name of revenue authority  
Department  
 
Job designation  
 
   
COMMONLY USED KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Q1. Please indicate how important or unimportant the following commonly used key performance indicators 
(KPIs) are to your organisation, in gauging the achievement of the outcomes specified below?   
 
 While some or all KPIs may or may not be important to you, please consider the scale carefully, as it 
would be beneficial to distinguish between the relative level of their importance or unimportance to you. 
 
Please circle one answer in each row only. 
 










not at all 
important 
Actual revenue compared to forecast revenue  1 2 3 4 5 
 










not at all 
important 
Percentage uptake in electronic filing  1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of ARA transactions which are 
processed using automated systems  1 2 3 4 5 
 









not at all 
important 
Percentage uptake in electronic filing  1 2 3 4 5 
Average processing turnaround time for tax returns and 
refunds 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of taxpayers satisfied  with 
services/information and tools provided by ARA 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of calls/correspondence answered within a 
target timeframe 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Outcome 4 - Taxpayers find it easy to pay 









not at all 
important 
Reduction in taxpayer/trader compliance burden 1 2 3 4 5 
Voluntary compliance rate 1 2 3 4 5 
The level of collectable debt 1 2 3 4 5 
The level of cash recovered from debt book 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of tax returns received by the filing due date 1 2 3 4 5 
Returns as a percentage of registered taxpayers 1 2 3 4 5 
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Outcome 5 - Deliberate non-compliance 









not at all 
important 
 Percentage of actual audits against plan 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of actual audits Vs registered taxpayers 1 2 3 4 5 
 No of non-compliant cases uncovered as a result of 
audits 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of cases recommended for prosecution 1 2 3 4 5 
 Number of cases successfully prosecuted 1 2 3 4 5 










not at all 
important 
Amount spent for every dollar of tax collected  1 2 3 4 5 
Administrative costs as a percentage of revenue collected 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of digitised records with the ARA 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage increase in timeliness 1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage increase in accuracy of processing 1 2 3 4 5 
 Percentage reduction in escalated service queries 1 2 3 4 5 
 
UNIVERSAL KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 
Q2. Please indicate how important or unimportant the following universally available key performance 
indicators (KPIs) are to your organisation, in gauging the achievement of the outcomes specified below?   
 
 While some or all KPIs may or may not be important to you, please consider the scale carefully, as it 
would be beneficial to distinguish between the relative level of their importance or unimportance to you. 
 
Please circle one answer in each row only. 
 










not at all 
important 
Corporate Income Tax Productivity (CITPROD)1 1 2 3 4 5 
Personal Income Tax Productivity (PITPROD)2 1 2 3 4 5 
 









not at all 
important 
Global ease of paying taxes ranking 1 2 3 4 5 
Outcome 4 - Taxpayers find it easy to pay 









not at all 
important 
Time taken to prepare, file and pay various taxes 1 2 3 4 5 
 VAT Gross Compliance Ratio  (VATGCR)3 1 2 3 4 5 
                                                     
1 Revenue productivity is calculated by dividing total corporate income tax revenues by GDP and then dividing 
this by the general corporate income tax rate. 
2 It is calculated by taking the actual revenue collected as a percentage of GDP, divided by the weighted average 
PIT rate 
3 It is computed by dividing VAT revenues by total private consumption in the economy and then dividing this by 
the VAT rate. 
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Outcome 9 - Staff capacity and/or 









not at all 
important 
Tax staff per population 1 2 3 4 5 
 
GOOD PRACTICE INDICATORS 
 
Q3. Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree that the following key performance indicators 
(KPIs) can be used on a universal basis (by ARAs), to gauge the achievement of the outcomes specified 
below?   
 
 While some or all KPIs may or may not be important to you, please consider the scale carefully, as it 
would be beneficial to distinguish between the relative level of their importance or unimportance to you. 
 
Please circle one answer in each row only. 







Percentage of electronic tax returns processed within x 
days of receipt 
1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of paper returns for individuals and non-
individuals processed within x and y days of receipt 
respectively 
1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of correspondence sent to the automated 
reply email reply service addressed within x working days 
1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of correspondence sent through normal 
channels addressed within x working days 
1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of electronic and paper amendment requests 
addressed within x days and y days of receiving all the 
necessary information respectively 
1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of taxpayers notified of the outcome of audits 
within x days of your ARA making a decision 
1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage of clerical or administrative errors fixed within 
x days 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Outcome 4 - Taxpayers find it easy to pay 







Percentage of taxpayers who agree that my ARA has 
made it easier to complete an income tax return 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Percentage of taxpayers who think it is easier now than in 
the past to deal with the tax system 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Themes covered in interviews with ARA executives 
Performance measurement practices: 
1. Are all the results of all transformation initiatives measured? 
2. Which transformation initiatives pose measurement challenges? Why? 
3. How are measures agreed upon? How are targets set? Are performance 
measures and targets regularly reviewed to assess their efficacy and/or 
relevance? Which stakeholders are involved in the process? 
4. What alternative measures could be used? Is it cost effective to collect data 
for such measures? 
5. What incentives are in place to use performance measures and targets? Are 
there any sanctions for non-compliance? 
6. How much of the performance measurement data is extracted from existing 
systems? 
7. Does the ARA solicit taxpayer opinions to assess the adequacy, and 
effectiveness of its transformation initiatives? If not why not? If so, is such 
feedback incorporated into the performance measurement process? 
Reliability of performance measures: 
8. Do stakeholders/ARA staff trust the performance information/ measures 
reported by the ARA? 
9. Are current indicators the right measures? Do they reflect the ARA’s strategic 
priorities/ issues? Can they be used as proxies to attribute good/poor 
performance? How? Are there gaps? 
10. Are there any unintended consequences associated with particular targets? 
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Demand for performance information: 
11. What are the uses of performance measures (e.g. reporting, aid decision-
making)? By whom? 
12. What performance information do the ARA’s management/board and Ministry 
of Finance demand? How frequently? 
13. Do any external stakeholders review performance measures reporting in 
ARAs’ annual reports? 
14. What measures are most valued by ARA staff and their key stakeholders? 
Why? 
Processes/routines: 
15. Is the performance measurement process routinised? What 
routines/processes/ systems are used to collect, analyse and report data? 
16. Who is involved in the operation of the performance measurement system? 
What is each jobholder’s responsibility? How have their capacities been 
developed? 
17. How do performance measurement routines vary in practice from prescribed 
rules? 
18. How have the tasks/routines around performance measurement changed over 
time?  
19. Is there discussion about making further changes to the process? What 
strategies are in place to effect changes? Who will be involved? What forms of 
resistance to the changes are anticipated? How can be resistance be 
minimised? 
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Comparative arrangements:  
20. What measures do the best in class organisations use to monitor 
performance? Why? 
21. What lessons can be garnered from best in class organisations? 
Enhancing the performance measurement framework: 
22. Can a monitoring framework be developed, implemented and sustained to 
measure impact on a holistic basis? What actions need to take place? 
23.  What capacity constraints and cultural changes need to be addressed to 
successfully implement and sustain a new performance measurement 
system? Why? How? 
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Topic guide for external stakeholders – tax practitioners, 
academics, associations and think tanks 
 
1. What if any are the merits of your tax office/authority reporting its annual performance? 
2. In your view, what is the best medium for disseminating reports? – glossy publications, mass 
media, semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (ARA) website etc. Why? 
3. What priority performance information would you expect to find in your tax office/authority 
report? 
4. Have you ever reviewed your tax office/authority’s annual reports? 
5. If so, what do you consider was the most valuable information reported? What reported 
information does not add value? 
6. How would you rate the way your tax office/authority’s annual reports are presented, 
structured, easy to read etc.? (1= very effective, 2=effective, 3= no strong opinion, 4= 
ineffective and 5= very ineffective)  
Very effective 1 
Effective 2 
No strong opinion 3 
Ineffective 4 
Very ineffective 5 
 
7. How else if at all can performance reports be improved? 
8. How accessible is the ARA to follow-up questions? 






Annex B: Various KPIs in use by 
ARAs 
PSV’s building blocks – Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) – case study






To  be an effective &
efficient  tax administration
which promotes voluntary
compliance by providing
high quality customer 
service with fairness &
integrity through competent
& motivated staff
• Administer tax laws
• Monitor, oversee & 
coordinate activities
• Monitor & ensure collection 
of fees, levies, charges, 
taxes by MDAs
• Advise on fiscal policy
• Promote voluntary 
compliance
• Improve taxpayer services




• Courts of law
• Tax consultants and 
• Clearing & forwarding 
agents





• Privacy & confidentiality
• Presumption of honesty
• Right to object to an 
assessment
• Right to plan tax affairs 
so as to reap maximum 
benefit under the 
revenue laws
• TRA will meet service 
standards specified in
Outcomes
What are the end results we aim to deliver to key internal and external 
stakeholdersDeveloping
outcomes
    
evasions
•Produce trade statistics
   
e.g. CTI, TCCIA etc
•General public
   
the taxpayer charter
• Revenue collections increased in a cost-effective way
• TRA’s operations modernised
• Customers/taxpayers receive high quality and responsive services
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
      
• Improved voluntary compliance
• An enhanced staff performance management system
Outcome Strategies KPIs
R ll ti B d th t b N f i t d t i th ITAX t
Developing
metrics
evenue co ec ons 
increased in a cost-
effective way (O1)
• roa en e ax ase
•Strengthen domestic revenue operations
• Improve tax structure
• Enhance the system for monitoring & 
controlling the cost of revenue collection






• Introduce electronic operations
• Enhance custom administration system
• Enhance domestic tax administrative 
system
• Strengthen data production & 
t
• % of operations conducted electronically
• % 
•% of transactions processed through ITAX
• None
R d ti i d t i timanagemen • e uc on n ocumen  process ng me
Customers/taxpayers 
receive high quality  
and responsive 
services (O3)
•Enhance TRA quality management 
system
• Improve customer service






• Enhance risk management
• Enhance tax knowledge
• Provide support to local government 
authorities
• None
•% taxpayer awareness on tax matters
• None




• Improve staff performance appraisal 
system
• Strengthen management controls
• Improve staff capacity






PSV’s building blocks – Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) – case study







To promote compliance with 
Kenya’s tax, trade, and border 
legislation and regulations by 
promoting standards set out in 
the Taxpayers Charter and 
responsible enforcement by 
highly motivated and 
professional staff thereby
• Assessing, collecting and 
accounting for all revenues 
in accordance with specific 
laws
• Advising the Minister for 
Finance on matters relating 
to revenue administration






•Clearing & forwarding 
agents
• Professional organisations
•Impartial , consistent & 
equitable treatment
• Privacy & confidentiality
• Presumption of honesty
• Timely notifications 
•Right to object to or appeal 
against an assessment
• Timely processing of
Outcomes
What are the end results we aim to deliver to key internal and external stakeholdersDeveloping
outcomes
   
maximizing revenue collection 
at the least possible cost for 
the social- economic well-
being of all Kenyans.
   
functions in relation to revenue 
as the Minister may direct
 
• General public
   
transactions
•KRA will meet service 
standards specified in the 
taxpayer charter
• 1- A professional team that is well remunerated
2 A bli k i t t d
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
• - n ena ng wor  env ronmen  crea e
• 3- Authority fully automated - allowing for a single view of the taxpayer and full utilisation of IT to promote 
compliance
• 4- KRA transited into a fully functioning organisation
• 5- Customer compliance costs minimised and services enhanced




1 (O9) • Ratio of staff salaries to the average in the 
financial sector as classified by State 
Corporations Advisory Committee 
• Develop a competitive & attractive remuneration package
• Enhance KRA’s corporate culture by espousing its core values
• Enhance capacity for the KRA team
• Implement Human Resources best practices
2 
(O10)
• Refurbished & equipped offices
• % of ISO requirements on work 
environment met
• Implement work environment policy
• Implement additional initiatives to ensure compliance with ISO 
standards
3 (O2) • Enhanced ICT services • Enhance ICT services, information systems security & ICT 
governance
• Modernise, maintain & integrate IT systems
• Enhance functionality of other IT systems
• Enhance & maintain IT infrastructure
4 (O9) • Integrated audit function in place
• Integrated risk management function in 
place
• Fully working functional structure in place
• Implement an integrated KRA wide audit function
• Implement an integrated KRA wide risk management function
• Implement functional structure
• Retain ISO certification
5 (O4) N b f i it t KRA’ b it M k i f ti il bl l t i ll KRA b it d • um er o  v s ors o s we s e
• Number and portfolio of publications 
available on website
• Reduced time taken to file tax returns
• a e n orma on ava a e e ec ron ca y on  we s e an  
improve outreach
• Implement electronic return filing and payment
• Streamline refund payment procedures
6 (O1) • Actual against target revenue
• Increase in level of compliance among 
taxpayers
• Reduced debt level
• Maximise revenue collection
• Discourage & deter non-compliance
• Reinvigorate management of debt
• Enhance enforcement capability
B2
PSV’s building blocks – South African Revenue Service (SARS) – case study





To  optimise revenue yield, 
to facilitate trade and enlist 
new tax contributors by 
promoting awareness of the 
obligation to comply with tax 
and customs laws, and to 
provide a quality responsive
• Secure the efficient and 
effective, and widest 
possible. enforcement of: (1) 
national legislation; and (2) 
any other revenue legislation 






• SITE & below threshold
• Large, medium and small 
businesses
•To be informed, assisted & heard
•To complain, object and appeal 
when taxpayer dissatisfied or 
disputes tax liability
•Taxpayer information will be 
treated confidentially
•High standard of professional
Outcomes
What are the end results we aim to deliver to key internal and external stakeholdersDeveloping
  ,  
service to the public • Advise the Minister (at 
his/her request) on revenue 
matters
• Public benefit 
organisations and  
government departments
• Employers as agents
    
ethics
• Impartial, fair, equitable & non-
biased treatment 
• Minimising the cost & compliance 
burden
•SARS will meet service standards 
specified in the taxpayer charter
outcomes
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
• 1- Increased customs compliance
• 2 - Increased tax compliance
• 3 - Increased ease  and fairness of doing business with SARS
• 4 - Increased cost effectiveness, internal  efficiencies and institutional responsibility
O t i di t St t i i iti
Developing
metrics




• Customs compliance index (per tax 
product)
• Decrease in size of illicit economy
• % trade volume coverage by preferential 
traders
• Customs revenue collections
• Drive revenue realisation to deliver now & ensure sustainability
• Fully deliver on customs mandate
• Implement segmentation
• Enable people to perform at their peak




• Tax compliance index
• Tax revenue collected
% PIT/CIT/VAT filing compliance
• Drive revenue realisation to deliver now & ensure sustainability
• Implement segmentation
Enable people to perform at their peak•    
• % audit coverage of registered taxpayers 
• % increase in small business register
• Cash recovered from debt book
•       




• Reduction in taxpayer compliance burden
• Reduction in trader compliance burden
• % uptake in eFiling, declaration & payment 
submissions for all tax products
•Average processing turnaround time for
PIT/CIT returns and/or VAT refunds
% d ti i l t d i i
• Drive productivity, service quality & cost efficiency
• Implement segmentation
• Enable people to perform at their peak
• Deepen key relationships to manage the whole value system





• Unit cost per process
• Productivity per employee
• % reduction in escalated service queries
• % first contact resolution in contact centre 
and branches
• % of files digitised within SARS
• Unqualified audit report
• Drive productivity, service quality & cost efficiency
• Improve the SARS operating model, streamline governance & 
strengthen leadership
• Implement segmentation
• Enable people to perform at their peak
•Deepen key relationships to manage the whole value system
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PSV’s building blocks – Inland Revenue (IR) of New Zealand - benchmark





To collect 85% of the 
Crown's revenue as well as 
collecting and disbursing 
social support programme 
payments and providing the 
government with policy 
advice
• To provide robust & 
comprehensive advice
• Responsible for care and 
management of the taxes 
covered by the Inland 
Revenue Acts
• To collect over time the
•Individuals & families
•Businesses & employers
• Non profit organisations
• Tax agents 
• The IR will provide reliable and 
correct advice &information about 
taxpayer entitlements & obligations
• The IR will treat all information 
about taxpayers as private and 
confidential, and keep it secure
• The IR will apply the law
Outcomes
Wh t th d lt i t d li t k i t l d t lDeveloping
     
highest net revenue that is 
practicable within the law
• Furnish to the Minister a 
report on the administration 
of the Inland Revenue Acts 
during the financial year
      
consistently so everyone receives 
their entitlements and pays the 
right amount
• Taxpayers have the right to 
question the IR
a  are e en  resu s we a m o e ver o ey n erna  an  ex erna  
stakeholdersoutcomes
• Ultimate outcome – Improving the economic & social well being of New Zealanders
• Intermediate outcome 1 - Revenue is available to fund government programmes through people meeting 
payment obligations of their own accord
• Intermediate outcome 2 - People receive payments they are entitled to, enabling them to participate in society
Raw metrics




Revenue is available to fund government 
programmes through people meeting payment 
obligations of their own accord (O1&4)
• The amount of revenue collected compared to 
forecast revenue
•The level of collectable debt (debt under installment             
arrangement & residual collectable debt)
People receive payments they are entitled to, 
enabling them to participate in society
• The level of people’s awareness of their social 
support entitlements
•The number of people who take up their 
entitlements (compared to forecast)
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PSV’s building blocks – Australian Tax Office (ATO)- benchmark








To optimise voluntary 
compliance and make 
payments under the law in a 
way that builds community 
confidence
• The Australian 
Government’s principal 
revenue collection agency
• A large payer of Australian 
Government funds
• An administrator of major 
aspects of Australia’s 
superannuation system
th t di f th
• Individuals
• Businesses
• Not for profit 
organisations
• Government agencies
• Tax practitioners 
• Fair and reasonable treatment
• To be assumed to be honest 
unless they act otherwise
• Professional  service and 
assistance from the ATO
• Privacy and confidentiality
• ATO to make it easy for 
taxpayers to comply
ATO t l i d i i d
Outcomes




• e cus o an o  e  
Australian Business Register
• Manages the business 
operations of the Australian 
Valuation Office
•  o exp a n ec s ons ma e 
about taxpayers
• Taxpayers have a right to make a 
complaint
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
Confidence in the administration of aspects of Australia’s taxation and superannuation systems through
helping people understand their rights and obligations, improving ease of compliance and access to benefits,






Shape, design & build 
administrative systems
• The level of satisfaction with ATO input to new tax & superannuation policy & law 
design processes, as per the agreed ATO Treasury protocol
• The degree of success in implementing new administrative solutions & support 
products for taxpayers & their advisers in time for new laws
• The degree of success in implementing improved business systems & processes 
in accordance with intent, outcomes & promised user experience
• The degree of success in managing litigation & consequences of court & tribunal             
decisions
Management of revenue 
collection & transfers
• The level of collectable debt compared to total collections
• The level of community satisfaction with the management of revenue
collections & payments, registrations, client contact & debt collection.
Compliance assurance & 
support for revenue collections
• The successful implementation of specifically funded activities contributing to the 
collection of revenue
• The level of community satisfaction with the information & tools provided by the 
ATO
• The successful delivery of active compliance products
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Compliance assurance & 
support for transfers &
regulation of superannuation 
funds
• The ATO’s role in successfully delivering this programme is demonstrated by 
payments being made in accordance with the law
• etc.
Services to governments & 
agencies
• The level of client satisfaction with services provided by the Australian Valuation 
Office, in accordance with service commitments etc.








PSV’s building blocks – Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (UK) - benchmark
To make sure that the 
money is available to fund 
the UK’s public services 
and help families and 
individuals with targeted 
financial support
•HMRC collects & 
administers direct and 
indirect taxes
• HMRC also pays & 
administers: child benefit; 
child trust fund; and tax 
credits
• HMRC enforces & 






• Not for profit 
organisations
• Child & family 
b fit i i t
• Respect & honesty
• Help & support to get things right
• Professionalism & integrity
• HMRC will tackle/challenge those who 
break /bend the rules
• Protection of taxpayer information
• Taxpayer representation by third parties
• Low transaction costs
HMRC’ i t d d ill b t
Outcomes




a m n s ers: or er  ron er 
protection; environmental 
taxes; national minimum pay;  
& the recovery of student 
loans
ene  rec p en s
• Persons with 
disabilities
• s serv ce s an ar s w  e me
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
1 - The extent to which individuals  & businesses pay the tax due & receive the credits & payments to which 
they are entitled  improved
2 - Customers’ experiences of HMRC & the UK business environment improved 




Outcomes (2009) Some of the outcome indicators used
The extent to which individuals  & 
businesses pay the tax due & 
receive the credits & payments to 
which they are entitled  improved
• Increase tax & national insurance contributions actually received relative to the 
amounts that should be received
• Reduce the level of incorrect tax credit payments made as a result of error & 
fraud by 5%
Customers’ experiences of HMRC 
& the UK business environment
• Improve customers’ perception of their experience of dealing with HMRC
• Reduce by 10% the administrative burden of forms & returns on business    
improved
            
customers
• Reduce by 15% the administrative burden of audit and inspections on 
compliant business customers
• Improve accuracy of processing in large-volume business areas, achieving at 
least 96% on a composite indicator of accuracy
• Improve timeliness of processing in key areas
• Improve correctness of advice and information given, and actions taken, in 
respect of contact from customers
• Increase access to business facing content & transactions from 




The risk of the illicit import & 
export of material which might 
harm the UK’s physical & social 
well-being reduced
• Maintain seizures of: heroin & cocaine at 2006/07 levels; and products of 
animal origin at 2005/06 levels
• Maintain the level of operational performance in screening traffic entering the 
UK for radiation
• % of requests  for interventions from the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
fulfilled 








PSV’s building blocks – Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) - benchmark
•Act as an agent of the 
Government and provide 
service in administering, 
assessing, collecting and 
enforcing payment of 
taxes
•Advise the Government 
and represent Singapore 
i t ti ll tt
•IRAS acts as agent of the 
government to assess, 
collect and enforce payment 
of taxes. These include: 
income tax; property tax; 
motor vehicle taxes; customs 
& excise duties; goods and 
services tax; betting taxes; 





• Meet service standards
• Listen to taxpayer feedback
• Promote taxpayer education
• Make it easy for taxpayers to comply
• Enhance taxpayer experiences through 
technology
Outcomes




n erna ona y on ma ers 
relating to taxation
cas no ax; an  s amp u y
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
1 – A competitive tax environment that encourages enterprise and supports economic growth is fostered
2 – IRAS provides excellent services
3 – Taxpayer compliance costs are minimised
4 – All taxpayers comply
5 – IRAS is cost effective and efficient
6 – Staff are highly competent and satisfied
Developing
metrics
Outcomes (2009/10) Some of the outcome indicators used
A competitive tax 
environment that encourages 
enterprise & supports 
economic growth is fostered
• No of unilateral & bilateral advance pricing arrangements completed & documented
• International collaboration as demonstrated by IRAS participation in conferences & 
forums
• No of tax policies reviewed to assess competitiveness
IRAS provides excellent 
services
• % of calls answered within one minute during non-peak & peak periods compared 
to service targets
• % of emails received that were responded to within five working days           
• % of refunds processed within 30 days
• % of taxpayers satisfied with IRAS’ service
Taxpayer compliance costs 
are minimised
• No of SMEs applying for the Accounting Software Assistance Scheme
• No of seminars & hands-on workshops held
All taxpayers comply • % of income tax returns received by the filing due date
• No of non-compliant cases uncovered as a result of audits
• No of prosecution cases published in the media
• Value of cumulative tax arrears
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IRAS is cost effective & 
efficient
• Amount spent for every dollar of tax collected
Staff are highly competent & 
satisfied
• % of payroll cost spent on training staff
• Recreational, social & sporting events organised during the year








PSV’s building blocks – Mauritius Revenue Authority (MRA) - benchmark
• To continually reform 
and modernise revenue 
administration in order to 
manage and operate an 
effective and efficient 
revenue organisation 
comprising of highly 
motivated and skilled 
t ff
• MRA is an agent of the 
state responsible for : (1) the 
assessment of liability to, the 
collection of and the 
accountability for,
Tax; and (2) the 
management, operation and 






• Meet service standards
• Provide quality & efficiency service
• Be fair & just
• Assist & communicate clearly
Outcomes




s a . aws
1 – Voluntary compliance promoted
2 – Quality services provided
3 – People, processes & technology developed
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
4 – Trade facilitated & borders & society protected
5 – Good governance strengthened & corporate image improved
Outcomes (2011 to 2013) Some of indicators used (at a strategic initiative level)
Voluntary compliance 
promoted
• Actual collections as a % of projected collections
• % of individuals/companies filing returns
Developing
metrics
   
• % of cases selected through random audit
• No of new taxpayers registered as a result of matching 3rd party information
• No of cases recommended for prosecution
• % collections out of debt raised during the year
• No of MoUs signed/ business notes prepared
• No. of tax agents/practitioners registered
Quality services provided • Maximum number of days for issuing income tax/ VAT refunds
• % increase in electronic filing returns 
• Time within which taxpayers calling at an office are served
No of guidance notes on complex tax issues•        
People, processes & 
technology developed
• No of training days provided
• No of training programmes conducted based on staff needs
• No of staff rotated to ensure internal mobility & multi-skilling
• ITAS fully operational
• No of social events & other welfare initiatives conducted
• No. of Client Relationship Managers in  the Large Taxpayers Department (LTD)
Trade facilitated & borders & 
society protected
• New modules in the customs management system introduced
• Increase in number of economic operators submitting paperless customs 
declarations
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•% of declarations subjected to physical examination
• Passenger Clearance Time Index
• Goods Clearance Time Index
Good governance 
strengthened & corporate 
image improved
• Annual report prepared yearly
• ISO 9001:2008 introduced
• No of integrity bulletins published








PSV’s building blocks – Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (USA) - benchmark
• Provide America's 
taxpayers top quality 
service by helping them 
understand and meet 
their tax responsibilities 
and enforce the law with 
integrity and fairness to 
all.
• The IRS is organized to 
carry out the responsibilities 
of the Secretary of the 
Treasury under section 7801 
of the Internal Revenue 
Code. The secretary has full 
authority to administer and 
enforce the internal revenue 











• The IRS to effectively communicate the 
availability of existing taxpayer services, 
the availability of contact channels, and 
an overall awareness of their tax 
obligations & benefits
• To have convenient access to 
information to assist them in meeting their 
t bli ti & l i i th t
Outcomes




aws an  as e power o 
create an agency to enforce 
these laws. The IRS was 
created based on this 
legislative grant. 
• ommun es ax o ga ons  reso v ng ssues a  
may arise
• A quality experience from the IRS 
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
1 – Services improved to make voluntary compliance easier 
2 – The law enforced to ensure everyone meets their obligations to pay taxes 
3 – Strategic foundations in place as a result of  investments for high performance 
Developing
metrics
Outcomes (2009 - 2013) Some of the outcome indicators used
Services improved to make 
voluntary compliance easier
• American Customer Satisfaction Index – Customer satisfaction score for individual 
income tax filers measured on a  0 – 100 scale. Links customer expectations & 
perceptions of satisfaction 
• e-File rate – % of all major tax returns filed electronically by individuals, businesses, 
& tax exempt entities 
• Taxpayer satisfaction with IRS services
• Timeliness of data delivery   
The law  enforced to ensure 
everyone meets their 
obligations to pay taxes
• Voluntary compliance rate – The amount of tax for a given year that is paid 
voluntarily and timely, expressed as a percentage of the estimate of true tax liability 
for that year reflects the impact of non-filing, underreporting, and underpayment 
combined
• Non filers – Number of individuals who do not file income tax returns, but have an 
obligation to do so 
• Enforcement contacts
• Non-filers
• Taxpayer perception of fairness of enforcement
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Strategic foundations in 
place as a result of 
investments for higher 
performance
• New hire retention rate
• Employee satisfaction & engagement








PSV’s building blocks – Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) - benchmark
To administer tax, 
benefits, & related 
programs, & to ensure 
compliance on behalf of 
governments across 
Canada, thereby 
contributing to the 
ongoing economic & 
i l ll b i f
•CRA administers: tax 
laws for the Government 
of Canada and for most 
provinces and 
territories; and 
various social and 
economic benefit and 
incentive programs 






• Not for profit 
organisations
• Child & family 
b fit i i t
The right to: 
• Receive entitlements & to pay no more 
& no less than what is required by law
• Privacy & confidentiality
• Formal review & subsequent appeal
• Professional, courteous & fair treatment
•Complete, accurate, clear &timely 
information
A i di id l t t i t
Outcomes




soc a  we - e ng o  
Canadians
e vere  roug  e 
tax system
ene  rec p en s
• Persons with 
disabilities
• s an n v ua , no  o pay ncome ax 
amounts in dispute before an impartial 
review 
• Expect CRA to publish service 
standards etc.
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
• CRA 1 - Taxpayers meet their obligations and Canada’s revenue base is protected
•CRA 2 - Eligible families and individuals receive timely and correct benefit payments





n erme a e ou comes xamp es o  ou come n ca ors
A • Taxpayers, businesses & registrants have 
access to timely & accurate information
• % of calls answered within 2 minutes
• Average no of days taken to issue an advance income tax 
rulings and interpretations
• % of rulings/responses issued within target timeframes
• % of accurately update internal reference materials for taxpayer 
services and charities’ agents
• % of callers who reach our telephone service
• Non compliance is detected & addressed • % of registered plan audits/reviews compared to planned-            
B •Assessment & payment processing are timely 
& accurate
• % of  CIT returns processed within target timeframe
• % of individuals /corporates who file electronically
• % of funds from non-electronic payments deposited within 24 
hrs of receipt
• % of returns assessed accurately
• % of taxpayer-requested adjustment reassessed accurately
C •Tax and non-tax debt are resolved on a timely 
basis and are within targeted levels
• % of intake resolved in the year of intake
• Non-tax debt collected (in US$)
• Dollar value of Tax Service Officers (TSO) production as a % of
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dollar value of TSO intake of new accounts receivable
• Dollar value of TSO tax accounts receivable older than five 
years
• TSO cash collection
• Non-tax debt collected
• Non-compliance is detected & addressed • Fiscal value of non-compliance (non -filers and registrants)








PSV’s building blocks – Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) - benchmark
To administer tax, 
benefits, & related 
programs, & to ensure 
compliance on behalf of 
governments across 
Canada, thereby 
contributing to the 
ongoing economic & 
i l ll b i f
•CRA administers: tax 
laws for the Government 
of Canada and for most 
provinces and 
territories; and 
various social and 
economic benefit and 
incentive programs 






• Not for profit 
organisations
• Child & family 
b fit i i t
The right to: 
• Receive entitlements & to pay no more 
& no less than what is required by law
• Privacy & confidentiality
• Formal review & subsequent appeal
• Professional, courteous & fair treatment
•Complete, accurate, clear &timely 
information
A i di id l t t i t
Outcomes




soc a  we - e ng o  
Canadians
e vere  roug  e 
tax system
ene  rec p en s
• Persons with 
disabilities
• s an n v ua , no  o pay ncome ax 
amounts in dispute before an impartial 
review 
• Expect CRA to publish service 
standards etc.
Raw metrics
How will we know that we have been successful in achieving outcomes?
• CRA 1 - Taxpayers meet their obligations and Canada’s revenue base is protected
•CRA 2 - Eligible families and individuals receive timely and correct benefit payments
P I t di t t (2009/10) E l f t i di t
Developing
metrics
rogram n erme a e ou comes xamp es o  ou come n ca ors
D • Reporting compliance • No of files audited as a % of estimate
• Percentage of voluntary disclosures that are fully compliant with 
VDP policies and procedures as reviewed as part of our Quality 
Assurance Program
• Financial recoveries as a % of estimates
• % of cases resulting in a change
• Processing time for voluntary disclosures (days)
E • Taxpayers receive an impartial & 
timely review of contested decisions
• Workable days to complete a case
• Average age of workable inventory (days)         
• Appeals activities that met standards for consistency/ 
transparency
• % service standard for initial contact
• Service complaints & taxpayer relief 
provisions are administered consistently
• % of service complaints acknowledged within 48hrs
• % of taxpayers contacted within 15 days
• % taxpayer relied provisions – consistent application
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Key: A= Taxpayer and business assistance; B= Assessment of returns & payment processing; C= Accounts receivable & returns 
compliance; D= Reporting compliance; E= Appeals. Not included – F= Benefit programs; and G= Internal services
Note – Each intermediate outcome is assigned a performance rating  (Met, mostly met or not met). CRA also rates the quality of the data 
as good, reasonable or weak
Volumetrics – CRA- benchmark
A
•No of enquiries handled p.a.
• No of visits to CRA’s website p.a.
• No of requests for advance rulings processed p.a.
B •No of individual returns processed p.a.• No of payments handled p.a.
No of additional ret rns recei ed d ring the earC •    u  v  u   y• % of the dollar value of new debt intake resolved
• No of audits and their fiscal impact p.a.
D
E
• No of cases referred to Public Prosecution 
Services Canada p.a.
•No of disputes resolved p.a.






Annex C: Frequency tables 
 
 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford C2 
DBA  Research Thesis 
 
 
   
Frequency tables - aggregated 
ARA 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid KRA 17 33.3 33.3 33.3
SARS 19 37.3 37.3 70.6
TRA 15 29.4 29.4 100.0
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O1KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 43 84.3 84.3 84.3 
Quite important 7 13.7 13.7 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O2KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 36 70.6 70.6 70.6 
Quite important 15 29.4 29.4 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O2KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 28 54.9 54.9 54.9 
Quite important 20 39.2 39.2 94.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O3KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 29 56.9 56.9 56.9 
Quite important 20 39.2 39.2 96.1 
No strong opinion 1 2.0 2.0 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
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Q1O3KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 35 68.6 68.6 68.6 
Quite important 16 31.4 31.4 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O3KPI3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 37 72.5 72.5 72.5 
Quite important 12 23.5 23.5 96.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O3KPI4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 25 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Quite important 21 41.2 41.2 90.2 
No strong opinion 4 7.8 7.8 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O4KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 35 68.6 68.6 68.6 
Quite important 16 31.4 31.4 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O4KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 38 74.5 74.5 74.5 
Quite important 12 23.5 23.5 98.0 
No strong opinion 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
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Q1O4KPI3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 24 47.1 47.1 47.1 
Quite important 22 43.1 43.1 90.2 
No strong opinion 5 9.8 9.8 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O4KPI4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 25 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Quite important 21 41.2 41.2 90.2 
No strong opinion 5 9.8 9.8 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O4KPI5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 26 51.0 51.0 51.0 
Quite important 24 47.1 47.1 98.0 
No strong opinion 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O4KPI6 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 28 54.9 54.9 54.9 
Quite important 20 39.2 39.2 94.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O5KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 25 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Quite important 19 37.3 37.3 86.3 
No strong opinion 4 7.8 7.8 94.1 
Not very important 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
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Q1O5KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 13 25.5 25.5 25.5 
Quite important 22 43.1 43.1 68.6 
No strong opinion 11 21.6 21.6 90.2 
Not very important 5 9.8 9.8 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O5KPI3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 23 45.1 45.1 45.1 
Quite important 21 41.2 41.2 86.3 
No strong opinion 4 7.8 7.8 94.1 
Not very important 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O5KPI4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 12 23.5 23.5 23.5 
Quite important 20 39.2 39.2 62.7 
No strong opinion 16 31.4 31.4 94.1 
Not very important 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O5KPI5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 29 56.9 56.9 56.9 
Quite important 15 29.4 29.4 86.3 
No strong opinion 7 13.7 13.7 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O6KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 35 68.6 68.6 68.6 
Quite important 12 23.5 23.5 92.2 
No strong opinion 3 5.9 5.9 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
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Q1O5KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 13 25.5 25.5 25.5 
Quite important 22 43.1 43.1 68.6 
No strong opinion 11 21.6 21.6 90.2 
Not very important 5 9.8 9.8 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O6KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 25 49.0 49.0 49.0 
Quite important 18 35.3 35.3 84.3 
No strong opinion 7 13.7 13.7 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O6KPI3 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 17 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Quite important 23 45.1 45.1 78.4 
No strong opinion 9 17.6 17.6 96.1 
Not very important 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O6KPI4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 26 51.0 51.0 51.0 
Quite important 22 43.1 43.1 94.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 98.0 
Not very important 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q1O6KPI5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 35 68.6 68.6 68.6 
Quite important 16 31.4 31.4 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
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Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 27 52.9 52.9 52.9 
Quite important 22 43.1 43.1 96.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q2O1KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 28 54.9 54.9 54.9 
Quite important 10 19.6 19.6 74.5 
No strong opinion 11 21.6 21.6 96.1 
Not very important 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q2O1KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 27 52.9 52.9 52.9 
Quite important 11 21.6 21.6 74.5 
No strong opinion 11 21.6 21.6 96.1 
Not very important 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q2O3KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 31 60.8 60.8 60.8 
Quite important 14 27.5 27.5 88.2 
No strong opinion 3 5.9 5.9 94.1 
Not very important 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q2O4KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 33 64.7 64.7 64.7 
Quite important 16 31.4 31.4 96.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
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Q1O6KPI6 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 27 52.9 52.9 52.9 
Quite important 22 43.1 43.1 96.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q2O4KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 23 45.1 45.1 45.1 
Quite important 17 33.3 33.3 78.4 
No strong opinion 8 15.7 15.7 94.1 
Not very important 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q2O9KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Very important 14 27.5 27.5 27.5 
Quite important 8 15.7 15.7 43.1 
No strong opinion 18 35.3 35.3 78.4 
Not very important 8 15.7 15.7 94.1 
Not at all important 3 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q3O3KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 32 62.7 62.7 62.7 
Agree 19 37.3 37.3 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q3O3KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 15 29.4 29.4 29.4 
Agree 20 39.2 39.2 68.6 
No strong opinion 12 23.5 23.5 92.2 
Disagree 4 7.8 7.8 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford C9 
DBA  Research Thesis 
 
 




Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 23 45.1 45.1 45.1 
Agree 22 43.1 43.1 88.2 
No strong opinion 5 9.8 9.8 98.0 
Strongly disagree 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q3O3KPI4 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 10 19.6 19.6 19.6 
Agree 30 58.8 58.8 78.4 
No strong opinion 6 11.8 11.8 90.2 
Disagree 4 7.8 7.8 98.0 
Strongly disagree 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q3O3KPI5 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 22 43.1 43.1 43.1 
Agree 24 47.1 47.1 90.2 
No strong opinion 3 5.9 5.9 96.1 
Disagree 1 2.0 2.0 98.0 
Strongly disagree 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q3O3KPI6 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 30 58.8 58.8 58.8 
Agree 19 37.3 37.3 96.1 
No strong opinion 1 2.0 2.0 98.0 
Strongly disagree 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
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Q3O3KPI7 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 25 49.0 50.0 50.0 
Agree 18 35.3 36.0 86.0 
No strong opinion 6 11.8 12.0 98.0 
Disagree 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 50 98.0 100.0  
Missing System 1 2.0   
Total 51 100.0   
Q3O4KPI1 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 29 56.9 56.9 56.9 
Agree 21 41.2 41.2 98.0 
No strong opinion 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
Q3O4KPI2 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 33 64.7 64.7 64.7 
Agree 15 29.4 29.4 94.1 
No strong opinion 2 3.9 3.9 98.0 
Disagree 1 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 51 100.0 100.0  
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Crosstabs 
ARA * Q1O1KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O1KPI1 
Total Very important Quite important 
Not very 
important 
ARA KRA Count 13 4 0 17 
% within ARA 76.5% 23.5% .0% 100.0% 
SARS Count 16 2 1 19 
% within ARA 84.2% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0% 
TRA Count 14 1 0 15 
% within ARA 93.3% 6.7% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 43 7 1 51 
% within ARA 84.3% 13.7% 2.0% 100.0% 
ARA * Q1O2KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 Q1O2KPI1 
Total Very important Quite important 
ARA KRA Count 15 2 17
% within ARA 88.2% 11.8% 100.0%
SARS Count 12 7 19
% within ARA 63.2% 36.8% 100.0%
TRA Count 9 6 15
% within ARA 60.0% 40.0% 100.0%
Total Count 36 15 51
% within ARA 70.6% 29.4% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O2KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O2KPI2 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 11 5 1 
% within ARA 64.7% 29.4% 5.9% 
SARS Count 8 10 0 
% within ARA 42.1% 52.6% .0% 
TRA Count 9 5 1 
% within ARA 60.0% 33.3% 6.7% 
Total Count 28 20 2 
% within ARA 54.9% 39.2% 3.9% 
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ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O3KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O3KPI1 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 5 1 
% within ARA 58.8% 29.4% 5.9% 
SARS Count 11 8 0 
% within ARA 57.9% 42.1% .0% 
TRA Count 8 7 0 
% within ARA 53.3% 46.7% .0% 
Total Count 29 20 1 
% within ARA 56.9% 39.2% 2.0% 






ARA KRA Count 1 17
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 0 19
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
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ARA * Q1O3KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 Q1O3KPI2 
Total Very important Quite important 
ARA KRA Count 12 5 17
% within ARA 70.6% 29.4% 100.0%
SARS Count 14 5 19
% within ARA 73.7% 26.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 9 6 15
% within ARA 60.0% 40.0% 100.0%
Total Count 35 16 51
% within ARA 68.6% 31.4% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O3KPI3 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O3KPI3 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 14 2 1 17 
% within ARA 82.4% 11.8% 5.9% 100.0% 
SARS Count 12 7 0 19 
% within ARA 63.2% 36.8% .0% 100.0% 
TRA Count 11 3 1 15 
% within ARA 73.3% 20.0% 6.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 37 12 2 51 
% within ARA 72.5% 23.5% 3.9% 100.0% 
ARA * Q1O3KPI4 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O3KPI4 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 7 10 0 
% within ARA 41.2% 58.8% .0% 
SARS Count 9 7 2 
% within ARA 47.4% 36.8% 10.5% 
TRA Count 9 4 2 
% within ARA 60.0% 26.7% 13.3% 
Total Count 25 21 4 
% within ARA 49.0% 41.2% 7.8% 
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ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O4KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 Q1O4KPI1 
Total Very important Quite important 
ARA KRA Count 16 1 17
% within ARA 94.1% 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 9 10 19
% within ARA 47.4% 52.6% 100.0%
TRA Count 10 5 15
% within ARA 66.7% 33.3% 100.0%
Total Count 35 16 51
% within ARA 68.6% 31.4% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O4KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O4KPI2 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 15 1 1 17 
% within ARA 88.2% 5.9% 5.9% 100.0% 
SARS Count 10 9 0 19 
% within ARA 52.6% 47.4% .0% 100.0% 
TRA Count 13 2 0 15 
% within ARA 86.7% 13.3% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 38 12 1 51 
% within ARA 74.5% 23.5% 2.0% 100.0% 
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ARA * Q1O4KPI3 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O4KPI3 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 4 3 17 
% within ARA 58.8% 23.5% 17.6% 100.0% 
SARS Count 7 10 2 19 
% within ARA 36.8% 52.6% 10.5% 100.0% 
TRA Count 7 8 0 15 
% within ARA 46.7% 53.3% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 24 22 5 51 
% within ARA 47.1% 43.1% 9.8% 100.0% 
ARA * Q1O4KPI4 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O4KPI4 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 8 8 1 17 
% within ARA 47.1% 47.1% 5.9% 100.0% 
SARS Count 10 6 3 19 
% within ARA 52.6% 31.6% 15.8% 100.0% 
TRA Count 7 7 1 15 
% within ARA 46.7% 46.7% 6.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 25 21 5 51 
% within ARA 49.0% 41.2% 9.8% 100.0% 
ARA * Q1O4KPI5 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O4KPI5 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 7 0 17 
% within ARA 58.8% 41.2% .0% 100.0% 
SARS Count 7 11 1 19 
% within ARA 36.8% 57.9% 5.3% 100.0% 
TRA Count 9 6 0 15 
% within ARA 60.0% 40.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 26 24 1 51 
% within ARA 51.0% 47.1% 2.0% 100.0% 
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ARA * Q1O4KPI6 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O4KPI6 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 6 0 
% within ARA 58.8% 35.3% .0% 
SARS Count 10 8 1 
% within ARA 52.6% 42.1% 5.3% 
TRA Count 8 6 1 
% within ARA 53.3% 40.0% 6.7% 
Total Count 28 20 2 
% within ARA 54.9% 39.2% 3.9% 






ARA KRA Count 1 17
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 0 19
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O5KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O5KPI1 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 11 6 0 
% within ARA 64.7% 35.3% .0% 
SARS Count 4 10 2 
% within ARA 21.1% 52.6% 10.5% 
TRA Count 10 3 2 
% within ARA 66.7% 20.0% 13.3% 
Total Count 25 19 4 
% within ARA 49.0% 37.3% 7.8% 
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ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 3 19
% within ARA 15.8% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 3 51
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O5KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O5KPI2 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 5 6 4 
% within ARA 29.4% 35.3% 23.5% 
SARS Count 4 8 5 
% within ARA 21.1% 42.1% 26.3% 
TRA Count 4 8 2 
% within ARA 26.7% 53.3% 13.3% 
Total Count 13 22 11 
% within ARA 25.5% 43.1% 21.6% 






ARA KRA Count 2 17
% within ARA 11.8% 100.0%
SARS Count 2 19
% within ARA 10.5% 100.0%
TRA Count 1 15
% within ARA 6.7% 100.0%
Total Count 5 51
% within ARA 9.8% 100.0%
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ARA * Q1O5KPI3 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O5KPI3 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 7 7 1 
% within ARA 41.2% 41.2% 5.9% 
SARS Count 8 7 3 
% within ARA 42.1% 36.8% 15.8% 
TRA Count 8 7 0 
% within ARA 53.3% 46.7% .0% 
Total Count 23 21 4 
% within ARA 45.1% 41.2% 7.8% 






ARA KRA Count 2 17
% within ARA 11.8% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 3 51
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O5KPI4 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O5KPI4 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 3 6 6 
% within ARA 17.6% 35.3% 35.3% 
SARS Count 4 9 5 
% within ARA 21.1% 47.4% 26.3% 
TRA Count 5 5 5 
% within ARA 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
Total Count 12 20 16 
% within ARA 23.5% 39.2% 31.4% 
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ARA KRA Count 2 17
% within ARA 11.8% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 3 51
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O5KPI5 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O5KPI5 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 5 2 17 
% within ARA 58.8% 29.4% 11.8% 100.0% 
SARS Count 10 6 3 19 
% within ARA 52.6% 31.6% 15.8% 100.0% 
TRA Count 9 4 2 15 
% within ARA 60.0% 26.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 29 15 7 51 
% within ARA 56.9% 29.4% 13.7% 100.0% 
ARA * Q1O6KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O6KPI1 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 13 3 1 
% within ARA 76.5% 17.6% 5.9% 
SARS Count 12 5 2 
% within ARA 63.2% 26.3% 10.5% 
TRA Count 10 4 0 
% within ARA 66.7% 26.7% .0% 
Total Count 35 12 3 
% within ARA 68.6% 23.5% 5.9% 
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ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 0 19
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
TRA Count 1 15
% within ARA 6.7% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O6KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O6KPI2 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 8 6 2 
% within ARA 47.1% 35.3% 11.8% 
SARS Count 6 8 5 
% within ARA 31.6% 42.1% 26.3% 
TRA Count 11 4 0 
% within ARA 73.3% 26.7% .0% 
Total Count 25 18 7 
% within ARA 49.0% 35.3% 13.7% 






ARA KRA Count 1 17
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 0 19
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
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ARA * Q1O6KPI3 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O6KPI3 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 8 7 2 
% within ARA 47.1% 41.2% 11.8% 
SARS Count 4 7 6 
% within ARA 21.1% 36.8% 31.6% 
TRA Count 5 9 1 
% within ARA 33.3% 60.0% 6.7% 
Total Count 17 23 9 
% within ARA 33.3% 45.1% 17.6% 






ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 2 19
% within ARA 10.5% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 2 51
% within ARA 3.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O6KPI4 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O6KPI4 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 9 8 0 
% within ARA 52.9% 47.1% .0% 
SARS Count 6 10 2 
% within ARA 31.6% 52.6% 10.5% 
TRA Count 11 4 0 
% within ARA 73.3% 26.7% .0% 
Total Count 26 22 2 
% within ARA 51.0% 43.1% 3.9% 
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ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O6KPI5 Crosstabulation 
 Q1O6KPI5 
Total Very important Quite important 
ARA KRA Count 12 5 17
% within ARA 70.6% 29.4% 100.0%
SARS Count 11 8 19
% within ARA 57.9% 42.1% 100.0%
TRA Count 12 3 15
% within ARA 80.0% 20.0% 100.0%
Total Count 35 16 51
% within ARA 68.6% 31.4% 100.0%
ARA * Q1O6KPI6 Crosstabulation 
 
Q1O6KPI6 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 9 7 1 17 
% within ARA 52.9% 41.2% 5.9% 100.0% 
SARS Count 10 9 0 19 
% within ARA 52.6% 47.4% .0% 100.0% 
TRA Count 8 6 1 15 
% within ARA 53.3% 40.0% 6.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 27 22 2 51 
% within ARA 52.9% 43.1% 3.9% 100.0% 
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ARA * Q2O1KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q2O1KPI1 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 2 5 
% within ARA 58.8% 11.8% 29.4% 
SARS Count 10 5 3 
% within ARA 52.6% 26.3% 15.8% 
TRA Count 8 3 3 
% within ARA 53.3% 20.0% 20.0% 
Total Count 28 10 11 
% within ARA 54.9% 19.6% 21.6% 






ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 1 15
% within ARA 6.7% 100.0%
Total Count 2 51
% within ARA 3.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q2O1KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q2O1KPI2 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 11 1 5 
% within ARA 64.7% 5.9% 29.4% 
SARS Count 8 7 3 
% within ARA 42.1% 36.8% 15.8% 
TRA Count 8 3 3 
% within ARA 53.3% 20.0% 20.0% 
Total Count 27 11 11 
% within ARA 52.9% 21.6% 21.6% 
 
Elizabeth Kariuki University of Bradford C24 
DBA  Research Thesis 
 
 
   






ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 1 15
% within ARA 6.7% 100.0%
Total Count 2 51
% within ARA 3.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q2O3KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q2O3KPI1 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 4 1 
% within ARA 58.8% 23.5% 5.9% 
SARS Count 12 4 2 
% within ARA 63.2% 21.1% 10.5% 
TRA Count 9 6 0 
% within ARA 60.0% 40.0% .0% 
Total Count 31 14 3 
% within ARA 60.8% 27.5% 5.9% 






ARA KRA Count 2 17
% within ARA 11.8% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 3 51
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
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ARA * Q2O4KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q2O4KPI1 
Total Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 13 4 0 17 
% within ARA 76.5% 23.5% .0% 100.0% 
SARS Count 8 9 2 19 
% within ARA 42.1% 47.4% 10.5% 100.0% 
TRA Count 12 3 0 15 
% within ARA 80.0% 20.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 33 16 2 51 
% within ARA 64.7% 31.4% 3.9% 100.0% 
ARA * Q2O4KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q2O4KPI2 
Very important Quite important 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 10 3 3 
% within ARA 58.8% 17.6% 17.6% 
SARS Count 5 10 3 
% within ARA 26.3% 52.6% 15.8% 
TRA Count 8 4 2 
% within ARA 53.3% 26.7% 13.3% 
Total Count 23 17 8 
% within ARA 45.1% 33.3% 15.7% 






ARA KRA Count 1 17
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 1 15
% within ARA 6.7% 100.0%
Total Count 3 51
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
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ARA * Q2O9KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q2O9KPI1 





ARA KRA Count 4 2 6 4
% within ARA 23.5% 11.8% 35.3% 23.5%
SARS Count 3 4 8 2
% within ARA 15.8% 21.1% 42.1% 10.5%
TRA Count 7 2 4 2
% within ARA 46.7% 13.3% 26.7% 13.3%
Total Count 14 8 18 8
% within ARA 27.5% 15.7% 35.3% 15.7%




Not at all 
important 
ARA KRA Count 1 17
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 2 19
% within ARA 10.5% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 3 51
% within ARA 5.9% 100.0%
ARA * Q3O3KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 Q3O3KPI1 
Total Strongly agree Agree 
ARA KRA Count 13 4 17
% within ARA 76.5% 23.5% 100.0%
SARS Count 9 10 19
% within ARA 47.4% 52.6% 100.0%
TRA Count 10 5 15
% within ARA 66.7% 33.3% 100.0%
Total Count 32 19 51
% within ARA 62.7% 37.3% 100.0%
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ARA * Q3O3KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O3KPI2 
Total Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion Disagree 
ARA KRA Count 7 5 4 1 17
% within ARA 41.2% 29.4% 23.5% 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 2 10 6 1 19
% within ARA 10.5% 52.6% 31.6% 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 6 5 2 2 15
% within ARA 40.0% 33.3% 13.3% 13.3% 100.0%
Total Count 15 20 12 4 51
% within ARA 29.4% 39.2% 23.5% 7.8% 100.0%
ARA * Q3O3KPI3 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O3KPI3 
Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 9 7 1
% within ARA 52.9% 41.2% 5.9%
SARS Count 6 10 2
% within ARA 31.6% 52.6% 10.5%
TRA Count 8 5 2
% within ARA 53.3% 33.3% 13.3%
Total Count 23 22 5
% within ARA 45.1% 43.1% 9.8%






ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
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ARA * Q3O3KPI4 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O3KPI4 
Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion Disagree 
ARA KRA Count 4 12 0 1 
% within ARA 23.5% 70.6% .0% 5.9% 
SARS Count 2 13 2 1 
% within ARA 10.5% 68.4% 10.5% 5.3% 
TRA Count 4 5 4 2 
% within ARA 26.7% 33.3% 26.7% 13.3% 
Total Count 10 30 6 4 
% within ARA 19.6% 58.8% 11.8% 7.8% 






ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q3O3KPI5 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O3KPI5 
Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion Disagree 
ARA KRA Count 8 8 1 0 
% within ARA 47.1% 47.1% 5.9% .0% 
SARS Count 8 9 1 0 
% within ARA 42.1% 47.4% 5.3% .0% 
TRA Count 6 7 1 1 
% within ARA 40.0% 46.7% 6.7% 6.7% 
Total Count 22 24 3 1 
% within ARA 43.1% 47.1% 5.9% 2.0% 
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ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q3O3KPI6 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O3KPI6 
Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 12 5 0
% within ARA 70.6% 29.4% .0%
SARS Count 9 8 1
% within ARA 47.4% 42.1% 5.3%
TRA Count 9 6 0
% within ARA 60.0% 40.0% .0%
Total Count 30 19 1
% within ARA 58.8% 37.3% 2.0%






ARA KRA Count 0 17
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 1 19
% within ARA 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 0 15
% within ARA .0% 100.0%
Total Count 1 51
% within ARA 2.0% 100.0%
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ARA * Q3O3KPI7 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O3KPI7 
Total Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion Disagree 
ARA KRA Count 11 5 1 0 17
% within ARA 64.7% 29.4% 5.9% .0% 100.0%
SARS Count 8 8 2 1 19
% within ARA 42.1% 42.1% 10.5% 5.3% 100.0%
TRA Count 6 5 3 0 14
% within ARA 42.9% 35.7% 21.4% .0% 100.0%
Total Count 25 18 6 1 50
% within ARA 50.0% 36.0% 12.0% 2.0% 100.0%
ARA * Q3O4KPI1 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O4KPI1 
Total Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion 
ARA KRA Count 8 9 0 17 
% within ARA 47.1% 52.9% .0% 100.0% 
SARS Count 11 8 0 19 
% within ARA 57.9% 42.1% .0% 100.0% 
TRA Count 10 4 1 15 
% within ARA 66.7% 26.7% 6.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 29 21 1 51 
% within ARA 56.9% 41.2% 2.0% 100.0% 
ARA * Q3O4KPI2 Crosstabulation 
 
Q3O4KPI2 
Total Strongly agree Agree 
No strong 
opinion Disagree 
ARA KRA Count 10 6 0 1 17
% within ARA 58.8% 35.3% .0% 5.9% 100.0%
SARS Count 14 4 1 0 19
% within ARA 73.7% 21.1% 5.3% .0% 100.0%
TRA Count 9 5 1 0 15
% within ARA 60.0% 33.3% 6.7% .0% 100.0%
Total Count 33 15 2 1 51
% within ARA 64.7% 29.4% 3.9% 2.0% 100.0%
 
